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Making war on village and forest: southern Mozambique during the sixteen-year conflict, 1976-1992

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MAKING WAR ON VILLAGE AND FOREST: SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE DURING THE SIXTEEN-YEAR CONFLICT, 1976-1992

by

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

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PH.D. THESIS

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To Diane, Tshihiwa, Lirando and Mveleki

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ABSTRACT

The history of Mozambique has been punctuated by episodes of warfare and natural calamities. This study looks at the history of the civil war that affected Mozambique from 1976 to 1992 beyond the framework of national state and global politics. It attempts to make the voices of villagers who suffered the hardship of war more audible through the exploration of histories of life. It offers a more complex discussion of social relationships and social change during the war by looking at villagers and their environments beyond victimization narratives.

It contends that apart from being the major targets of the war, villagers and their environments had agency in the conflict. It argues that environmental factors influenced the course of war and exacerbated the harmful effects of war on local people and natural resources. It observes that the civil war affected an agrarian society which was particularly dependent on a rich and diverse yet disrupted ecosystem therefore, studying the civil war with focus on the environmental context shows the true cost of warfare, and how it was experienced by rural society.

It shows that humans and wildlife were in times of peace interconnected in symbiotic relationship which included episodes of cooperation and conflict. Elephants, hippos, monkeys, bush pigs, and birds invaded farms in search of food. Humans relied on wild animals and plants to improve their diet and to mitigate the impact of drought and disease. These symbiotic relationships were heavily disturbed by warfare and drought as villagers were displaced from lands about which they had micro-geographical knowledge to mitigate the effects of recurrent droughts.

PUBLIC ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I was born and raised in rural southern Mozambique and I experienced the hardship of the civil war and drought that affected the region in the 1980s and 1990s. From the age of ten I still remember clearly seeing women and men in our village carrying water and food to supply government troops. I still remember sleepless nights spent in dark forests to escape kidnapping. I also remember seeing the rebel forces raiding our village and kidnapping people to serve as porters of plundered goods to their military bases located several miles away. Some of the kidnapped, including my one year old baby sister and my cousins, disappeared forever, never to be seen again.

In addition to military confrontation and violence against civilians, I also witnessed what was, in effect, ecological warfare. Thousands of wild animals and forests were decimated by both civilians and soldiers as they struggled for wood for fuel and construction and for illicit commodities such as ivory and rhinoceros horns. In some regions, people seeking refuge in forests were also exposed to attacks by ferocious animals such as poisonous snakes and lions. As forests became simultaneously battlefields and safe havens, people and wild animals, insects and serpents struggled for survival in a fierce ecological competition over natural resources.

Experiences such as the ones described above are scant in the literature of the civil war in Mozambique. When I went to study History in college I realized that villagers and the village setting were underrepresented in the history of the Mozambican civil war. This

observation motivated me to focus my research on warfare, environment, natural resources and society. In fact, one of the purposes of this dissertation is to investigate whether my memories of the civil war are widely shared, and whether my impressions of the war are representative of what many people experienced.

Research Problem and Objectives

The history of Mozambique has been punctuated by episodes of warfare and natural calamities. The nineteenth century witnessed widespread violence related to the demand for slaves to supply Brazilian and Mascarene Islands plantations. Moreover, in this period, Mozambique experienced the Portuguese military campaigns of colonial occupation. The early twentieth century was marked by the extension of the First World War confrontations in northern Mozambique (1917-1918). After a period of peace following the end of the First World War, the 1960s opened another cycle of warfare with the liberation struggle (1962-1974) and, following independence in 1975, a civil war between the ruling party, the Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), and the rebel movement, Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO), (1976-1992). In addition to these military confrontations, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Mozambique and the rest of southeastern Africa experienced severe droughts.[1] These man-made and natural

[1] For general history of Mozambique see Malyn Newitt, *A History of Mozambique* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); HEDGES, David, coord. *História de Moçambique* (Vol. 2): *Moçambique no Auge do Colonialismo, 1930-1961*, 2ª ed., (Maputo: Livraria Universitária, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 1999). For detailed study of drought in Southern Africa, see Mike Davis, *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of the Third World* (New York: Verso, 2001); Malyn, Newitt D.D., "Drought in Mozambique, 1823-1831" *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 15, 1 (1988): 15-35; For the chronology of natural calamities in Mozambique see Gerhard Liesegang, "Famines, Epidemics, Plagues and Long Periods of Warfare and Their Effects in Mozambique, 1700-1975," *Conference on Zimbabwean History: Progress and Development* (Harare, 23-27 August, 1983). Borges Coelho, João Paulo, " Estado, Comunidades e

catastrophes affected mainly the rural areas population putting in jeopardy the welfare of more than eighty per cent of Mozambicans.

Despite the coincidence of long periods of warfare and ecological disturbance, the relationship between the two phenomena is not fully researched. Scholars of the civil war in Mozambique put more emphasis on international political factors such as colonialism, Cold War, and decolonization. The civil war is often studied as part of the global Cold War in southern Africa. In this approach, FRELIMO and RENAMO are presented as proxies of the Soviet Union, the U.S. and their allies.[2] Those who see the conflict in national perspective accuse Portuguese colonialist renegades and FRELIMO's internal struggles as causes responsible for the outbreak of war in Mozambique.[3] This approach neglects the agency of rural society in varied environmental settings. It ignores the facts that the coincidence of war and drought provoked the shortage of food supplies contributing for the depletion of natural resources on which villagers relied in drought stricken areas. Moreover, drought and food scarcity made it difficult for villagers assisting the military with supplies and lead the belligerents to resort to violence against the civilians who were

Calamidades Naturais no Moçambique Rural," in *Moçambique e a Reinvenção da Emancipação Social,* ed. Boaventura Sousa Santos e Teresa Cruz e Silva (Maputo: Centro de Formação Judiciária, 2004).

[2] Joseph Hanlon, *The Revolution under Fire* (London: Zed, 1984); Alex Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique* (London: James Curry, 1991); William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994); Otto Roesch, "Renamo and Peasantry in Southern Mozambique: a View from Gaza Province." *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 26, no. 3 (1992): 462-484."; Janice Love, *Sothern Africa in the World Politics: Local Aspirations and Global Entanglements* (Boulder Colo.: Westview Press, 2005); Sue Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).

[3] Bernabé Lucas Nkomo, *Urias Simango: Um Homem, Uma Causa* (Maputo: Edições Nova Africa, 2003); João M. Cabrita *Mozambique: The Tortuous Road to Democracy* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

supposed to be the backbone of guerrilla insurgency. Half a million people or more were killed by war and its collateral effects such as famine and diseases.[4]

Unlike previous studies of the civil war in Mozambique which focus on regional, national and international geopolitics at the expense of more local and individual approaches, I take a socio-environmental approach to warfare in Mozambique. Like the renowned Italian ecologist Almo Farina, I see warfare as "a process of societal economic, cultural and environmental disturbance and a powerful agent of societal change, geographical alteration, and ecosystem and landscape perturbation."[5] Without neglecting the role of Cold War politics, I emphasize the story of suffering and damage that occurred in rural southern Mozambique due to the conflict. I argue that villagers were the major players in the war because they lived in the terrain of struggle. Villagers experienced the war as a struggle for survival involving friends and relatives or people who lived together before the war and reunited after the end of the conflict. I illustrate the broader dimension of rural hardship by showing how the war disrupted ecologies and environmental relationships in the countryside making villagers more vulnerable to drought, hunger and illness in a way they had not been before. Because the war took place in drought stricken rural areas, it disrupted agricultural activities and displaced villagers from lands about which they had micro-geographical knowledge. It also prevented people from accessing animals and plants on which traditionally they had relied on to cope with recurrent droughts. The war forced villagers to seek refuge in regions that offered security but

[4] There are contradictory numbers of the civil war mortality in Mozambique. For one estimate of the number of victims, see Mozambique Information Office *News Review*, 149/50, March 1989 quoted in David Hoile, ed. *Mozambique 1962-1993: A Political Chronology.* London: The Mozambique Institute, 1994.
[5] Almo Farina, "An Essay on the Relationship of Warfare Ecology," in *Warfare Ecology: A New Synthesis for Peace and Security*, ed. Machlis et al, (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, Springer Science Business Media B.V., 2011), 274.

exposed them to collateral effects of war including trauma, and vulnerability to contagious diseases, hunger and malnutrition.

Region of Study

Geographic location and climate

This dissertation focuses on the southern region of Mozambique.[6] This region consists of the provinces of Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo (Figure 1) but the fieldwork was conducted in the districts of Funhalouro and Mabote in Inhambane Province, and Chigubo and Massangena in Gaza Province (Figure 2). These districts are located in the interior of Southern Mozambique (Figure 3). They are geographically contiguous and share similar environmental and climatic characteristics. They have small seasonal lakes and lagoons which play an important role in the local life. The most significant rivers in this region are Changani and Save. Most of the water sources run out of water in dry seasons but in the raining rainy season they flood regularly, sometimes with devastating impact.

[6] Southern Mozambique can be defined as the area in the south of Save River between the parallels 21° 05'(mouth of Save River) and 26° 52' (Ponta do Ouro) of South Latitude and meridians 32°20' (Pafuri) and 35°20' (Cabo das Correntes), longitude East. Southern Mozambique extends for more than 5° of latitude and is traversed in the middle by the tropic of Capricorn. In the proximities of parallel 23° south, the region has approximately 300 Km (186 miles) of width. In the southern part it has a minimum width of approximately 50 Km (31 miles). In the west it is limited by the territories of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland in an extension of approximately 800 Km (497 miles) border. In the southeast, it shares 80 Km (50 miles) of border with South Africa. See Aniceto dos Muchangos, *Moçambique: Paisagens e Regiões Naturais.* Maputo, 1999.

Figure 1 Map of Mozambique



Figure 2 Map of Southern Mozambique



Figure 3 Map of Fieldwork Districts



According to Aniceto Dos Muchangos, the climate of southern Mozambique is tropical. Along the seacoast, the average annual rainfall varies between 800 and 1000 mm. Average temperatures oscillate around 22° and 24° C (72 and 75° F) . The regions with high rainfall are located in the littoral of Inhambane with rainfall above 1,400 mm and average temperatures are around 26° C (79° F). The regions of the interior, including the districts of Chicualacuala, Massingir, Chigubo, Massangena and Funhalouro, are predominately dry. Average temperature in these areas ranges from 24° to 26° C (75 and 79°F). The annual rainfall decreases to 300 mm (11.8 in). The rainy season in Southern Mozambique coincides with the hot season but there is occurrence of some rain in the cold season particularly in the southern part of the region due to the influence of cold fronts. The duration of the rainy season depends on location in relation to the coast and on the consequent diminution of the influence of masses of humid air and trade winds. Simply put, as one travels from the coast to the hinterland the precipitation decreases. This makes the interior of southern Mozambique the most arid region in the country. Consequently, southern Mozambique has been severely affected by the droughts of 1906-8, 1912-3, 1922-3, 1981-4 and 1990-1992.[7]

[7] See Aniceto dos Muchangos, *Moçambique: Paisagens e Regiões,* 152. For more information on droughts in Southern Mozambique, see Liesegang, "Famines, Epidemics;" Borges Coelho, "Estado, Comunidades e Calamidades Naturais."

Vegetation

The ecological conditions of the coastal areas contribute to the development of natural vegetation of humid and dry forest. Along the mouths of the main rivers develop forests of mangroves. The vegetation of the drier interior has the characteristic of shrubby savanna with abundant undergrowth of bushes. Along the banks of rivers in areas of alluvial soils there is gallery forest. These forests have diverse plants which play an important role as foods and medicines in the lives of local villagers. The climate and the alluvial nature of soils along the valleys favor intensive irrigation agriculture.[8]

Population and Socio-Economic Organization

According to the first post-civil war population census conducted in 1997, the four districts of study had the following population. The district of Massangena with an area of 7,482 Km² (4650 sq. miles) had 13,300 inhabitants. This corresponded to a population density of 1.77 inhabitants per square kilometer. The District of Chigubo with an area of 14,864 Km² (9236 sq. miles) had 13,405 inhabitants. This corresponded to a population density of 1.1 inhabitants per square kilometer. The district of Mabote with an area of 14,577 Km² (9058 sq. miles) had 39,661 inhabitants. This corresponded to a population density of 2.7

[8] Dos Muchangos, *Moçambique*, 153.

inhabitants per square kilometer. The district of Funhalouro with an area of 13,653 Km² (8484 sq. miles) had 30,321 inhabitants.

The table below shows the demographic trends in the four districts from 1997 to 2011 census.

Table: Evolution of Population in the region of study[9]

District **Area in Km²**	**1997 Population Census**		**2007 Population Census**		**2011Population Census**	
	Total	Density in Km²	Total	Density in Km²	Total	Density in Km²
Chigubo, 14,864 Km²	13,405	1.1	20,810	1.4	24,707	1.7
Funhalouro, 13,653 Km²	30,321	2.2	38,799	2.8	43,207	3.2
Mabote, 14,577 Km²	39,661	2.7	45,884	3.1	49,099	3.4
Massangena, 7,482 Km²	13,300 ²	1.77	15,878	2.1	16,987	2.3

The inhabitants of the four districts all belong to the Tsonga ethnic group. They speak Xitswa and Xishangana but in the northern parts of Mabote and Massangena district there are some speakers of Xi-ndau, a variation of the Shona language. The demographic data

[9]Based on data from Instituto Nacional de Estatística, *Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação: Indicadores Sócio-Demográficos Distritais, Província de Inhambane* (Maputo: INE, 2010); Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Estatísticas do Distrito de Mabote (Maputo: INE, 2011), 10; Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Estatísticas do Distrito de Funhalouro (Maputo: INE, 2011), 10; Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Estatísticas do Distrito de Chigubo (Maputo: INE, 2011), 10; Instituto Nacional de Estatística, Estatísticas do Distrito de Massangena (Maputo: INE, 2011), 10.

presented above were gathered from 1997 population census, five years after the end of the civil war. Many people who had fled their areas of residence due to war had returned. However a significant number of displaced people remained where they settled during the conflict. Despite these circumstances, the 1997, 2007 and 2011 population censuses show that southern Mozambique has very low population density.

Having presented the population trends of the Chigubo, Funhalouro, Mabote and Massangena districts, the following paragraphs describe the social and economic conditions of the region during the war time. Looking at the socio-economic organization of this region show some similarities between the period before and after war. Kinship was a crucial social institution in this region plagued with recurrent droughts.[10] In addition to biological kinship, villagers extended their social networks though ties of marriage and friendship. Marriage was a crucial moment in the process of building kin networks. Marriages were arranged locally and in the neighboring villages. They allowed poor families to establish supportive relationships with the relatively better-off family members. For example, marrying a miner worker provided benefits such as access to imported food, cloths, bicycles, and cash, while marrying a cattle owner, traditional healer, pastor and prophet helped a family to cope with drought and war effects. Marrying someone from a different micro-environment or social status opened access to resources not available in one's micro-environment. This is not to say that marriage became a commodity. In fact, men and women made their decisions based on various factors including passion and love. For example, in my home village there were young women who had reputation of refusing

[10] On kinship see Henri Alexandre Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe* (New Hyde Park, N.Y., University Books 1962)*;* Augusto Cabral, *Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indígenas do Distrito de Inhambane* (Lourenço Marques: Imprensa Nacional, 1910).

many marriage proposals. In many cases the suitors were wealthy but the women rejected them because they considered then ugly. Many of these young women, acted against the will of their parents. Men also rejected women arranged by their parents. For example, my father rejected the woman selected by his parents while he was at work in South African gold mines. According to him, when he returned from South Africa he did not like the woman, and he decided to go out to find another one who happens to be my mother. Despite these variations, as it happens elsewhere today, in addition to love, marriage often involved a calculation of interests including material benefits. During the time of war and drought, in addition to building a family, marriage contributed to the mitigation of the impact of regional disasters. In southern Mozambique, it is believed that is the man who marries a woman, not the other way arounds but the union of two people from different families involved social and moral obligations to the whole community. For example, if a man or woman from the Mubai family married into the Mouity family, he or she established a relationship of in-laws for everyone bearing the Mouity and Mubai surnames, including those who were not part of the nuclear family. Marriages also provided reasons to travel, to send gifts of food, to send and receive the cattle of bridewealth.

In addition to kinship and marriage, religion played an important role in villagers' social lives. Traditional healers and spirit mediums were the main source of treatment of physical and spiritual maladies. People consulted traditional healers to enquire about illness, death of family members, theft, misfortune, rain and crop failure, infertility, witchcraft, jealousy and the recovery of stolen goods.[11] As it will be demonstrated in

[11] See Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe;* Augusto Cabral, *Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indigenas*.

Chapter Five, in the 1980s and 1990s villagers consulted traditional healers, spirit mediums and prophets to enquire about war and famine misfortunes.

Moving from social factors to economics, the villagers of southern Mozambique used machetes and axes to clear forests and hoes to farm. They also used draft animals and ploughs to open farms of approximately two hectares. To respond to irregular and scarce rainfall, they relied on intercropping that is, they sowed maize, millet, beans, groundnuts, cassava, sweet potatoes other and vegetables together along river. The basic unit of production was the household particularly women and children.[12] But, despite villagers' dedication to farming, their seasonal harvest was insufficient to feed the family for long periods and periodic scarcity was normal. In fact, villagers' food stocks covered less than two months of their food needs.[13] This deficit was covered by remittances from migrant labor, small businesses, government and non-governmental organization food assistance and foraging for forestry products. At times an overreliance on food donations led government and non-government officials to spread unfounded claims that the people of these districts were no longer farming because they had become dependent on receiving food donations. During my fieldwork I heard of these allegations from officials and from villagers themselves. Judging from villagers' strategies of coping with natural distress, which will discussed in chapter five there is no evidence supporting these claims, and farming was pursued when possible throughout the period of war.

[12] For ethnographic, social and economic organization of the area of study see Augusto Cabral, *Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indígenas*; Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe;* Ministry of Tourism - Mozambique, *Banhine National Park: Management Plan.* Maputo, 2010; Ministério da Administração Estatal, Perfil *do Distrito de Funhalouro, Provincia de Inhambane* (Maputo: MAE, MÉTIER – Consultoria & Desenvolvimento, Lda, 2005;

[13] See Ministério da Administração Estatal, *Pefil do Distrito de Massangena Provincia de Gaza*. Maputo: MAE, MÉTIER – Consultoria & Desenvolvimento, Lda, 2005.

What allegations of food dependency ignore is that southern Mozambique is free of tsetse fly making it Mozambique's largest producer of livestock.[14] In fact, villagers supplemented food-growing by keeping livestock, foraging, hunting and migrant labor. They also raised domesticated animals such as chickens, goats, cows, rabbits, ducks and pigs. Chickens, ducks and rabbits were destined for family consumption, while goats and cows were sold to purchase other goods including maize, rice, clothing, bicycles, and construction material. They also harvested wild foods and hunted wild animals such as gazelles, deer, grey duiker, ostrich and squirrels.[15]

Some villagers weaved mats and baskets, fermented and distilled wild fruits to make liquors and engaged in carpentry and pottery. There were no wage laborers in the region excluding local government employees. As earlier as the nineteenth century so in the twentieth the absence of wage labor pushed men to migrate to the neighboring South Africa and Zimbabwe for work in the gold mines and on large farms.[16] The income from migrant labor supplemented agricultural production in this region beset with recurrent droughts.

Politically southern Mozambique is today regarded as a FRELIMO stronghold, but RENAMO activities has expanded in the four districts of study because of their proximity

[14] Dos Muchangos, *Moçambique*, 99; For more on agriculture and natural resources of southern Mozambique see *Revista Internacional em Língua Portuguesa*. "Agricultura de Moçambique Pós-Independência: Da Experiência Socialista à Recuperação do Modelo Colonial," III Série, Nº 21 (2008): 47-66.
[15] See Augusto Cabral, *Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indígenas*; Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe;* Ministry of Tourism - Mozambique, *Banhine National Park;* 2010; Ministério da Administração Estatal, Perfil *do Distrito de Funhalouro;* Ministério da Administração Estatal, Perfil *do Distrito de Mabote;* Ministério da Administração Estatal, Perfil *do Distrito de Chigubo;* Ministério da Administração Estatal, Perfil *do Distrito de Massangena.*
[16] See Patrick Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Labourers in Mozambique and South Africa. C.1860-1910* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994); Luís António Covane, *O Trabalho Migratório e a Agricultura no Sul de Moçambique, 1920-1992* (Maputo: Promédia, 2001).

to the region immediately to the north of Save River which is, in general, more supportive of RENAMO. This political alignment goes back to the time of the liberation struggle and has dominated the politics of post-independent Mozambique. From the independence of Mozambique in 1975 to 2015, all Mozambican presidents have come, from southern Mozambique. In contrast, the central and northern region of Mozambique has consistently voted since elections began in 1994 for RENAMO, the former guerrilla movement that transformed itself into a political party as stipulated by the 1992 general peace agreement. When RENAMO launched the guerrilla insurgency in 1976, it was dominated by the Ndau speakers, a Shona group of central Mozambique, residents of north of Save River.[17] Among RENAMO guerrillas, Ndau became a lingua franca, and the struggle became a conflict between southern and central regional elites. This rivalry affected the way the war was fought and experienced in the two regions as each contender brutalized civilians from its foe's region. The widespread use of violence against civilians during the civil war led some scholars to classify southern Mozambique as an area of destruction. They claimed that RENAMO relied on scorched earth tactics to achieve its goals.[18] Speaking as resident of this region during the civil war, I witnessed many attacks on civilians along the roads, villages and communal settlements. I also witnessed the looting of villagers' property. In many cases, these actions were attributed to RENAMO guerrillas, but as it will be demonstrated, on some occasions, government troops disguised themselves as RENAMO guerrillas to perpetrate attacks against civilians.

[17] See Hanlon, *Mozambique,* 229; Mark F. Chingono, *The State, Violence and Development: The Political Economy of War in Mozambique, 1975-1992* (Aldershot, England; Brookfield, Vt.: Avebury c1996), 16-17.

[18] Robert Gersony, "Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique." U.S. Department of State, 1988, 28; Roesch, *Renamo and Peasantry*.

Sources

Written Sources

It is a challenge to write the history of the civil war in Mozambique from the perspective of the villagers who were directly affected by the conflict. The chief difficulty is the absence of written records. When the war broke out in 1976 more than ninety per cent of Mozambicans were illiterate and therefore unable to make written records of the major events occurring in their communities.[19] Moreover, because the civil war destroyed social infrastructure including schools, hospitals and everything that represented state authority, even the few records produced by local government officials were destroyed. Whatever records that were sent to the provincial capital cities and to Maputo were generally neglected.

In the four districts of study there are no archives documenting the war time. In Inhambane city I found a pile of documents poorly kept in one storage room at the provincial government headquarters without minimal conditions for their preservation. The room is damp and many documents are being destroyed by cockroaches and other pests. Moreover, the documents are stored in boxes without any kind of classification. These boxes have valuable reports from district to provincial officials. They include information about economic activities, political activities, justice, security, weather, drought, famine and war. This information was sent to the provincial government via radio and was

[19] República Popular de Moçambique, Conselho Coordenador do Recenseamento, *Primeiro Recenseamento Geral da População: População e Escolarização, Educação,* 4, 1. Maputo, 1980, 2.

recorded on paper. The documents cover the period from late 1970s to 2000. It is a very rich collection, but it lacks thematic or chronological organization. I had to scrutinize each box to find relevant information. For the purpose of this study, the most valuable records available in this archive are reports on the situation of drought, war and famine in Inhambane Province. The reports by the Provincial Department for the Prevention of Natural Disasters were particularly helpful. Also relevant is a collection of military reports about the course of war, military conscription and the contentious relationship between the military and civilians during the conflict.

In Gaza Province the situation of archives is even worse. As in Inhambane Province, there are no documents stored at District level. District authorities claim to have sent the documents to Xai-Xai, the capital city. Unfortunately, in 2000, this city was devastated by the worst floods in the living memory.[20] The provincial archive is located in down town, an area which was completely submersed. According to government employees, when the city flooded there was not enough time to evacuate, and in any case saving archival documents was not a priority. Thus, unlike Inhambane where there are fragments of government records for the period of study, the record situation in Gaza Province is gloomy.

Moving from provincial to national level, the situation is not as good as I expected. The Ministry of Agriculture building in Maputo suffered a massive fire in 2005 and it is claimed that the archives were among the areas destroyed. Only academic institutions

[20] Frances Christie and Joseph Hanlon, *Mozambique and the Great Flood of 2000* (Oxford: James Currey, 2001). Roland Brouwer and Joel Nhassengo "About Bridges and Bonds: Community Responses to the 2000 Floods in Mabalane District, Mozambique," *Disasters*, 30, 2, (2006): 234−255.

provide considerable data. In Maputo, the Eduardo Mondlane University Central Library has a collection of theses and dissertations which helped to situate my research within the current academic debate. The library contains theses and dissertations on Mozambique written within and outside the University. In addition, the Center of African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University has an important collection of publications by national and international researchers. Many of these publications cover the last years of colonial rule and post-colonial period and are very important sources for this study. At the Mozambique National Archive (Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique) in Maputo there are important documents on the civil war but most of them have not been organized. The *Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique* holds back-issues of the TEMPO magazine, the *Agência de Informação de Moçambique*, AIM, (Mozambique Information Agency) Bulletin and the daily newspaper NOTICIAS. These periodicals were very useful in cross-checking the information provided by oral sources in chronological order. During the conflict, TEMPO and AIM had regular pages dedicated to war information. Despite their editorial alignment with the government, they provided good information on the course of war and its consequences on the national economy and people. They also had a special column reserved for readers' letters to the editor from which one learns what people thought about the conflict and its consequences. In addition to these documents, the archive provides statistical data on cattle in the area of study for the period immediately before the war through the last years of the conflict. Unfortunately this data is incomplete because the war prevented researchers from accessing some areas of the country. In summary, archival documents for the period of civil war in Mozambique are scant. The few records available offer little information about local welfare and economic life and are more concerned with

decision making, diplomatic affairs and administrative correspondence at different levels of government. There are few records of information that describe the conditions in rural areas which are the main focus for this dissertation.

Oral Sources

Bearing in mind my desire to put villagers and their environment first, my dissertation privileges oral history. Oral history refers to "personal reminiscence solicited by the researcher in an interview format, [which] may focus on the life history of the person being interviewed, on specific events of interest to the historian, or on the subject's unique memories of a family, neighborhood, community, or movement."[21] Oral history is vital to this study because, as David Henige observes, it provides an opportunity to people of all social strata to testify to their lives as well as of those around them from a perspective far different than the official one.[22] As Barbara Cooper observed, "oral interviews are important ways of valorizing and making more widely accessible the rich knowledge of Africans about their worlds and environments."[23] Barbara Cooper went further to explain that "often this kind of detailed knowledge has to do with things like population movements, disease control, agricultural practices, shift in environmental conditions, and so on."[24] In fact, historians such as James Giblin, Gregory Maddox, Juhani Koponen,

[21] Barbara M. Cooper, "Oral Sources and the Challenge of African History" in *Writing African History*, ed. John Edward Philips (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2005), 192.
[22] David Henige, "Oral Tradition as a Means of Restructuring the Past," in *Writing African History*, ed. John Edward Philips (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2005), 187.
[23] Cooper, "Oral Sources," 206.
[24] Cooper, "Oral Sources," 206.

Thomas Spear, Jocelyn Alexander, JoAn McGregor and Terence Ranger have all used oral accounts to study the entanglement of environment and society.[25] This study builds from these examples to reassess the history of civil war in Mozambique taking into account the human-environment nexus. It is aware that oral sources, just like documentary sources, have their strengths and limitations. For example, people forget, are biased, misremember and are influenced by their present social and political environment.

The dissertation pays attention to accounts from nearly all social segments including men and women. The interviews were conducted face to face in southern Mozambique in the districts of Mabote and Funhalouro in Inhambane Province and Massangena and Chigubo in Gaza Province from August to December of 2013. This is a region where I was born and I spent my adolescence. I speak four major languages of the region namely Xi-Tsonga, Xi-Chopi, Xi-Tswa and Portuguese which is the official language of Mozambique. As a child I personally witnessed the devastating effects of warfare and droughts in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly while travelling throughout Gaza and Maputo while under FRELIMO government military escort.

[25] See James L. Giblin, *The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1860-1940* (Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); Gregory Maddox, James Giblin and Isaria Kimambo, eds., *Custodians of the land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania* (London: James Currey; Dar es Salaam: Mkuti na Nyota, 1996); Juhani Koponen, *People and Production in Late Precolonial Tanzania: History and Structures* (Helsinki: Finish Historical Society, 1988); Thomas Spear, *Mountain Farmers: Moral Economies of Land and Agricultural Development in Arusha and Meru* (Dar es Salaam Mkuti na Nyota; Oxford: James Currey, 1997) and Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 'Dark Forests' of Matabeleland* (James Currey: Oxford, 2000).

Methodology

This dissertation has required me to intermix and overlap archival research and interviews. My approach to written and oral evidence is to esteem and question both without favor. In fact, I combine written and oral sources and thus try to produce complementarity and coherence. Following the example of Carolyn Keyes Adenaike, I strive to ensure that the interpretation of history flows from the internalization of experiential learning during the fieldwork. I also evaluate information and I cross-check it with other types of evidence, namely written sources and my own experience.[26] It should be underlined that the cross-checking of written and oral sources does not suggest that one type of source is more reliable than the other; in fact, it simply recognizes their complementarity. Written sources are better in transmitting certain kinds of information such as dates and certain kinds of detail, while oral accounts, convey more of the lived experience of the past. Admittedly interviews result in retrospective reconstructions in the present of the past. Interviewees practice a selection process according to the nature of their interpretations, just as historians do. This process of selective interpretation complicates a bit more the nature of oral accounts as sources of information. Some historians object to the idea of using oral accounts minimally as sources of information. Instead, they see them as much more than that.[27]

Bearing in mind the further complication that oral sources are not isolated from the influence of written sources, I searched for earlier publications previous interviews

[26] Carolyn Keys Adenaike "Reading the Pursuit: An Introduction" in *In Pursuit of History: Fieldwork in Africa*, ed. Carolyn Keyes Adenaike and Jan Vansina (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1996), xxv; xl.
[27] While attending the Oral History Seminar in spring 2013 we had an interesting discussion about this topic with the coordinator of the seminar, Professor J. L. Giblin.

conducted in the area of study. Thereafter, I compared the written materials about the areas of study to the responses given to my questions. In addition, I took into account the level of education of my informants and others in the community. This helped me to distinguish personal experiences from what people eventually heard on the radio or read in newspapers or in other written material.[28]

The oral accounts were used at two levels. First, they corroborated written archival data. Second, and more importantly, they gave me access to a flood of otherwise undocumented social experiences. The selection of the interviewees followed a snowball sampling technique, where one informant nominated others. This technique was not applied in all situations, because on some occasions the local authorities suggested the people who they thought were more qualified to talk. For example, in one district the local administrator received me at his official house and offered me a meal. Thereafter, he insisted that I should go with him to the village. When we arrived there he introduced me to the local official who received instructions to show me *Vanu va kalhe* a Xishangana language expression which may be translated as 'show him the good people.' Said this way it created a divide between good people, those who are sympathetic to the ruling party and bad people, those who criticize the party or are sympathetic to the opposition. Thereafter, the chief assembled only "good people" to participate in my research. He introduced me to the audience as a son from the village who, like Eduardo Mondlane, the founding father of the Mozambican nation, went to study in South Africa and the United States and returned home to serve his country. He went on to state, "don't fear him, talk to him freely, he is one of us, he does not speak Xi-Ndau language." It is noteworthy that during the civil war

[28] This treatment of oral sources is based on Henige "Oral Tradition," 183-5.

Xi- Ndau language was the official language of RENAMO guerrillas, independently of their place of origin.

In this case the way I was introduced to the villagers shows the role of ethnic rivalry in Mozambique society. The chief assumed that, because I am southerner, I was also a FRELIMO member. This assumption had been made once before in 2003 when I was collecting oral accounts in Nampula Province, a RENAMO stronghold. There, my interviewees treated me as FRELIMO member, just because I was from the south. The way I was introduced affected the attitude of my informants significantly. Once I started interviewing people, I realized what it meant to be "good people." I realized that most of my interviewees were FRELIMO party members. I also realized that they were some of the prosperous members of the community who had been selected by the authorities to speak with me. The chief had assumed that the poor had nothing to say. The gathering produced mixed results. On one hand, there were villagers who, despite their political affiliation, turned out to have good memory of the events. On the other hand, there were also those who were concerned to show off their fidelity to the ruling party and thus slanted their stories accordingly. There was also a third group of outsiders who arranged meetings with me privately to find out what I was looking for. They also proved to be good informants and provided a narrative that dissented from that of the FRELIMO party loyalists. On some occasions, those who were excluded by local authorities mingled in the conversation and they turned out to have good stories to share.

Eighty seven people were interviewed including forty seven men and forty women. The Institutional Review Board exempted me from demanding the signing of informed consent forms but I explained the purpose of my research to all my interviewees and I asked

permission to record the interviews. Only those who accepted to participate were interviewed. The interviews totaled fifty one hours of audio and video recording. The youngest interviewee was thirty seven years old and the oldest interviewee was eighty. Most of interviewees were illiterate and did not know their exact year of birth. Even those who presented identification cards claimed that the stated age was based on estimates by the registrar services. Some claimed to be much older than their official age and others claimed to be much younger. There are various explanations for these discrepancies. Some claimed that their parents had increased their age to be eligible to migrate to South African gold mines; others said that their age had been reduced to delay paying tax during the colonial time. There were also those who said that they increased their age to attend school. In order to better estimate the age persons who lacked ID's, I asked them how old they were when FRELIMO launched the liberation struggle in 1964. I also asked where they were when Mozambique became independent in 1975. I asked men whether they worked in South African mines, how and when they married and had their first-born, where they were recruited, and what transport they used to go South Africa. I also asked whether they remember some of the major droughts that occurred in the region in the second half of the twentieth century. Finally I asked where they were when the civil war broke out in their region. These questions helped me to estimate the age of my interviewees and to learn whether they were old enough to have witnessed historical events.

In addition to their age I also paid attention to specific type of information possessed by clan elders, community leaders, retired local government officials, humanitarian aid workers, and religious leaders. Almost all men interviewed had

experience of migrant laborers in South Africa and Zimbabwe. Other had worked for wages in Mozambican urban centers, particularly Maputo.

Finally many who lived in the region during the conflict had joined one of the sides in the war as soldiers or militia. My research included devoting part of my daily schedule to community engagement. I helped in farming activities and attended attend social gatherings including, dances, and birth celebrations parties. I also played soccer with local youth and gave talks at local primary schools to mentor pupils and encourage teachers to invest their energies in studies.

The conduct of interviews took into consideration the various methods of collecting oral data including structured interviews, semi-structured interviews, unstructured or focused interviews, and group interviews. The structured and semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to determine the course of the conversation. But they may fail to capture additional information not listed in the predetermined questions. Group interviews save time and have the advantage of bringing openness and comparison of ideas. However, they are more likely to reflect certain bold individuals' opinions, because not everyone in a group has the courage to express themselves in public, especially those who dissent from local orthodoxy. Bearing in mind that all types of interviews have strengths and weaknesses, I opted for unstructured interviews. They were time-consuming but since I am an insider and have background information about the region of study, this technique was effective. Using unstructured interviews allowed my personal feelings to select what questions to ask; it also allowed me to answer questions the interviewees posed to me.[29]

[29] See Isaac Olawale Albert, "Data Collection and Interpretation in the social history of Africa," in *Writing African History*, ed. John Edward Philips (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2005), 300.

This offered the interviewees some latitude to direct the conversation as they wished. My introductory questions avoided explicit references to war. Instead, I asked people to talk about their ancestors, genealogies, family, children and migration. As the conversation rolled on, I explored situations in which people mentioned warfare and drought. While conducting the interview, I listened patiently and politely, I stimulated the interest of the respondent and encouraged discussion of the topic.

Following Elizabeth Tonkin's approach, I paid attention to the genre of my informants' narratives.[30] I listened to peoples' jokes and songs, and I interviewed them wherever they felt comfortable to talk. Some were interviewed in their houses, farms, public spaces and during road trips. I exploited different situations where people spoke with or without an audience. In this process, I realized that most men were indifferent about talking in the presence of an audience, while women preferred to talk privately. I did not notice a different relationship with interviewees when interviewed by me or my female research assistant. Some interviewees preferred to speak in the presence of young people or contemporaries, women or men. Some old folks preferred to talk in family gatherings. It was my impression that the presence of youngsters in these gatherings encouraged them to talk about their experiences. One of the major lessons from this exercise was the realization that people were more comfortable talking during the night. Because I used video camera and many of my interviewees lacked lighting in their homes, I normally conducted my interview during the day light. But some interviews lasted long until it got dark. I noticed that the openness of my interviewees increased as it became dark. Once I realized this, whenever it was possible, I scheduled my interviews late in the afternoon so

[30] Elizabeth Tonkin, *Narrating Our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History* (Cambridge University Press, 1992).

that I could prolong my work into the night. The interviews conducted during the night turned out to be the ones that brought forward dissenting narratives. I recorded my interviews and at the end of each day of interviewing I spent the night translating the interviews from Xitswa and Shangana to English. Copies of digital voice and video recordings of the interviews were stored at Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique for public consultation.

Outline

This dissertation is organized in six chapters. Following the introductory chapter, the second chapter focuses on the historiography of the civil war in Mozambique with particular attention paid to the contribution of global, regional and national factors for the outbreak of the civil war in Mozambique. Building from global and Mozambican history of warfare, Chapter Two challenges the claims that the violence against civilians during the civil war has no parallel in the history of warfare in Mozambique. It argues that in the case of Mozambique, violence against civilians has historical roots and has prompted multiple explanations determined by the local political, economic, environmental and social aspects.

Chapter Three begins with an analysis of the way scholars have studied the relationship between warfare, environment and society in Mozambique. Drawing from global case studies, it suggests a socio-environmental approach for the study of the civil war in Mozambique. Focusing on three major topics, namely, the environment of the war zone, the relationship between natural adversity and war experience, and the logistics and

morale of the belligerents, this chapter argues that war disrupted delicate ecologies and micro-environmental relationships in the countryside, making villagers more vulnerable to drought, hunger and illness.

Chapter Four introduces firsthand accounts from villagers who suffered the effects of war and prolonged drought. It looks at the intricate effects of warfare on the lives of villagers and their environment. It argues that the overemphasis on broad national, regional and international factors in the Mozambican civil war obscures the immediate effects of war on villagers and their environment. The chapter shows how people survived within the liminal zone that separated them from the military contenders. It analyses the relationship between warfare, drought and rural economy. It explores the effects of warfare and drought on rural people, on their economy and on their relationship with wildlife. It asks how access to essential crops, livestock, wild plant foods and wildlife needed to survive famine and to prosper in southern Mozambique environment was threatened by war and military forces.

Chapter Five argues that the civil war and drought in Mozambique must be understood beyond Cold War ideologies, military confrontation and quantification of victims. It must extend the study to the analysis of the collateral effects of war and drought on villagers and their surrounding environments. Bearing this in mind, this chapter relies on oral accounts to document the experience of villagers in dealing with violence, trauma, hunger, diseases and death. It pays attention to social institutions that villagers relied on to cope with warfare and drought and examines what people did to obtain support during the time of calamity. Finally it re-presents the population of the war zone not merely as victims but as innovators.

Chapter Six examines how post war Mozambican politics have shaped memories of war and the way political affairs affect perceptions of the researcher and the researcher's relationships with people of the region. As one of the survivors of this conflict, I engaged with villagers who had suffered the brutality of war but were clearly reconstructing their memories. I argue that the General Peace Agreement of 1992, which recommended forgetting war atrocities and transformed the former belligerents into political opponents in a new multiparty democratic dispensation, has failed to heal the wounds of war because there is less commitment to reconciliation than outside observers once assumed. In fact, the appeals from the government of Mozambique and from the international community for national reconciliation have effectively sealed off and censored an important chapter of Mozambican history, thereby constraining the way war survivors have dealt with their turbulent past. As result villagers appear hesitant to talk about their experiences and those most willing to talk are selective and strive to be politically correct to conform to the official discourse of national reconciliation.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This chapter looks at how scholars have analyzed the civil war in Mozambique. It pays attention to the causes of the conflict particularly the role of internal and external factors. Given the predominance of violence in the literature of warfare in Mozambique, this chapter looks at the global and local motives of violence in warfare. It addresses the debate over the use of violence against the very civilians who in Marxist-Leninist theory are supposed to be an indispensable resource to conduct the war. Learning from experiences of violence against civilians in other conflicts throughout the world, it situates the Mozambican conflict on the global stage and looks at the logics of violence in Mozambique's civil war. It suggests an historical approach for the study of the armed conflict and violence in Mozambique. In the process, it pays attention to changes and continuities in the history of warfare in Mozambique and identifies aspects that need further research.

The Historiography of Civil War Mozambique

The historiography of the civil war in Mozambique has been influenced by Mozambican nationalism, the Cold War and apartheid. As has been observed elsewhere, in post-colonial Africa, nationalist historians were reluctant to acknowledge the legitimacy of the rebel

movements that erupted in the aftermath of independence.[31] In Mozambique, nationalist scholars and those who opposed Western imperialism and apartheid were loath to acknowledge any sign of rural support for RENAMO or any dissatisfaction with FRELIMO. In fact, they portrayed RENAMO as nothing but terrorists and bandits.[32] By focusing on exposing the 'barbarous' nature of RENAMO warfare, scholars failed to acknowledge changes and continuities in the history of warfare in Mozambique. They ignored the obvious fact that the warfare in Mozambique was not unique in post-colonial settings. They neglected the accounts of other rural society in which non-combatants were the major victims and actors of warfare.

The idea that the Mozambican civil war was provoked by external interests has many adherents including nationalist historians. In a comparative study of the roots of the wars in Mozambique and Angola, one scholar concluded that "independently of internal ideological questions, external intervention had decisive effects in both Mozambique and Angola."[33] Another scholar focusing on the external factors of war and violence regarded RENAMO as primarily an instrument of external destabilization.[34] The wars in Mozambique and Angola were seen as part of global and regional Cold War politics. In this historiography, RENAMO appears as a puppet-like creation of the South Rhodesia regime and former Portuguese settlers.[35] A study based on secondary sources, archival records and speeches by Samora Machel, the first President of Mozambique, highlighted

[31] See William Reno, *Warfare in Independent Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
[32] Hanlon, *The Revolution under Fire;* Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism*; Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*; Roesch, "Renamo and Peasantry;" Love, *Sothern Africa in the World Politics;* Onslow, ed., *Cold War in Southern Africa.*
[33] Minter, *Apartheid's Contras*, 6.
[34] Roesch, "Renamo and Peasantry"
[35] Love, *Southern Africa in World Politics,* 86; 95.

the contribution of Rhodesia and South Africa to the formation of RENAMO and consequent beginning of civil war in Mozambique.[36] In the same vein, Alex Vines argued that RENAMO was a creation of Rhodesia and later South Africa but it evolved on its own once it operated in Mozambican hinterland. Based on secondary and primary sources such as newspaper articles, interviews with international dignitaries and RENAMO officials, he concluded that the support that RENAMO claimed to receive freely from people of rural Mozambique was in fact obtained through terror and coercion.[37]

The FRELIMO government's emphasis on the role of external forces is evident in the memoir of Jacinto Veloso, former minister of Intelligence Services and later minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. For Jacinto Veloso, the civil war in Mozambique was linked with the interests of super-powers in the context of the Cold War. In fact, Jacinto Veloso provides an interesting view from inside the civil war and regional conflicts which is in line with wartime official discourse.[38]

In their turn, pro-western scholars have viewed the war as the result of popular dissatisfaction with the Marxist-Leninist ideology adopted by the new leadership of post-colonial Mozambique.[39] As part of the Cold War ideological struggle, some scholars penetrated inside RENAMO bases and investigated the motivation of people behind the movement. They were fearful of FRELIMO's radical nationalism and concluded that the cause of the civil war in Mozambique was FRELIMO's adoption of Marxism-Leninism.[40]

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[36] Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence* (Athens/Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997), 152.
[37] Vines, *Renamo: Terrorism*, 1-2.
[38] Jacinto Veloso, *Memórias em Voo Rasante* (Maputo, 2006).
[39] See, Hanlon, *Mozambique*; Robert T. Huffman, "Colonialism, Socialism and Destabilization in Mozambique" *Africa Today*, Vol. 39, 1/2, Angola and Mozambique 1992 (1st Qtr. - 2nd Qtr. 1992): 9-27.
[40] David Hoile, *Mozambique: A Nation in Crisis* (London: Claridge Press, 1989), 86.

However, what is often overlooked in this debate is that even if an original radical political orientation was present, it lasted only for five years. In fact, by 1982 the government of Mozambique had realized the failure of its economic program.[41] In a clear departure from its past socialist slogans, at its third Congress held in 1983, FRELIMO opened space for a market economy and private enterprise.

Despite these signals of economic policy change, FRELIMO's strong political opposition to apartheid and its support of South African and Namibian freedom fighters threatened South Africa and its Cold War allies. This prompted South Africa to continue supporting RENAMO as part of the war against communist influence in Southern Africa. The decline of Cold War tensions, the total discrediting of apartheid from the early 1980s and the expansion of RENAMO guerrilla warfare in Mozambican countryside contributed to the shift of emphasis scholarly interpretation: now internal factors became prominent. In fact, after the signing of Komati Non-aggression Pact between the government of Mozambique and the apartheid regime in 1984, many scholars predicted the surrender of RENAMO and the end of civil war in Mozambique.[42] Surprisingly, however, from the early 1980s RENAMO extended its operations in the countryside. RENAMO's success without the formal backing of its external allies put into question the explanations portraying it as the pawn of the Rhodesian and South African regimes. As result of these trends, scholars shifted their attention from Cold War geostrategic explanations to internal factors.

[41] Barry Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture: the Mozambican Experience" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 22, 2 (1984):199-221, 199.
[42] For detailed information on this agreement see Hanlon, *Mozambique*, 255-265.

One of the first studies to point to internal factors as causes of the civil war in Mozambique concluded that people supported RENAMO in reaction to FRELIMO's marginalization of traditional village and ethnic authorities and to the policy of forced resettlement.[43] Using the same line of analysis, other authors have also argued that forced communal settlements and the suppression of traditional forms of authority were among the causes of civil war.[44] This came as surprise to both government and nationalist scholars and led to a broader academic debate over the test the applicability of these findings to the rest of the country.[45]

The thesis of the marginalization of traditional authorities has found many adherents but the contribution of communal settlements in breeding support for RENAMO has been contested. Some scholars argued that the attack on traditional authorities during the time of socialist state was critical reason that rural communities shifted their support to RENAMO. For these scholars, communal settlements alone did not drive people to support RENAMO. One study focusing in central Mozambique denied that relocation mattered because the state did not have the capacity to force people into communal villages.[46]

For other scholars, the war in Mozambique began with external aggression by Rhodesia and South Africa but evolved into a civil war. Nationalist scholars, they argue, failed to acknowledge that in pursuing too radical and rapid transformation of Mozambican society, FRELIMO committed many mistakes. They cite forced settlements without social

[43] Christian Geffray, *A Causa das Armas: Antropologia da Guerra Contemporânea em Moçambique* (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1991).
[44] Africa Watch, *Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992).
[45] For more on the critique to Geffray's work see Bridget O'Laughlin, "Interpretations Matter: Evaluating the War in Mozambique" *Southern Africa Report,* 7, 3 (1992).
[46] Fernando Florêncio, "Christian Geffray e a Antropologia da Guerra: Ainda a Propósito de La Cause des Armes au Mozambique" *Etnográfica*, 4, 2 (2002):347-364

or agricultural benefit, repression of religion, and the humiliation of traditional chiefs as factors that helped RENAMO find support in the countryside.[47]

In my judgment the thesis that emphasizes an erosion of the role of traditional authorities is based on selective and biased interpretation. It is certainly the case that this thesis cannot be applied to the entire country because of the diversity of Mozambican society and environments. During and after the war, it appears that traditional authorities continue to be key political players in Northern Mozambique. In fact, the political mobilization in current multi-party democracy in Mozambique has shown them to have been crucial in territorial administration and political mobilization. It was not until FRELIMO abandoned its ideological insistence that chiefs were colonial invention and recognized the legitimacy of traditional authorities in 2000 that it begun to reverse the tendency of Northern Mozambique voters to support RENAMO.[48]

Scholars have also looked at RENAMO's successful transformation from guerrilla movement to political party as an indication of grassroots support. They observed that RENAMO appeared to provide an opportunity for people who occupied marginal position in post-colonial politics. They stated that "individuals frustrated with their lot might have come to view RENAMO, after an initial adjustment period, as an unexpected opportunity to gain prestige and power, a place in the political life of the nation."[49] Other scholars started challenging the idea that RENAMO guerrillas were "bloodthirsty bandits"

[47] Michel Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique," *Review of African Political Economy*, 57, (1993): 46-59.

[48] Decreto no.15/2000. Publicado no Boletim da República, 1ª Série, no. 24, Suplemento de 20 de Junho de 2000.

[49] Carrie Manning, "Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: RENAMO as Political Party," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24, 1 (1998), 176.

constructed by the FRELIMO government and nationalist scholars. They criticized academics and journalists for writing about RENAMO without having visited the rebel movement bases. Under these circumstances, it was argued, they blindly reproduced the government's view of RENAMO as armed bandits, or stooges of the South African and Rhodesian governments. In fact, the idea that RENAMO guerrillas were "bloodthirst bandits" was thrown into question by the 1994 election in which RENAMO showed that it was attracting cadres who joined the movement during and after the conflict due to their disappointment with the policies of the ruling party.[50]

Scholars who point to internal factors to explain the causes and character of the civil war in Mozambique agree that South Rhodesia and South Africa played an important role in the creation of RENAMO. What distinguishes these scholars from Cold War ideologues and nationalist scholars is their exposing of the internal factors that facilitated the success of external intervention. They emphasize the failure of FRELIMO to implement its socialist programs and its attack on rural society's political, economic and cultural practices in the name of anti-tribalism and national unity.[51]

The proponents of internal factors have been met with strong criticism. They are faulted for generalizing their findings to the entire country. The critics point out that in southern Mozambique, communal relocation did not cause dissatisfaction because the majority of the people relocated came from areas that had been affected by the floods of 1977.[52] The critics dismiss the idea that "villagization" was the cause of civil war in

[50] Michel Cahen, *Os outros: Um Historiador em Moçambique*, 1994, Transl. Fatima Mendonça (Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing, 2004).
[51] For more discussion on internal triggering factors for the civil war in Mozambique see Cabrita, *Mozambique.*

[52] Roesch, "Renamo and Peasantry," 465.

Mozambique. Citing the example of Tete Province, where both colonial and post-colonial governments implemented policies of communal resettlements, they argue that RENAMO's attacks on communal villages were part of the movement's practice of targeting everything that symbolized the presence of FRELIMO's state. As one scholar put it, "people were ordered out of the communal villages simply because the government authorities wanted them to remain in them: while the Government was seeking to maintain the nucleations for administration and control purposes, RENAMO needed people to be settled in a dispersed manner so that it could extract the meager peasant surpluses and abduct men for its military activities."[53]

However, my research shows that the idea that the communal settlements in Southern Mozambique were part of a popular government strategy to mitigate the impacts of floods is misleading. Flood mitigation by resettlement occurred, but as it will be discussed below, FRELIMO also forced people to move to communal settlements in order to isolate them from RENAMO guerrillas. The focus on natural disasters mitigation obscures a broader understanding of forced resettlements in Mozambique. It neglects the environmental consequences of relocation, which are addressed by this study.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the euphoria of independence waned and a new historiography of the war period appeared. This development coincided with the end of Cold War and the introduction of multi-party democracy. Public debate began about matters that could not be addressed openly under one party rule. Journalists, political analysts and previously ostracized liberation war veterans challenged established

[53] João Paulo Borges Coelho, "State Resettlement Policies in Post-colonial Rural Mozambique: The Impact of the Communal Village Programme on Tete province, 1977–1982" *Journal of Southern African Studies* 24, 1 (1998), 91.

narratives about the nation, nationalist struggles, the conception of national history and national heroes. They also brought to light new perspectives on the civil wars not only in Mozambique but throughout independent Africa.

Inspired by revisionist historiography of the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya and the liberation struggle and civil war in Zimbabwe, historians began in the 1990s to ask new questions about the role of peasantry in warfare and about internal struggles within independence movements.[54] Scholars acknowledged the complexity of the liberation struggle and civil wars as well as the connections between external and internal factors. They went on to question the appropriation of the history of nationalist struggle by the winning elites. They also brought to light the contribution of marginalized groups such as women and even the so-called traitors to nationalist struggle.[55]

In this revisionist scholarship, the civil wars that affected countries such Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe have been reassessed in light of new sources, particularly oral testimonies.[56] One approach, based on interviews with refugees in the borderland of Mozambique and Malawi, criticized previous studies of civil war in Mozambique for dealing with culpability. It shifted the paradigm of Mozambican civil war from Cold War

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[54] See Norma Kriger, *Zimbabwe's Guerrilla War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Masipula Sithole, *Zimbabwe: Struggles within Struggle, 2nd ed.* (Harare: Rijeko Publishers, 1999); Jocelyn Alexander, JoAnn McGregor and Terence Ranger, *Violence and Memory*; Kenneth Manungo, *The Role Peasants Played in the Zimbabwe War of Liberation with Special Emphasis on Chiweshe (PhD Dissertation, Ohio University, 1991)*; Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Henry Halt and Company, 2005); David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005). Yussuf Adam, *Escapar aos Dentes do Crocodilo e Cair na Boca do Leopardo* (Maputo: Promédia, 2005).

[55] For the reassessment of the contribution of the so-called traitors to Mozambican liberation struggle see Nkomo, *Urias Simango*.

[56] See Cabrita, *Mozambique*; Tanya Lyons. *Guns and Guerilla Girls: Women in the Zimbabwean National Liberation* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press c2004); Daniel Branch, *Defeating Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonization* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Giblin and Jamie Monson, eds. *Maji: Lifting the Fog* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010); Reno, *Warfare*.

geopolitics and nationalist ideology to the analysis of diverse elements and motivations within borderland society. [57]

Another approach, which was based on interviews and secondary sources, looked at the experiences of children involved in armed conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. It discussed the limitations of international conventions intended to ensure children's protection against war and violence.[58] Although focusing on post-war events, this kind of study provides examples of how 'ordinary people', particularly children, carried the burden of civil war during and after the conflict. Thus, a few scholars have found new focuses and have shifted from the old paradigms focusing on the external-internal divide. It is clearly necessary to situate the civil war in the broader context of colonial and post-colonial Africa.

Despite differences of interpretation, in their treatment of the civil war, Mozambican nationalists, Cold War ideologues and post-war revisionists have converged in putting greater emphasis on violence against civilians and the consequent increase of internally displaced and refugee people. But they have failed to make a deeper analysis of violence and forced resettlements. Overall, they make accusatory arguments against those who impose atrocities against civilians but they point fingers at different perpetrators. For nationalist scholars, RENAMO was mostly responsible for the atrocities. For Cold War warriors, FRELIMO was responsible. Nationalist scholars argued that RENAMO's violence against civilians was pathological, and had no equivalent in the history of

[57] Harri Englund, *From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland*. London: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.
[58] Alcinda Honwana, "Children of War: Understanding War and War Cleansing in Mozambique and Angola," in: *Civilians in War* ed. Simon Chesterman (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 124.

Mozambique.[59] Both sides have produced divergent statistics of civil war victims making it difficult to know how many people died. Nevertheless, if one considers the number of people killed and those who died due to collateral effects of warfare such as famine, epidemics and lack of health assistance it is reasonable to agree with those claiming over a half a million deaths.[60] There is also enough evidence to show that both FRELIMO and RENAMO engaged in violence against civilians. In fact, violence was a common factor in the relationship between military and civilians. The following section looks at the global and local explanations of violence against civilians who are regarded as indispensable resource to wage war.

Warfare and Violence: A Global Approach

This section is an attempt to explain the reasons behind the recurring use of violence against civilians in warfare and build a theoretical base for the understanding of violence against civilians in Mozambican civil war.[61] Rather than arguing for a single, universal explanation for the cause of violence everywhere, it argues that violence arises from various causes in district contexts among which one must include the brutal nature of human beings, military

[59] The idea of labeling certain forms of warfare as irrational has long history. For more detail see Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War: Its Practice and Concepts, 2nd ed* (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1971), xi; 254-265; Thornton, John K. "African War and World History," in *Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800* ed. Thornton, John K. (London, GBR: Routledge, 1999).
[60] Mozambique Information Office *News Review,* 149/50, March 1989 quoted in Hoile, ed., *Mozambique*, 124; Hanlon, *Mozambique,* 254.
[61] Note that the aim is not to make moral or legal judgments of righteousness of violence in warfare but to comprehend the motivations.

culture, ideological indoctrination and racism, dehumanization and objectification of humans and the conflict over control of local resources.

In warfare violence is produced at various levels. There is violence between military units and violence against civilians and ecosystems. In Europe, the unrestrained use of violence in warfare gradually led to the regulation of war conduct. Alarmed by brutal treatment of prisoners of war and civilians during warfare, the international community established the Geneva Conventions (1864, 1906, 1929, 1949 and 1977) that defined the basic wartime rights of civilian and military prisoners, established protection for the wounded and established battlefield medical care protection for the civilians.[62] Another preoccupation has been to restrain the use of chemical and biological weapons in war. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 regulating the laws of war and war crimes were reinforced by the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925 which prohibited the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and bacteriological methods in war.[63] These attempts to regulate the conduct of war show a preoccupation with 'humanizing' the conduct of war by discouraging the use of weapons of mass destruction and distinguishing between civilians from soldiers.

According to the Geneva and Hague Conventions, any militia that engages in indiscriminate violence against civilians commits war crimes. But an analysis of the wars that took place since these conventions were established shows that civilian victims are far

[62] See Anthony Dworkin, "The Laws of War in the Age of Asymmetric Conflict," *The Barbarization of Warfare*,Ed.George Kassimiris (London: Hurst and Company, 2006), 227; 221-237; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Conventions, Accessed on February 20, 2014;
[63] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geneva_Protocol, Accessed on February 20, 2014. For more international regulation on warfare conduct see David Lovell and Igor Primoratz (eds.), *Protecting Civilians During Violent Conflict: Theoretical and Practical Issues for the 21st Century* (Farnham, England: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2012), 2-3.

larger in number than military casualties. Civilians account for more than 90 per cent of war casualties in the world and more children than soldiers are killed.[64] It has been also observed that "at least 75 per cent of all fatalities in the wars of the late twentieth century were civilians."[65] In the Democratic Republic of Congo, "only six per cent of the total war-related deaths (2.5 million) were combatants."[66] By the end of twentieth century eight civilians were killed for every soldier that fell in the battle.[67]

There are various interpretations of this tendency to destroy civilians in war, including those questioning the statistical accuracy of civilians' victims. It is argued that because the laws of war have succeeded in protecting civilians' reports of large numbers of civilians victims must be taken with a grain of salt. Scholars have gone so far as to question the distinction between civilians and military in warfare. They point out that some of the people regarded as civilians are actually engaged in combat and are used to promote *lawfare,* the practice of using human shields to avoid direct confrontation with a relatively strong army.[68] Despite this controversy about statistics the majority of scholar and journalistic accounts concurs that the number of civilian victims in warfare has been increasing.[69]

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[64] Nordstrom, Carolyn, *A Different Kind of War Story* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 5.

[65] Daniel Rothbart, Karina V. Korostelina and Mohammad D. Cherkaoui, *Civilians and Modern War: Armed conflict and the ideology of violence* (London and NY: Routledge, 2012), 3.
[66] Rothbart, et al, *Civilians and Modern War,* 3.

[67] Igor Primoratz (ed.), *Civilian Immunity in War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 4.
[68] See Adam Roberts, "The Civilian in Modern War," in *The Changing Character of War* ed. Hew Strachan and Sibyille Scheipers (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 376-377.
[69] See George Kassimiris (ed.), *The Barbarization of Warfare* (London: Hurst and Company, 2006); Joanna Bourke, *The Second World War: A Peoples' History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2-5.

Influenced by Thomas Hobbes and Thucydides, some scholars have explained the use of violence as characteristic of the violent nature of humans. According to George Kassimeris, killing is part of innate characteristic of human beings. Warfare serves as an excuse for people to display their hidden desire for killing. As he puts it, "people behave with unspeakable savagery in wartime because this is the way things are, the propensity for cruelty is in all of us."[70] He goes on to argue that "the prosecution of war according to recognized laws has been an exception not the rule."[71] Killing, he contends, "is defensive, one kills because of fear of being killed by either the enemy or by one's superior."[72] In this perspective, killing is innate to human beings, and warfare is a pretext for its practice. To normalize killing one needs to objectify and dehumanize the other in order to overcome moral ethical constraints. In the case of Mozambique, this argument finds support in the number of killings of civilians outside the military confrontation.

It can be argued that in the initial stage of war, few states or guerrillas plan to attack noncombatants. Such violence appears as response to the failure of the initial projection of military victory.[73] As part of military strategy, barbarity against civilians is allowed to speed victory and to lower the number of deaths of combatants. In other cases, belligerents may opt for violence against civilians out of fear that their opponents may resort to it to gain advantage in the battlefield.[74] In 2006 this argument led military strategists such as the British Defense secretary John Reid and U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld to

[70] George Kassimeris, "The Warrior's Dishonour," in *Warrior's Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture in Modern Warfare, ed. George Kassimeris* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2006), 6.
[71] Kassimeris, "The Warrior's Dishonour," 8
[72] Kassimeris, "The Warrior's Dishonour," 8
[73] Alexander B. Downes, "Military Culture and Civilian Victimization: The Allied Bombing of Germany in World War II," in Rothbart, D. et al, *Civilians and Modern War,* 73.
[74] David W. Lovell, "Protecting Civilians," 1, 2 and 6.

ask for the revision of international war conventions to allow "enhanced interrogations techniques" or torture.[75] Despite the failure of their request, torture was widely used against suspected terrorists including civilians. This violation of Geneva conventions by global powers which claim to be guardians of law and order demonstrated that even well-established democracies sometimes engage in actions of violence against civilians.

Military strategists may also resort to violence due to the lack of clear distinction between civilians and militias. In this case, violence appears as response to civilians' complicity in warfare. Military necessity may result from the frustration of regular armies to track-down insurgents among civilians. In the American war on terror, it has become common to hear military commanders and journalists refer to civilian victims of aerial bombing as "collateral damage." Their deaths are presented as secondary effects of a major target which apparently cannot be reached without sacrificing the lives of civilians around it.

The key factor shared by explanations which stress military necessity and collateral damage is the control of people, territory and resources. People are regarded as key strategic asset. Belligerents get their conscripts, porters, informants and collaborators from local populations. Some members of the population may at different times perform the role of combatants, making it difficult to distinguish civilians from the military. There are many examples of this situation in European imperial wars in Africa. For example, German interpretation of military necessity allowed it to engage in acts of well-poisoning in the desert lands of modern day Namibia. This action was seen as indispensable to deprive the

[75] See Christopher Coker, *Ethics and War in the 21st Century* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 1-6.

enemy of the means of existence.[76] This pattern of warfare continued in the wars of independence in places such as Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia and Mozambique.[77] As it will be seen below, in Mozambique there were cases of contaminating wells with human corpses.

Violence has also been connected to ideological and racial factors. It is argued that the Geneva conventions up to 1949 were not concerned with people of color. "Moral and legal doctrines developed in the West and relating to warfare," argues Stephen Rockel, "were never meant to apply to conflicts between the so-called 'civilized' world and the "uncivilized," the colonizers and the colonized, or to conflicts involving white nations or people on one side and black, brown, or red people on the other."[78] In fact, despite the 1949 Geneva Conventions, no Western state has ever seen its military or political leadership prosecuted for war crimes against a non-Western nation.[79] This impunity endured despite evidence of massacres of civilians in the colonial wars that took place between the 1950s and 1970s in Malaya, Kenya, Algeria, Rhodesia, Angola and Mozambique.

One of the great effects of ideology is its capacity to create divisions among people who before the conflict lived together peacefully. The major goal of ideology and indoctrination is to create a culture of obedience to leadership, institutional complicity and

[76] Isabel Hull, "Laws of War in Imperial Germany," in *Order, Conflict, and Violence*, ed. Stathis N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 366.
[77] For more information on massacres of civilians in colonial wars see Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2005); Anderson, *History of the Hanged*; Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning*.

[78] Stephen J. Rockel, "Collateral Damage: A Comprehensive History," in *Collateral Damage: Civilian Causalities, War, and Empire*, ed. Stephen J. Rockel and Rick Halpern (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009), 17.
[79] Rockel, "Collateral Damage," 17.

an uneven structure of society where some people are ostracized.[80] This segmentation has accompanied the history of warfare up to present. Inspired by these principles, the military continue to label their enemies and people associated with them as if they are sub-human objects, an evil to be eradicated at any cost. These dichotomies played an important role on the massacres of civilians in the Pacific War of 1939-45, in the Vietnam War, and also in the Rwandan Genocide. In all cases, civilian victims were dehumanized with expressions such as 'japs' 'dirty,' 'commies,' and 'cockroaches.'[81]

Making these radical distinctions between perpetrator and victim "may be one of the reasons why warfare is so savage and why war crimes and atrocities are now integral to the very prosecution of war."[82] Thus, the increasing number of civilian fatalities in warfare is a result of objectification of human beings who are "seen as objects of war, frictions to the war machine, hindrance to the movement of forces, potential combatants, possible collaborators and possible collaborators with the enemy."[83]

Ideology, indoctrination and racism are intimately connected to politics of identity invention. Politicians play with identity politics to construct boundaries between identity groups. They frame the other in stereotypical ways that legitimize violence.[84] Identities are also based on the divide between what Simon Chesterman denominates as 'in-groups' and 'out-groups' which are often defined in terms of ethnicity, religion, language, or clan. This divide plays an important role in violence against civilians. According to Simon

[80] See Amalendu Misra, *Politics of Civil Wars: Conflict, Intervention and Resolution* (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 51-52.
[81] See Joanna Bourke, "Barbarization verus Civilization," in *The Barbarization of Warfare, ed. George Kassimeris* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2006), 30-31.
[82] George Kassimeris, "The Warrior's Dishonour," in George Kassimeris, *The Barbarization of Warfare*, 8.
[83] Rothbart, D. et al, *Civilians and Modern War*, 8.
[84] Rothbart, D. et al, *Civilians and Modern War*, 9.

Chesterman, "in general, it is expected that militias will treat in-groups better than out-groups. The more heavily a militia depends on the population it controls; the more likely it will be to limit the harm done on this population."[85] In-groups and out-groups are also created in the name of national defense. When the ruling elites see their position under threat, they are more likely to redefine and denigrate identities. This involves accusing the insurgents of treason and recasting citizens as enemy's agents. Putting an emphasis on defending the country against external forces, governments give themselves the right to redefine the citizens' identities.[86]

Violence against civilians has been also explained as the characteristic of the contentious concept of 'new wars'. 'New wars,' also referred to as 'post-modern wars', 'wars of the third kind', or 'peoples wars,' are said to lack the civility of the 'old wars' in the following aspects: "old wars were motivated by ideology or collective grievances; had broad popular support; limited violence to the instrumental; and largely respected the distinction between combatants and non-combatants so that many soldiers than civilians were killed."[87] In contrast, 'the new wars' "are motivated by greed and a desire to loot; lack of popular support; gratuitous or excessive violence; and disregard for the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, so that many civilians than soldiers are killed."[88] It has been argued that unlike inter-state wars, which were often seen as wars of self-defense, the new wars involve members of certain identity groups and resurrect medieval

[85] Chesterman, *Civilians in War*, 46, 59.
[86] See Karina V. Korostelina, "The Plight of Crimean Tartars and Californians of Asian descent during the World War II," in Rothbart, D. et al, *Civilians and Modern War*, p.52.
[87] Uwe Steinhoff, "Why there is no Barbarization but a Lot of Barbarity in Warfare," in *Warrior's Dishonour: Barbarity, Morality and Torture in Modern Warfare, ed. George Kassimeris* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2006), 101.
[88] Steinhoff, "Why there is no Barbarization, 101.

ideas of just war as punishment for wrongdoing. These wars, it is contended, are based on crude notions of collective responsibility and guilt.[89] In these wars, even those deemed as merely sympathetic to the enemy are subject to punishment.

Although some of the distinctions between characteristics of old and new wars look reasonable, they fail to pass the test of historical evidence. As it has been observed, there is no clear boundary between the characteristics of old and new wars. Killing civilians, it is contended, has been a common practice in the history of humanity and it has been associated with an extreme unwillingness to risk the lives of one's own soldiers. For example, United States' over-reliance on air strikes on civilians and environments is an indication of both the prevalence of barbarity and the unwillingness to risk the lives of one's own soldiers.[90] For some scholars, "those who argue that violence against civilians is exclusive practice of the 'new wars', their conclusion are drawn from incomplete or biased evidence. In fact, the distinction between old and new wars is false. Violence is the central component of all kinds of civil war, ethnic and non-ethnic alike."[91] Violence against peasants had been a common practice in the Spanish and Russian civil wars and the abduction of children to turn them into soldiers was widespread in the Afghan war against Soviet invasion and in the Guatemalan, El Salvador and Nicaragua civil wars.[92]

Having observed that the distinction between 'new' and 'old' wars does not explain the predominance of violence in warfare, it is important to underline that there is no single explanation for the varieties of violence in warfare. It is also important to stress that the

[89] Primoratz, ed., *Civilian Immunity in War,* 15
[90] Steinhoff, "Why there is no Barbarization, 105-106.
[91] Stathis Kalyvas, "New" and "Old" Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?" *World Politics* 54 (2001), 114.
[92] Kalyvas, "New and Old Wars",115

debate over the excessive use of violence in warfare is ideologically charged. Different groups explain the use of violence according to their cultural and political standing. In this context it is relevant to focus on selective and indiscriminate violence against specific groups in the population. Selective violence requires private information which may be provided to the military by political actors including civilians in areas where they lack complete control. In areas of higher level of military control, people are more likely to denounce defectors because they run low risk of retribution. The denunciation of defectors "constitutes a new micro-foundation of intimate violence, and hence, civil war."[93] Informants turn to denunciation to settle accounts with personal and local enemies. In so doing, they turn the military contenders of the civil war into their own proxies to resolve personal conflicts. Thus, one of the reasons that make civil war so violent is the opportunity for indirect violence.[94] This suggests a need to shift from global to local considerations to explain violence against civilians. Without taking for granted all explanations discussed in this section, both the selective and indiscriminate violence approaches appear to be useful for the understanding of violence against civilians in Mozambique.

Shifting the explanation of violence against civilians from a global to local perspective and from inter-state conflict to local contexts, it seems that violence is intimately connected to access and control of resources such as material items that help insurgent or rebel groups to achieve their goals. These resources include food, guns, water, forests, wildlife and civilians. In the Mozambican case and other civil wars throughout Africa, insurgent groups have been based in rural areas. Considering that in rural areas

[93] Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press 2006), 14.
[94] Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, 14.

people live off the land, the control of extensive productive areas is of particular importance to an insurgent group. For example, a comparative study of insurgents' behavior in South Sudan, Colombia and Turkey concluded that insurgents treat local citizens violently when they face active rivalry for access to resources. It showed that insurgents will use violence against civilians when they realize that their opponents, including the state, are gaining control of the region's resources.[95]

Having lived in a contested area during the Mozambican civil war, I find this argument persuasive. One has to keep in mind that insurgent groups are by definition the antithesis of the established regime or government. The insurgency and the government are in a struggle over the control of the territory, people and other resources. In this struggle, "violence is strategic and at times the only option left to armed groups. Insurgents use violence selectively to gather information among local populations and the administration of violence is a response to local dynamics"[96] Claire Metelits comes close to explaining the experience of the civil war in Mozambique when she states that "if an insurgent group obtains food for its soldiers from local farmers, it wants to be the only group doing so."[97] As it will be demonstrated below most of the atrocities committed against civilians in Mozambique were directed against people who allegedly supported one of the contenders.

[95] Claire Metelits, *Inside Insurgency: Violence, Civilians, and Revolutionary Group Behavior*, (New York and London: New York University Press, 2010), 11.
[96] Metelits, *Inside Insurgency*, 24.
[97] Metelits, *Inside Insurgency*, 11.

The Logic of Violence in Southern Mozambique

This section has several purposes. First it analyzes the intricacies of violence in Mozambique's civil war. It then argues that in the case of Mozambique, violence against civilians has historical roots and was often determined by local political, economic, environmental and social factors. It also challenges the received idea that Mozambique in the 1970s and 1980s was facing an atypical war, a war without parallel in the history of warfare in Mozambique. Further it questions the assumption that only RENAMO guerrillas committed gruesome atrocities against civilians, while government troops were disciplined guardians of law and order. Finally it agrees with Jessica Schafer's observation that blaming only RENAMO for violence against civilians leads to an interpretation of "the post-independence war in isolation from historical experiences of armed conflict and violence in Mozambique, implying that it was unique in its means and ends."[98] Like Joanna Bourke, this section sees warfare "as much about the business of sacrificing others as it is about being sacrificed."[99]

War-time looting and violence against civilians in Mozambique has a long history. The brutality that characterized the civil war in Mozambique resembles pre-colonial and global practices of warfare. In fact, there is evidence of continuity in the way the military relied on violence to control strategic civilian resources such as cattle, water sources, and above all, people. Civilians were targeted during the Angoni wars of the second-half of the nineteenth century and also during the colonial wars. In the nineteenth century, historians,

[98] Jessica Schafer, *Soldiers at Peace: Veterans and Society after the Civil War in Mozambique* (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2007), 54.
[99] Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing: Face to Face Killing in the Twentieth Century Warfare* (London: Great Books, 1999), 374

traveler writers and oral tradition made reference to drought, warfare, violence and famine.[100] It was under these dire circumstances that southern Africa witnessed the controversial phenomenon of Mfecane, a long period of military violence and population movements in the whole southeastern Africa.[101] The immediate impact of Mfecane was the formation of Gaza state (1821 - 1895) in the territory of modern-day southern and central Mozambique with its capital in Mandlakazi, modern-day Gaza Province.[102]

The functioning of Gaza state and the attitude of its army towards civilians help us to understand a pattern of violence against civilians in the history of southern Africa. As it happened in the late twentieth century civil war in Mozambique, the Gaza state used its military might to compel the payment of tribute in cattle and other goods. During his visit to Southern Mozambique in 1873-1874, the trader Mr. St. Vincent Erskine observed that *"*the Umgonis (Nguni) or Zulu section of the community subsist mainly by robbing the Tongas. The country, although fertile in itself, is consequently always in a state of approximate famine."[103] In fact, looting appears to have been a common practice of the Gaza state administration. Along the Save River, Mr. St. Erskine observed that, "rice of a very fine quality is grown along the lower Sabi, but not in any quantity, because the Tongas are in constant dread of attracting the notice and rapacity of their Zulu [Angoni]

[100] Charles Ballard, "Drought and Economic Distress: South Africa in the 1800s," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 1, 17, (2), (1986), 359-378; Gerhard Liesegang, "Nguni Migrations between Delagoa Bay and Zambezi, 1821-1839," *African Historical Studies*, Vol.3, No.2 (1997), 317-337; V. Erskine and Dr. Mann, "Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza, or Southern Mozambique, 1873 to 1874, and 1874 to 1875," *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society of London*, Vol. 48 (1878), 25-56.
[101] For more details about Mfecane, see C. Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1995).
[102] For more details on the history of Gaza state see Gerhard Liesegang, "Notes on the internal structure of the Gaza Kingdom of Southern Mozambique," in: *Before and after Shaka: Papers in Nguni History,* ed., Peires, J.B. (Grahamstown: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Rhodes University, 1981), 179
[103] Vincent Erskine and Dr. Mann, "Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza," 27.

oppressors."[104] Mr. St. Erskine's observation sheds light on the practice of extracting food from civilians has long historical roots in the region.

Another indication of continuity in Mozambican warfare is cattle plundering. When the Gaza-Nguni warriors attacked Quiteve, in modern-day Manica Province 1830, "they took all cattle which existed (…) as well as the [nearly grown up] boys and girls, the first as soldiers and the second as wives, killing the rest, even babies."[105] According to Antonio Rita-Ferreira, the Gaza state organized frequent pillage of cattle. Cattle, he explains, constituted ideal food for warriors due to its mobility and protein value.[106]

In nationalist historiography and public media, cattle raiding, kidnapping and murdering were key factors in the construction of RENAMO guerrillas' image as armed bandits. However, these practices were not introduced by RENAMO. In fact, even the practice of transforming children into soldiers precedes RENAMO's appearance. Both pre-colonial and post-independence belligerents engaged in a continuous struggle for the control of people and natural resources.

During the civil war, violence involved a process of identity redesignation. People under government control were distinguished from those under RENAMO influence by selectively stripping them of their citizenship and labeling them as agents of imperialism or communism, according to each camp of the war. Under the pretext of Cold War, there was a process of indoctrination that created an ideological divide between the local contenders. Further the involvement of foreign mercenaries provided a racial discourse to

[104] Vincent Erskine and Dr. Mann, "Third and Fourth Journeys in Gaza," 29.
[105] Liesegang, "Nguni Migrations," p.325.
[106] António Rita-Ferreira, "Memórias do Instituto de Investigação Científica de Moçambique," no. 11, Série C. Lourenço Marques, 1974.

the civil war. Throughout the conflict the belligerents' war propaganda messages coined derogatory images about their enemies and dehumanized fellow citizens in the enemy's camp.

It is important to observe that the control of people and the definition of their identity in the war zone were fluid. In southern Mozambique, ascribed and claimed identities and the control of certain regions by particular forces were continuously changing. Areas under control of FRELIMO or RENAMO were fluid and unstable. Even the idea of belonging or not belonging to a certain group was constantly renegotiated. As will be demonstrated below through interviews, the lack of clear distinction between FRELIMO government troops and RENAMO guerrillas forced people to develop strategies of identifying their military interlocutors before claiming loyalty. The contenders constructed new identities that dehumanized the enemy and its supporters. RENAMO guerrillas were framed as the others, invaders, bad guys, and evildoers. On the other hand, RENAMO portrayed government troops as Communists, *ma-Kepisos,*[107] among other pejorative expressions. By portraying the opponent as an evil-doer, military commanders associated civilians deemed those who collaborated with the enemy as collaborators. This categorization legitimized the use of violence against civilians. In fact, one of the legacies of the civil war in Mozambique is the creation of two opposing identities, the FRELIMO people and the so-called "other guys," (RENAMO). [108]

[107] Corrupted term that refers to military caps. The use of caps was one of things that differentiated government troops from RENAMO guerrillas.
[108] "The other guys" is a literal translation of Va yisa lavayani in Xi-changana and Xitswa languages. It was a code word to refer to RENAMO guerrillas

The invention of identities took also a form of geographic localism and linguistic markers. RENAMO appeared as a movement led by people from central Mozambique and it used Ndau, a language from that region, as its official language. Even guerrillas recruited in non-Ndau speaking communities of Southern Mozambique had to learn Ndau. During my fieldwork, I was interested to observe how my interviewees mimicked the way RENAMO guerrillas spoke. Expressions such as *ati yendi* (let's go), *tita fela bazwini* (you will die in the base), *ti djula ku wisa* (do you want to rest? meaning to die) are part of the vocabulary legacy of civil war. The politicization of language identities reenacted old divergences between central and southern Mozambique. In fact the two regions have been part of power struggles in Mozambique since pre-colonial time.[109] Recently RENAMO has been identified with central Mozambique, while the southern region is regarded the bastion of the ruling party, FRELIMO.

During the war the majority of the government officials, including the two presidents that commanded the war against RENAMO, were southerners. This may also explain RENAMO's excesses against civilians in this region. It is said that RENAMO's commander in southern Mozambique, General Gomes ordered his men to kidnap everyone who could walk and to kill ill people and elders.[110] Scholars and journalists writing on the civil war in Mozambique confirm that in fact RENAMO killed more civilians in the southern region than in central and northern regions. Looking at the post-war political landscape, this regional distinction makes sense, but its proponents do not provide an explanation for this selective violence. I asked some RENAMO war veterans about the

[109] See Nkomo, *Urias Simango*.
[110] Boaventura Massaiete,*Chicualacuala: A Guerra na Fronteira, 1975-1992* (Tese de Licenciatura, UEM, Faculdade de Letras, Departamento de História, Maputo, 1999).

cause of this attitude. According to one former RENAMO guerrilla, there were no strict orders to kill people but those who were suspected of collaborating with the government or who attempted to run away from RENAMO areas were killed. This explanation sheds light on the understanding of the dichotomization of identities as an explanation for the use of violence against civilians. It appears that once people became associated with a particular identity they lost their human character making it easy to kill them.

The dehumanization and objectification of humans took its most effective form in the public media propaganda. An overview of the major newspapers that circulated in Mozambique during the war shows that it was not until the beginning of peace talks in 1990 that the government referred to its enemy as RENAMO. Throughout the war period, RENAMO was presented as puppet of the external aggression by racist groups in the region. Its guerrillas were presented as dirty, barbarous evildoers and savages, to mention but few attributes. Having represented them as inhuman, it became legitimate to kill them and those who assisted them. In fact, the 1979 law on 'crimes against the security of the people and the people's state' targeted, among others, civilians accused of collaborating with the so-called armed bandits.[111] In the implementation of this law, the government organized public gatherings to witness executions of alleged agents of imperialism. For example, in 1983 the Mozambique Information Agency (AIM) reported that "on April 2, six men were sentenced to death under the law on crimes against the security of the people and people's state. Two of the six accused were members of the South African-sponsored 'Mozambique National Resistance', and were found guilty of crimes of terrorism."[112] Their

[111] Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique (thereafter AHM), Agência de Informação de Moçambique (thereafter AIM, 83, April-May, 1983), 19.
[112] AHM, *AIM*, 83, April-May, 1983, 19.

executions were public, and the condemned were referred to as members of externally sponsored organization, making their deaths less frightening in the eyes of common citizens. These public executions and military propaganda against the so-called armed bandits were broadcast in the public media making it accessible to RENAMO guerrillas.

These developments might explain RENAMO's own execution of prisoners of war and civilians who lived in areas under the influence of the government. The fact that RENAMO guerrillas listened to public broadcasting propaganda calling them a band of savages may have compelled them to act in vengeance. As I show below, ordinary people say RENAMO killed everyone suspected of supporting or becoming government troops and became intolerant of people living under government control.

The killings became more acute as the government blurred the distinction between civilians and military by arming civilians to defend themselves against RENAMO. In a highly attended public gathering at the independence square in Maputo, President Samora Machel asked people what they needed in order to fight the 'bandits.' They replied in loud cheers, 'give us guns!' He held similar a gathering in Inhambane province where again, large crowds demanded guns.[113] On all such occasions, Machel made only symbolic distribution of guns to civilians. Throughout the country, local political structures in collaboration with local military commanders continued the distribution of guns to civilians. In another public gathering held in Manhiça district, north of Maputo city, President Samora Machel ordered civilians to take responsibility in defending national sovereignty and for promoting economic development. He argued that to achieve those

[113] It is not clear whether these demands were voluntary or were orchestrated by the government but people ended up receiving guns.

goals it was necessary to eliminate the bandits. As he put it, "we must kill the bandits, don't capture them; kill them!"[114]

RENAMO knew about the arming of civilians. Perhaps this explains RENAMO's decision to not distinguish the military from civilians. Many civilians suspected of being military were killed in this period. One among various victims was my cousin aged sixteen. He was kidnapped while wearing a belt suspected of being part of a military uniform. Despite denying that he was a soldier, RENAMO guerrillas cut off his penis and killed him afterwards. Like him, many young men were killed because they had marks in their shoulders or because their feet and legs had scars. Having marks on the shoulders and legs was regarded as an indication of carrying a gun (AK 47) or of wearing military boots.

Another indication that the attack on civilians may have been a reaction to government militarization of civilians is "messages" sent to the government by prisoners released by RENAMO. Some of these came back with their mouths or limbs cut off. According to testimonies collected in the region of study, RENAMO ordered people who it had cut mouths to go to smile to President Machel.[115] In this case the message was not directed only to President Machel but to civilians who cheered war propaganda and the execution of RENAMO's war prisoners. By cutting peoples' lips and limbs RENAMO sent a strong message to government supporters to shut up and stop supporting the government.

The distribution of guns to civilians encouraged intra-community violence. Many of the local militias (civilians armed by government) lacked military discipline and, unlike the military, they received neither salary nor uniforms. They only received guns and

[114] AHM, *AIM* 102, January 1985, 3.
[115] Interview with Celeste Jossai Mbenzane, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.

ammunitions. Living in a context of warfare, they had little time to farm. To make things worse, they operated in the context of severe drought and the military put them in the frontline.[116] Having families to sustain, these militias used weapons to compel the support from civilians and, because they were known in the community, they were likely to kill their victims to avoid denunciation.

The distribution of guns to civilians gave an opportunity to some people to settle accounts with local enemies. One informant's experience of seeing her husband gunned down in a dispute over a marital affair is an indication of how the proliferation of guns exacerbated violence.[117] Arming local militias transformed justice into a violent enterprise. In many villages, militia men presided as judges of different types of crimes and administrated floggings to people accused of witchcraft, adultery and theft. Based on the power of guns, local militias became an instrument for violence and terror among the villagers. As one woman has observed, it was a common practice for people to denounce those with whom they had problems or envied in order to see them arrested, flogged or even killed for collaborating with the enemy.[118]

Jealousy and envy were significant cause of violence during the civil war. As it has been observed in the introduction, one of the characteristics of the southern region of Mozambique is that it sends migrant labor to South African gold mines. Due to poor soils and drought agriculture in southern Mozambique is not a reliable source of food and income. Poor families work for food on the farms of those who have alternative sources of income, especially mineworkers, relatives of bureaucratic officials in big cities and cattle

[116] Interview with Johane Tavane Moiane, Mbokoda, Massangena, August 16, 2013.
[117] Interview with Cristina Feijão Matavele, Maculuve, Mabote, August 07, 2013
[118] Interview with Deolinda José Macuacua, Tome, Funhalouro, August 22, 2013.

owners. Even when the region receives rainfall, poor families may not have yet prepared their farms for planting. Consequently, even in years of good harvests, this segment of people has no enough food and is forced to continue working on the farms of the better offs not only for food but for other essential goods such as soap, kerosene and cloth. This quasi-permanent dependency creates resentment among the rural communities and, when the region was affected by war, some people saw it as an opportunity for vengeance.

As a teenager, I was intrigued by hearing people claim that RENAMO guerrillas who had been raiding our village in Inhambane Province were looking for the Pave family. This family was considered rich by local standards. It had two brothers working in South African mines. It also employed people to work on their farms in the exchange for cloth, school material and food. It was not until my fieldwork in December 2013 that I understood the logic of these rumors. In an informal conversation with friends I came to see that in the process of exchanging goods for labor, the Pave family was regarded as unjust, arrogant and exploitative. It was believed that the Pave assigned heavy tasks for little reward.[119] This sentiment of injustice together with jealousy explains the rumors that RENAMO guerrillas were looking for the Pave household. In fact, one of the Pave brothers was killed in a car ambush on his way back to South Africa.

Another example of how people used the civil war to settle personal quarrels comes from my family in Inhambane Province. My father worked in South African mine in Free State and my mother worked as a seamstress. Like the Pave and other families with non-agricultural income, we had people working for us in exchange for goods such as sugar,

[119] Informal conversation with Jerónimo Mubai and Horácio Valente Massangaie, Zavala, December 2013.

cloth, soup, kerosene, school material and salt. It was quite strange when suddenly we heard rumors that RENAMO guerrillas called our village "Free State." Later on, in 1990, my mother together with my aunt and my two young sisters aged one and seven, were kidnapped. At this time the village was experiencing severe drought and famine which caused some deaths. Strangely, the alleged RENAMO guerrillas had extensive knowledge of our belongings and demanded my mother to hand them over. As she denied having all the belongings listed by guerrillas, they threatened to kill her. This prompted my seven year-old sister to lead the guerrillas to the place where the stuffs were hidden. My mother's attitude infuriated the rebels, and they forced her to carry a heavy load with a baby in her back. After walking a distance of approximately 20 miles, she was exhausted. When she asked for time to rest, the guerrillas killed the baby on her back with bayonets and stabbed her, leaving her unconscious. Thanks to my father's love and perseverance he recovered her alive after two days of sorrow. He carried her over 15 miles to the main road where she got help to reach the hospital. There were many rumors and interpretations of this episode, including one claiming that the people who kidnapped them were not 'real' RENAMO guerrilla but local militias, including our neighbors. Whether these allegations were true or false we will never know, but it is clear that the civil war in Mozambique created various opportunities that fed indiscriminate and selective violence against civilians. Throughout the country there are several examples of civilians and militaries using the situation of warfare to pursue private business.

Another example of selective violence and of using warfare as a pretext to settle personal ambition is the attack on mineworkers. Looking at the cases of car ambushes at National Road Number 1 (N1) as well as at the pillage of private property, it is clear that

mineworkers were the targets of both government and RENAMO guerrillas. As one informant stated in an interview, it was quite strange that RENAMO guerrillas knew about his return from the mines and had specific information about what he had brought. In his own words: "This level of detail about my personal life was provided by someone who knew me very well. There were many false warriors. People knew who was better-off in the village and organized gangs that pretended to be RENAMO's soldiers. Many of the killings and lootings that occurred in the village were perpetrated by locals or in collaboration with RENAMO guerrillas. That's why I decided to leave this area of Metchisso until the end of war in 1992."[120] According to some informants, mineworkers were victims of jealousy. In the eyes of the military, mineworkers were enjoying good life, while they were risking their lives as soldiers to protect miners' families and property.[121] This observation is very important, because the economy of Mozambique collapsed during the war and even in big cities like the capital Maputo, the shops ran out of stock. Only those working in South Africa managed to buy clothes and other goods including cars making them better off.[122]

According to my interviewees, some people were targeted just because they had beautiful wives. This situation was common in both government and RENAMO guerrilla camps. If it happened that an ordinary guerrilla had a beautiful wife or partner, it is said that his commander might deploy him to the most difficult missions to have him killed. Another informant tells the story of local militias who, as they patrolled in the evening,

[120] Interview with David Moiseis Chitlango, Mechisso, Mabote, August 8, 2013.
[121] Interview with Albertina Daniel Chirindza, Saúte, Chigubo, August 28, 2013
[122] The selective attack against mineworkers puts in question thesis that RENAMO was South Africa's pawn. If that was the case it is not clear why would it disrupt supplies of mine labor to its strategic ally. Some would argue that it intended to destabilize Mozambican economy but taking into account the high cost of recruitment and training of mineworkers it also hit South African economy.

passed a house where a couple was having sexual intercourse. Annoyed with the couples' screams, the militiamen banged the door, accusing the man of abusing his wife. The man was arrested and flogged and spent the night in the military barracks. According to my informant, the man was arrested because he was having good time while others were risking their lives.[123] This episode may appear trivial but it shows the diversity of factors that made the civil war in Mozambique a violent enterprise.

Another explanation for violence against civilians in Mozambican civil war involved the excessive use of alcohol and marijuana. Government and RENAMO troops were not allowed to consume alcohol while in duty but I remember seeing many soldiers drinking while in uniform. In fact, much of the physical violence against civilians, particularly flogging, was administrated by drunken soldiers. According to a former RENAMO guerrilla, guerrillas were not allowed to drink in the barracks but during their missions they abused alcohol. In addition to alcohol, the use of stimulants such as marijuana is widely recognized as one of the reasons behind the atrocities committed against civilians. My informants characterized the military as people who had red eyes because of smoking marijuana. One government war veteran remembers that in one of RENAMO bases that they destroyed, they found extensive gardens of marijuana. But he did not know whether the marijuana was intended for RENAMO consumption or for export.[124]

Violence against civilians was also a consequence of the breakdown of government troops' logistics together with the impact of severe drought that affected southern

[123] Informal conversation with Salvador Chavana, Maputo, October 12, 2013.
[124] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote-Sede, August 20, 2013.

Mozambique in the 1980s and 1990s.[125] According to one war veteran, a Mozambican citizen returning from the South African mines with his van full of goods was attacked by an armed group in Massinga district. Luckily he escaped and arrived home the following day. To his disbelief, he found some of the goods that he was transporting in his car in his own house. He questioned the wife about the provenance of goods and he found out that she received them from a soldier with whom she was having a love affair. The miner notified local military authorities about the occurrence but the only sanction applied to the militaries involved in this attack on civilians was to be transferred to other district.[126] There were reports of similar incidents in most of the attacks against civilian cars in N1 Road with particular incidence on the mineworkers. These episodes show the complexity of the causes and nature of violence against civilians in warfare context.

Conclusion

An analysis of the literature on the Mozambican civil war showed that scholars diverge on the causes of the conflict as well as on the contribution of internal and external factors. It also showed that the scholarship of the civil war in Mozambique is dominated by blaming narratives about the use of violence against civilians. The chapter demonstrated the merits and demerits of these explanations and concluded that they complement each other. It acknowledged that in the transition from the colonial regime to independence many mistakes were committed which provided enough ingredients for the outbreak of the civil

[125] See chapter 4
[126] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote-Sede, August 20, 2013.

war. These internal conflicts facilitated the intervention of external forces such as the right wing minority regimes of South Rhodesia and South Africa and the global Cold War politics in southern Africa. Thus, although the war began as an external aggression, it evolved into a violent civil war with devastating effects on the Mozambicans livelihoods.

An analysis of violence against civilians during the civil war in Mozambique showed that violence resulted from a combination of diverse factors including the location of vital resources, drought and famine, lack of discipline among the armed groups, individual behavior of commanders, political indoctrination, military necessity, dehumanization of the enemy through war propaganda, proliferation of guns in civilians' hands, personal disputes provoked by jealousy and envy. The diversity of factors that contributed to violence against civilians during the Mozambican civil war shows that the war followed a general pattern of military conflicts in other parts of the world. But because Mozambique has its specific environmental, economic, social, cultural and political characteristics some of the explanation of violence on civilians in other parts of the world may not find full application in Mozambican context.

Having reviewed the literature on the historiography of the civil war in Mozambique and looked at the global and local explanations of violence in warfare context, it appears that while new research on the Mozambican civil war has begun to embrace a more inclusive approach, there are vital aspects which are not addressed such the contribution of civilians to the war effort and the economic social and environmental conditions in which the war took place. Little is said about the impact of warfare on people and wildlife. It is not clear how specific environment features influence the way war is

fought and experienced by people. The following chapter addresses these shortcomings by suggesting a social and environmental approach of warfare in Mozambique.

CHAPTER III

WARFARE, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES: THE BASIS FOR A NEW APPROACH

Introduction

As was observed in the previous chapter, the relationship between warfare and environment in Mozambique is poorly understood. This chapter analyses the way scholars have studied this relationship. Learning from global case studies, it suggests a social and environmental approach for the study of the civil war in Mozambique. It argues that war disrupted ecologies and environmental relationships in the countryside making villagers more vulnerable to drought, hunger and illness in a way they had not been before. It focuses on three major topics: the environment of the war zone, the relationship between natural adversity and war experience, and the logistics and morale of the belligerents.

The Relationship between Warfare, Environment and Natural Resources

The literature on warfare and environment has focused on macro-economics and geopolitics at the expenses of personal experiences. It also limits environmental factors to strategic natural resources such as water, arable land, wildlife, minerals and oil.[127] Its

[127] In addition to this view of environment, this dissertation pays attention to political, economic, social and technological environments.

analysis of the relationship between environment, natural resources and warfare is dominated by the preoccupation with verifying whether the abundance or scarcity of natural resources was a cause of war. Inspired by Cold War and post-Cold War civil wars in various parts of the world, some scholars developed the thesis of natural resources curse.[128] This thesis asserts that the abundance of natural resources such as crude oil, diamonds cobalt and uranium was the major cause of wars in Africa.

Other scholars went on to argue that the scarcity of resources, together with natural disasters such as droughts, were the cause of many military conflicts in the post-Second World War period. Others reject this argument saying that environmental stress is more likely to result in voluntary migration rather than war. Other scholars reject both ideas of the natural resources curse and the scarcity of natural as causes of war. They argue that the presence or absence of natural resources has no direct impact on the potential for military confrontation. While natural resources can be used to fuel an armed conflict, they say, they cannot be blamed for causing warfare.[129]

Beyond the causation debate, scholars have analyzed also the environmental consequences of warfare. Scholars have stressed the ecological effects that war brings about on the environment and on living organisms as well as the influence of environment

[128] The advocates of this thesis include Niles French, "The Coltan Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo" in *War and Peace in Africa* ed. Toyin Falola and Raphael Chijioke Njoku (Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 2010); Jedrzej George Frynas and Geoffrey Wood, "Oil and War in Angola," *Review of African Political Economy*, 28, 90 (2001): 587-606; Michael Watts, "Imperial Oil, the Anatomy of a Nigerian Oil Insurgency," *Erdkunde*, 62, No.1 (2008): 27-39; Paul S. Orogun, "The Political Economy of Armed Conflicts and Economic Violence in Modern Africa," *Perspectives on Global Development and Technology*, 2, 2 (2003): 283-313; Assis Malaquias, "Making War and Lots of Money: Political Economy of Protracted Conflict in Angola," *Review of African Political Economy*, 28, 90 (2001): 521-536.

[129] See Brenda Shaffer and Taleh Ziyadov, eds., *Beyond the Resource Curse* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001).

on war processes.[130] One environmental historian emphasizes the strength of the linkages between ecological and political affairs in general. Taking the impact of diseases in warfare as example, he argues that as vectors of transmission of yellow fever and malaria, mosquitos "underpinned the geopolitical order in the Americas until the 1770s, after which they undermined it, ushering in a new era of independent states."[131] He shows that mosquito-transmitted diseases initially slowed down British conquests of Spanish Americas, but later helped revolutionary Americans and Haitians to defeat European armies who were susceptible to yellow fever and malaria.

The recognition of the reciprocal impact of geopolitics and ecology was embraced by other scholars including those who looked at the impact of war on wildlife conservation. Writing on the impact of warfare in Vietnam, one scholar observes that "fourteen percent of the country's tropical forests and more than 50 per cent of its coastal mangroves were defoliated by aerial application of agent orange and other herbicides."[132] Shifting from Southeast Asia to Africa, he observes that in Mozambique and Rwanda, civil wars have often been associated with increasing poaching of elephants, hippos and other large ungulates."[133]

Also dealing with the impact of Cold War on fauna, a study conducted in Korea, Indochina and Afghanistan argues that animals and their habitats were very much victims

[130] See Farina "An Essay"; John Lewallen, *Ecology of Devastation: Indochina* (Baltimore, MD.: Penguin Books Inc., 1971).
[131] J.R. McNeill, *Mosquito Empires: Ecology and War in the Greater Caribbean, 1620-1914* (Cambridge, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.
[132] Thor Ranson, "War and Biodiversity Conservation: The Role of Warfare Ecology", in *Warfare Ecology: A New Synthesis for Peace and Security*, ed. MACHLIS, G.E. at al. (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, Springer Science Business Media B.V., 2011)
[133] Thor Ranson, "War and Biodiversity"

of superpower rivalries and the conflicts that they generated.[134] It explains that, like humans, animals are casualties of warfare. Like humans, it contends, animals may be forced to flee a war zone and become refugees in contiguous areas.[135] It goes further to observe that even in post-conflict periods, animals are at risk due to the proliferation of landmines, the breakdown of veterinary services and displacement of livestock during and following the conflict. The influx of refugees putting pressure on natural resources, it argues, can deplete wildlife habitat gravely.[136] Taking the example of Vietnam, it shows that species such as tigers, rats and termites saw their numbers increase due to availability of food brought about by war. The study concludes that "from animal perspective, war affects the food supply, alters the biotic relationships between ecosystems, and can even create new environments that benefit some species more than others. It is noteworthy to underline that this study brings an optimistic but controversial view of the impact of warfare on wildlife and livestock. By emphasizing both negative and positive impact of warfare on wildlife, these studies show the complex nature of the relationship between warfare and environment.

Also writing on the environmental consequences of war, one scholar takes the examples of the Vietnam and the 1991 Persian Gulf War to argue that warfare has detrimental environmental consequences such as destruction of ecological regions, human and wildlife.[137] On the other hand, he also argues that warfare can contribute to the

[134] Greg Bankoff, "Curtain of Silence: Asia's Fauna in the Cold War" in *Environmental Histories of the Cold War*, ed. J.R. McNeill and Corinna R. Unger (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 203.
[135] Greg Bankoff, "Curtain of Silence," 204.
[136] Greg Bankoff, "Curtain of Silence," 209.
[137] Jürgen Brauer, *War and Nature: The Environmental Consequences of War in a Globalized World* (Lanham; New York: Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2009).

preservation of natural ecosystems. Taking the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea as example, he observes that the zone became a haven for wildlife. Similarly, he observes that in Angola and Cambodia minefields limit human resettlement, creating refuges for wildlife.[138]

Like Asian Cold War hotspots, African ecosystems suffered the impact of warfare. But the environmental approach of the study of warfare is in its infancy. Several studies conducted in Africa are based on secondary sources and generalize their findings to the rest of the continent. Overall they do not pay attention to the experiences of rural society and their environments.[139] Among the few studies that paid attention to the environmental dimension of warfare is one research report based on secondary sources and official records. It focuses on the impact of warfare on wildlife, particularly the large mammals. It presents a gloomy picture of natural resources plunder in Gorongosa National Park and Marromeu Reserve in central Mozambique by government troops and their Zimbabwean allies as well as RENAMO's guerrillas in collaboration with South African allies.[140] Despite its focus on biodiversity and war, this study has the limitation of putting more emphasis on militaries to the detriment of local people. Moreover, it sees biodiversity as limited to big mammals with high commercial value.

Another study situates the consequences of war on environment in the context of Cold War proxy wars. It observes that proxy wars in Asia, Angola, Mozambique, Central America and Middle East were fought in remote rural landscapes by poor and hungry

[138] Brauer, *War and Nature,* xvii.
[139] JoAnn McGregor, "Violence and Social Change in a Border Economy: War in the Maputo Hinterland, 1984-1992," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24 No.1 (1998): 37-60, is an exception in this regard.
[140] John Hatton, Mia Couto and Judy Oglethorpe. *Biodiversity and War: A Case Study in Mozambique* (Washington, D.C.: Biodiversity Support Program, 2001).

people. It points out that in Mozambique and Angola, "the fragility of ecosystems made the ecological damage hard to repair, and the poverty of the affected populations made environmental warfare an especially effective political tool."[141]Bearing in mind that environmental conditions are key factor in the conduct of warfare as well as in the way it experienced by people, the next section shifts the study of warfare and environment from global to local approach.

The Environment of the War Zone

Environmental conditions shape the conduct of war in various ways. They help to determine the establishment of military camps, launching military offensives and mobilizing key resources for the conduct of war. This section analyzes the relationship between environment and the conduct of war. It argues that the environment of Southern Mozambique was conducive to RENAMO guerrilla warfare. Environmental factors, it is argued, influenced the course of war and exacerbated the harmful effects of war on local people and natural resources. Before going any further it is important to underline that for the purpose of this study, the environment of the war zone includes not only the natural endowment (vegetation, water sources and wildlife), but also economic, social, political and technological environments. Natural environment is the major focus of this dissertation but it is important to underline that it shapes other environments including economic, social, political and technological conditions. Consequently, the final part of this section

[141] Krieke, Emmanuel, "War and the Environmental Effects of Displacement in Southern Africa (1970s-1990s)," quoted in J.R. McNeill and Corinna R., ed. *Environmental Histories of the Cold War* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 5.

pays attention to the contribution of non-natural environment to the way the warfare was conducted and experienced in southern Mozambique.

The vegetation of the region of study is characterized by the predominance of deciduous forest-woodland savanna and bush-grass savanna. Moving from North to south of the Save River, the region presents an alternation of open and dense forests. This natural configuration determined the location of RENAMO military bases. RENAMO installed its permanent bases in dense forests rich in wild animals and fruits while using temporary bases in open lands to facilitate aerial delivery of military supplies. For example, RENAMO's base in Chichococha was located in dense forest. When government troops dislodged the guerrillas in 1985, captured guerrillas told AIM that they chose that location due to its impenetrability and that they received supplies by parachutes.[142] Dense forests were also important hiding places for civilians escaping from guerrilla atrocities and abuse by government troops. As it will be observed from peoples' first-hand experiences below, many people fled to forests to escape military coercion and violence.

Deciduous forest-woodland savanna and brush-grass savanna favor another key natural endowment for the logistics of war, the wildlife. Wildlife concentrates in two national parks, Banhine and Zinave. These parks were established in 1972 and 1973.[143] During the war they became disputed sources of wild meat for both militaries and civilians. The region is also endowed with wild foods locally known as *massala, makwakwa, xigutso,* palm trees, and others which are generally consumed in years of famine. In wartime, the control of this vast wilderness constituted a strategic assert. Because warfare coincided

[142] AHM, AIM, 109, 1985, 10-11.
[143] Ministry of Tourism - Mozambique, *Banhine National Park: Management Plan* (Maputo, 2010), 7.

with long spells of drought and famine soldiers, relied on access to wildlife for food.[144] In fact, the control of forests and other natural resources, including diverse wild animals such as impala, buffalo, elephants, rabbits, kudos and grey duiker, became part of military strategy.

Water was another strategic asset in warfare. Throughout southern Mozambique water resources shaped the course of warfare. Because much of this region lacks reliable water sources, civilians and soldiers battled for the control of the few water pools and seasonal rivers. The most significant hydrographic basins in the area of study are Save and Changane. The Save Basin has 14,646 km.² It starts in Zimbabwe highlands and runs from west to east to the Indian Ocean.[145] This river plays an important role in local ecosystems by providing a source of water during droughts. It serves both humans and wild animals in Banhine and Zinave National parks. As one interviewee put it, in times of drought it is easy to hunt because all animals move to the margins of the Save River.[146] During the civil war, the Save River served as a reliable water source for the militaries of both sides. The crucial importance of water sources in warfare is well illustrated by the fact that during the civil war, opposing sides shared the same sources of water. Enemies reached gentlemen's agreements about sharing access to water.[147] Because the RENAMO stronghold was

[144] There are many types of droughts; the most common in the areas of study are meteorological, hydrological, and agricultural droughts. A meteorological drought is a reduction in rainfall supply compared with specified average condition over a specific period. A hydrological drought refers to the impact of lower than normal rainfall on surface or sub-surface water shortfall. Agricultural drought is considered to be a reduction in moisture availability below the optimum level by a crop during different stages of its growth cycle, resulting in impaired growth and reduced yields.

[145] Dos Muchangos, *Moçambique*, 56.
[146] Interview with Simione Jossefa Chitlango, Mabote District, August 6, 2013.
[147] Interview with Albino Capitine Chaia, Mabote District, August 16, 2013 and Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.

located in the north of Save River, this river served as natural barrier protecting RENAMO guerrillas from government troops.

The Changane River is seasonal and dries up in years of drought. In some areas it has salt water. People living along this river explained that throughout the year some segments of the river change from potable to salt water. As one interview put it, "the water becomes salty in such a way that we cannot use it for cooking and irrigation."[148] In addition to its importance as a source of water, the Changane River was militarily strategic. As tributary of the Limpopo River it played an important role in the course of warfare. Flooding of the Limpopo River in 1977 and 1984 affected the Changane River and isolated the districts of Chigubo and Massangena from the cities of Chockwe, Chibuto and Xai-Xai, their source of supplies. This influenced the dynamic of warfare in the interior because Chibuto was the headquarters of the government provincial command. Moreover, floods increased mosquito populations and the concentration of people in displaced peoples' camps encouraged the spread of malaria, diarrhoea and cholera.

Economic, social, political and technological environments all interconnected with the natural environment. They were key factors for the prosecution of war as well as for the way ordinary people experienced war. The economic environment of the region of study is characterized by the predominance of rain-fed agriculture and cattle husbandry.[149] When RENAMO guerrillas extended their operations to this region in the early 1980s, these economic activities were experiencing severe drought which affected both agricultural and cattle output. It was in this environment of economic distress that

[148] Interview with Francisco Johane Moiane, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.
[149] Thanks to the absence of tsetse fly, the region is one of the major livestock producers in Mozambique.

RENAMO guerrillas and, later on, government troops entered the region demanding unconditional support in the form of staple foods and transportation (portage). This created a situation in which poorly equipped and supplied armies relied on the support of subjugated civilians. These conditions affected the relationship between civilians and soldiers, and altered the economic and social environment of the region. As will be demonstrated below, the conflict over access to scarce resources led to violence against civilians. It also led to intra-community conflicts in which some people took warfare as an opportunity to settle personal conflicts.

Drought was also one of the factors which pushed men to undertake migrant labor in neighboring Zimbabwe and South Africa. This male-dominated migration exposed women to the effects of warfare in the region. Considering that both government and RENAMO guerrillas recruited their men from local civilians, the migration of males left the armies with few alternatives but to rely on women and children to help in war effort. Women were mobilized coercively and voluntarily to provide food for guerrillas and to work as porters. The children were incorporated in the armies. Thus it was in this social environment that the civil war affected people in southern Mozambique.

The political environment of the warzone was characterized by the predominance of one political party with Communist ideology, FRELIMO. The war broke out one year after the declaration of independence in 1975, it only reached the region of study in the early 1980s. Having lived in the region of study in this period, I remember that by then FRELIMO had implanted party structures in all communities. Technically all residents were regarded as members of the ruling party. Moreover, the fact that the majority of the senior government officials in the newly independent country, including the president,

were natives of the region consolidated the idea that the region was FRELIMO's stronghold. As was underlined in chapter two, when the warfare reached the region, local party structures disseminated official discourse which presented RENAMO guerrillas as a gang of armed bandits or terrorists who were savages, satanic, abnormal or insane.[150]

Because of this political environment, the first targets of RENAMO guerrillas were FRELIMO local power structures including secretaries of party cells, militias, and chiefs of ten houses.[151] Later on, RENAMO transformed the whole southern region into what one scholar labelled an area of destruction.[152] As will be discussed later, the association of southern Mozambique with the FRELIMO party was confirmed in successive electoral results from 1994 to 2013. Therefore, the political environment of southern Mozambique was characterized by the divide between RENAMO and FRELIMO. For RENAMO guerrillas, the region was sympathetic to the enemy. My interviews show that this explains the predominance of brutality against civilians in the region. One resident of Funhalouro described his experience of torture by RENAMO guerrillas by saying, "in 1981 I was captured by the guys from bush. When they captured me they said that they had captured Samora Machel. They ordered me to lie down on my belly and flogged me unmercifully. They beat me very badly but I did not die because God was with me that day. I stood up and they said, he does not feel pain because is Samora Machel."[153] Following chapters will describe the stories of many ordinary people who related their first-hand experience of

[150] Three years before RENAMO attacked our home village in 1985, as school pupils we sang Matsanga's (RENAMO) head is full of lice. If you partake with him; he will infect you!
[151] Interview with Ramos Vicente Manhice, Mabote District, August 19, 2013; Interview with Bandane Mahungane Maunze, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013; Interview with Alberto Nwamutsotso Sumbane, Chigubo District, September 1, 2013.
[152] Gersony, "Summary of Mozambican," 28.
[153] Interview with Aminosso Maela Matcheque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.

violence due to the political environment of southern Mozambique. Thus the conduct of warfare in southern Mozambique, particularly the relationship between civilians and militaries was influenced by the political environment of the time.

The technological environment was another key factor for warfare in southern Mozambique. The level of technological and infrastructural development conditioned military operations. It influenced the space and timing of military attacks. The area of study is located over 120 km (74 miles) from the west side of National Road Number 1 (N1) and over 300 km (186 miles) from the provincial capitals of Inhambane and Gaza making it one of the most isolated areas in southern Mozambique.[154] The roads connecting the region with N1 are sandy and poorly maintained. In years of drought only four-wheel drive cars can drive. In the rainy season, the lack of bridges isolates the region completely from the main urban centers and main road network. Moreover, transportation by draft animals is poorly developed. This isolation was strategic asset for RENAMO guerrillas. They took advantage of this isolation and lack of good roads which would have facilitated the movement of government troops to exercise their influence in the region. Unlike the government troops who could afford mechanized infantry, RENAMO relied on small groups of roving guerrillas to extend its presence in the countryside. The control of this extensive territory made it easier for RENAMO to coordinate attacks on government convoys and to receive aerial supplies from its South African allies.

This technological environment exacerbated the impact of warfare on civilians. Because of poor road infrastructure and lack of draft animal transportation, both RENAMO

[154] During my fieldwork between July and November 2013, It took me five hours to drive 120 Km (74.5 miles) from the N1 to Mabote district and another 6 hours to drive from Mabote to Massangena, a distance of approximately 150 km (93.2 miles).

and government troops requisitioned bulk supplies staple foods locally. Civilians were compelled to produce to supply the armies and to transport staple foods and war booty to military camps. As will be discussed below, porterage involved opening new roads or using shortcuts to avoid land mines and ambushes. Considering that the hot and dry season is longer than the cooler season and that the majority of civilians and guerrillas had no shoes or boots, walking in forests exposed people to various dangers including exposure to thorns of wild trees and snake bites. Injuries suffered in these long journeys affected the productivity of both guerrillas and civilians and exacerbated the effects of war on people. I remember that many of the people (including my mother, my aunt and many friends and relatives) who were kidnapped or mobilized to perform porterage returned home with swollen feet and other diseases that prevented them from pursuing their routine activities. In the long run, porterage became one of the causes of labor absenteeism and affected agricultural productivity, reducing the staple food supply for the belligerents.

The natural, economic, social, political and technological environments all affected the conduct of warfare and the way it was experienced by ordinary people. Natural environment determined the location of military camps and the decision to launch military offensives. In the interior of Southern Mozambique, natural environment together with the region's strategic geographic location[155] encouraged RENAMO to launch its southward expansion in this region. The first RENAMO camp in southern Mozambique was established in Tanguane, northwest of Mabote district.[156] Later, RENAMO installed its

[155] Strategically, the districts of Massangena and Mabote border the Provinces of Manica and Sofala in central Mozambique. RENAMO established its headquarters in Sofala Province. Massangena district borders with Manica Province, which hosted the first military base of RENAMO, the base of Sitatonga. Massangena also borders Zimbabwe which in the late 1970s was ruled by a minority white regime sympathetic to RENAMO.
[156] Interview with Alberto Nataniel Ngovene, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.

provincial base in Manzuile-Tome, in the District of Funhalouro, Inhambane Province in 1982. Other regional bases were subsequently located in Saúte, Chigubo, (1980s and 1992) and Nhanale, Chigubo, (ca.1987-1991) in Gaza Province.[157] In addition, there were small camps scattered throughout these districts. Oral accounts say that these military bases had aircraft runaways used by RENAMO external supporters to unload weapons.[158] The economic and social environments were also vital in determining the location of military bases and on the relationship between civilians and military. The political environment contributed to the characterization of the enemy and administration of violence. The technological environment was key factor in defining the timing of skirmishes and mobilization of logistics. These environmental conditions interacted with other factors such as drought. The next section analyzes how the combination of natural and non-natural environmental conditions and drought shaped the armed conflict in southern Mozambique.

Natural Adversity during the War

Written and oral sources show that the sixteen years of warfare were marked by recurring droughts in 1976, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989 and 1992.[159] This section traces the effects of these droughts on the course of warfare. It argues that on one hand, drought reduced the capacity of people to supply food staples to the military. On the

[157] AHM, *Tempo*, 679, 1983, 20-23; *TEMPO*, 785, 1985, 12-17; Arquivo do Governo da Província de Inhambane (hereafter AGPI), Distrito de Mabote, Comissão Distrital do Programa de Emergência, *Relatório Mensal, Abril e Maio de 1992*. Mabote, 11 de Junho de 1992.
[158] AHM, *Tempo*, 804, 1986, 8-13
[159] AHM, *Tempo*, 595, 1982, 20-25; AHM, *AIM*, 56, 1981, 11-13; AHM, *AIM*, 71, 1982, 13.

other hand, it compelled the military to target convoys of humanitarian aid and communal settlements that had received food from humanitarian agencies. Because of drought and subsequent famine, it is argued, the belligerents intensified the extortion of civilians. Drought determined the timing of military operations and transformed food into the most valuable war booty. Therefore this chapter focuses on the assessment of the severity of drought in the region of study in order to build a foundation for understanding the experience of warfare in the region.

On August 29, 1980, the government of Mozambique, launching an urgent appeal for assistance to fight the effects of drought, reported that 1.5 million people were severely affected in six provinces, including the three provinces of Southern Mozambique. It went on to observe that another 4.5 million people were feeling some effects of drought. The government observed that in large areas of the country there had been no rain since 1976.[160] In fact, many regions of the country continued to lack rain into the early 1980s, forcing the government and the UN to launch new appeals in 1982, 1983, 1985, 1989, 1990 and 1992. These appeals emphasized the increase of the number of affected people, continued lack of rain and the drying of rivers. They also blamed RENAMO's southwards expansion for the exacerbation of the impact of drought on rural dwellers. Even large rivers such as the Save, Umbeluzi, Limpopo and Komati were reported to have sustained dramatic reduction of water. According to the state agency AIM, "the average flow of water in the Maputo, Limpopo and Komati rivers used to be 29, 4, and 17.5 cubic meters respectively. By September 1982 those figures had declined to four, two, and zero cubic meters a second."[161]

[160] AHM, *AIM*, 50, 1980, 8-9.
[161] AHM, *AIM*, 76 1982, 16.

In the 1983 appeal for emergency aid for the victims of drought, the Mozambican government described the drought as the worst in the last fifty years. It indicated that eight of the country's ten provinces were affected with the worst conditions in the three southern provinces of Maputo Gaza and Inhambane. According to the Mozambican government, a third of the total population suffered the effects of drought.[162] It also pointed out that drought affected also the neighboring countries of Zimbabwe and South Africa. Considering that South Africa and Zimbabwe served as sources of food imports, the occurrence of drought in these countries exacerbated the vulnerability of Mozambicans to natural distress.

The successive government appeals for humanitarian aid received mixed results. In many cases, donors committed themselves to provide aid but bureaucratic procedures and logistical problems delayed its delivery. Up to April 1988, despite increased pledges of aid, Mozambique continued to face a food deficit of 400 thousand tons of grain. The total of those displaced by war, or otherwise at risk, was estimated at 4.5 million people. Around 607, 000 people facing famine were inaccessible, even by air.[163] In 1989 the Mozambican government launched one more appeal to the international community to support the national emergency plan. The government admitted that it lacked food and funds to transport humanitarian aid to the remote areas which were most affected by war and famine. It estimated that the number of people in need of humanitarian aid for the period 1990/91 as 5.6 million. Again, the government complained that the aid was slow to come.[164]

[162] AHM, *AIM*, 79 1983, 5.
[163] AHM, *AIM*, 133, 1987, 9.
[164] AHM, *TEMPO*, 978, 1989, 2-4.

The reports by provincial and local authorities convey a sense of the real drama of the combined effects of prolonged drought and warfare. The provincial coordinator of the Council for the Prevention of Natural disasters in Inhambane described drought and famine in Mabote and Funhalouro in 1980-81: these districts, he explained "had not received rain for long time. To make things worse, wild food products traditionally used to mitigate famine, including palm wine which was used to as substitute for water, were no longer available."[165] Reports by local officials and humanitarian aid coordinators in different districts of Inhambane Province were dominated by the description of the devastating impact of warfare and drought. From Funhalouro, Mabote, Mambone, Vilanculo, Massinga, Panda, Inharrime and Zavala districts, administrators reported deaths related to drought and warfare. They also reported diversion of humanitarian aid, military attacks on lorries bringing aid, delays in response to requests for aid and the exhaustion of local mechanisms of coping with prolonged drought.[166] A report by the administrator of Funhalouro in July 9, 1987 described well the gloomy situation of famine and warfare in the district. It pointed out that people were abandoning communal villages to find refuge in the forest where they could look for scarce wild foods. All economic and social activities including education and health were paralyzed, and administrative staffs fled the district. The district government lacked fuel for cars and small industry making it impossible to pursue its activities including assessing the humanitarian crisis in the district.[167]

[165] These were exactly the years in which RENAMO expanded its operations in these districts.
[166] AGPI, Provincia de Inhambane, *Relatório das Actividades Desenvlvidas Pelo Conselho Coordenador Provincial de Prevenção e Combate às Calamidades Naturais, Durante o Periodo Decorrido Desde Junho de 1980 a Janeiro de 1981*. Inhambane, Fevereiro, 1981.
[167] AGPI, Carta para o Director do DPCCN, Inhambane, 4 de Julho de 1987.

The director of the Department for the Prevention and Combat of Natural Calamities (DPCCN) in Panda district in the interior of Inhambane Province stated that warfare and drought had destroyed all crops. To make things worse, drought resistant cassava was attacked by a plant disease. In 1992, a Panda district official accused RENAMO guerrillas of destroying crops before they matured.[168] In April, May and June, 1992, the DPCCN in Panda continued to warn that famine was the major cause of death. In September 2, 1992, Panda district reported the death of 96 people, mostly the elderly and children, due to famine. It also reported the intensification of the armed conflict throughout the district saying that even the district's headquarters had become vulnerable to RENAMO attacks. In addition to armed attacks and famine, the district faced an epidemic of cholera which caused deaths. The report lamented the inability of local government to assist the victims of warfare, diseases and famine due to the lack of transport.[169]

Further north in Mabote district, the situation was also precarious. According to a local DPCCN report, Mabote has been plagued by a combination of drought and RENAMO attacks. Due to the presence of RENAMO in the adjoining district of Chigubo, Mabote district received thousands of displaced people who put pressure on scarce resources.[170] In 1992, the Funhalouro District DPCCN estimated that 44.7 per cent of the population was affected by drought and famine and said that all water sources had dried up. Under this circumstance, it observed, people and cattle lacked water and were in need of emergency

[168] AGPI, Delegação Distrital do DPCCN/Panda, *Relatório Mensal da Situação de Emergência no Distrito.* Panda, Fevereiro de 1992.
[169] AGPI, DPCCN/Panda, *Relatório Mensal, Agosto 1992*. Panda, 2 de Setembro de 1992.
[170] AGPI, Distrito de Mabote – Comissão Distrital do Programa de Emergência, *Relatório Mensal, Abril e Maio, 1992*. Mabote, 11 de Junho de 1992.

aid.[171] Another report from Funhalouro pointed out that the district has been affected by severe drought in the preceding three years. As in Mabote district, Funhalouro authorities described large number of dislocated people from the Gaza Province. They requested assistance to help increasing number of victims.[172]

In Gaza province the situation remained perilous through the late 1980s and early 1990s. The districts of Chigubo, Guija, Chóckwè and Chicualacula did not received rain from 1982 to 1985. With the local government unable to deliver humanitarian aid, thousands of people were deprived of food and clothing.[173] According to a DPCCN report, in 1991 Chigubo district in Gaza had 6000 people displaced by war and famine.[174]

The droughts had devastating effects on natural ecosystems. By the early 1990s, the Limpopo basin was dry as result of what was regarded as the worst drought in the century. Drought exacerbated the critical conditions brought about by war. Some people died due to the lack of water. The drying of rivers caused the death of fish and scarcity of this alternative source of protein. In regions such as Mapai and Chicualacuala, the government had to import drinking water from the neighboring Zimbabwe.[175] Droughts were accompanied by other natural disasters such as cyclones which occurred in 1981, 1984, 1988, and 1994.[176] Rural communities had to deal with the combined impacts of these natural and human-made calamities. Oral accounts suggest that the drought of the

[171] AGPI, Comissão Distrital de Emergência de Funhalouro, *Informação.* Funhalouro, 26 de Março de 1992.
[172] AGPI, Delegação Distrital de Combate e Prevenção de Calamidades Naturais de Funhalouro, *Relatório Trimestral, 1992.* Funhalouro, 26 de Junho de 1992.
[173] AHM, *NOTICIAS*, November 10, 1985, 12-19.
[174] AGPI, DPCN, *Programa de Emergência: Dados da População Beneficiária.* Maputo, Outubro, 1991.
[175] AHM, *NOTICIAS* 1121, April, 12, 1992, 5-7.
[176] J. Filipe, *Moçambique, p.21;* AHM, *Diário de Moçambique, 28/12/1981*.

1980s and 1990s were the most devastating natural disaster in living memory. People recall years of starvation and associate drought with warfare.

Thus, geographic, environmental and climatic conditions made the interior of southern Mozambique suitable for the guerrilla warfare. Natural adversity such as recurrent droughts influenced the way belligerents conducted the war. Because drought led to scarcity of food and water, competition for available resources exacerbated the impact of warfare on people and their environments. Controlling water sources such lagoons, water pools and rivers became part of warfare strategy. In this way a human conflict made a devastating impact on ecosystems and wildlife.

Soldiers, Civilians and Natural Distress

Bearing in mind that military preparedness and winning the 'hearts and minds' of civilians are key factors in warfare the next section analyzes the logistics and morale of the belligerents. It seeks to answer these questions: What means did RENAMO and Mozambican army have to wage the war? To what extent did the military logistics, morale and discipline affect the conduct of war? How did they negotiate their relationship with civilians and their environments? It argues that both RENAMO and government troops lacked adequate military logistics to wage the war. This limitation compelled them to rely on civilians and surrounding natural resources to obtain the bulk of supplies of staple foods and porterage.

As was discussed in the second chapter, RENAMO was initially a proxy of right wing minority regimes in South Africa and South Rhodesia. This external connection initially hindered RENAMO's efforts to mobilize supporters in Mozambique. But from the early 1980s, RENAMO had transformed itself into a genuinely Mozambican rebel movement strongly rooted in the countryside. The extension of its operations in the countryside and the mobile character of its guerrillas brought new challenges to the movement. It became more difficult to receive military rations from South Africa and distribute them to dispersed guerrillas. Under these circumstances, access to military equipment and food became a key element for RENAMO's survival.

As external support became unreliable, RENAMO looked for local solutions. It obtained war material from the battlefield. A significant part of its weapons were captured from government troops or obtained from government army renegades. According to a story told throughout Mozambique, the former Chief of staff of the Mozambican army, Lieutenant General Sebastião Marcos Mabote,[177] was involved in smuggling military material to RENAMO.[178] One government war veteran says that on one occasion they were surprised to observe that RENAMO guerrillas were wearing new uniforms similar to the ones they had received the same week.[179]

[177] Sebastião Marcos Mabote was a very controversial figure in Mozambican history. He was veteran of the Liberation struggle and occupied various government posts including the one of Joint Chief of Staff of the Mozambican army, vice-minister of defense and Member of Parliament. Rumors corroborated interviews claiming that Mabote was seen by President Machel body guard landing with helicopter at RENAMO base in Gaza Province. Coincidently, President Machel had ordered domiciliary prison (house arrest) against Mabote just before his fatal journey from Ndola, Zambia on October 19, 1986. In 1988 General Mabote was again detained accused of plotting a coup d'état against President Chissano. He was trialed in military court but the court found him not guilty. In 2004 Mabote, who was known as great swimmer, was found dead in Bilene Beach, allegedly a victim of drowning. He received a state funeral and the title of national hero.
[178] Interview with Samuel Mabunda, Nhanala, Chigubo, District, August 29, 2013.
[179] Interview with Casimiro Francisco Noa, Matola City, October 15, 2013.

The material obtained in the battlefield and from government renegades was not enough to sustain sixteen years of war, a problem worsened by developments in the region such as the signing of Komati Non-Aggression Pact. This pact between the government of Mozambique and the South African apartheid regime required the South African government to recognize the government of Mozambique and stop supporting RENAMO. Despite evidence showing that people connected to the apartheid regime continued supporting RENAMO, this pact disrupted the delivery of supplies to RENAMO.

In addition to weapons, guerrillas needed food, which could not be obtained from external sources due to insecurity. Locally, they could count on requisitions from locals and on wild foods including wild animals. They could farm, but the roving nature of guerrilla warfare interfered with such effort. This situation compelled RENAMO to build networks of popular support in areas under its control. As one former RENAMO guerrilla observed: "in the military bases we used to eat bush meat and the food that the guerrillas used to request from local people. We used to farm but it was not viable because we were attacked frequently by FRELIMO forcing us to abandon our unripe crops."[180] Moreover, the prolonged drought that affected southern Mozambique hampered agricultural production and reduced sources of food for guerrillas. Guerrilla members had to obtain food either from civilians or by attacking government shops and warehouses.

According to oral testimonies, initially RENAMO guerrillas poached wild animals and requested chickens, goats and cows from villagers.[181] As these resources became

[180] In Xitswa language Kuthekela, means to request but in during the war it meant extortion. Interview with Artur Wetela Mazive, Funhalouro, District, August 22, 2013. Interview with Artur Wetela Mazive, Funhalouro, District, August 22, 2013.
[181] Interview with Carlota Faustino Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.

exhausted, RENAMO guerrillas began to use violence to pressurize people to provide them with food and intelligence. Also in search of food supplies, RENAMO launched frequent ambushes on civilians' cars along the main roads. The majority of attacks were directed on mineworkers, humanitarian aid convoys, and all civilians suspected of transporting valuable goods, particularly food. In southern Mozambique, civilians travelling along the N1 highway near Maluana, 3 de Fevereiro, Pessene, Chimbala and Lindela became frequent targets of attacks. Many people were assassinated and hundreds of cars were destroyed by RENAMO guerrillas.[182] These attacks on civilians were well publicized by the government to paint the image of RENAMO as a gang of armed bandits without any political agenda. Yet, RENAMO was responding to changes in national and regional geopolitics and natural adversity.

Having analyzed logistical conditions of RENAMO, we turn now to the motivation of these guerrillas. What compelled men and women to abandon their families and join roving guerrillas in one of the most remote and unhospitable areas of southern Mozambique? Nationalist scholars have argued that RENAMO was formed by neocolonialists and undisciplined and dissatisfied Mozambican people. The RENAMO leadership was presented as lacking a viable political project that could attract people to join the struggle, while many RENAMO guerrillas were said to be conscripted.[183] Pro-government accounts described how the people who joined the guerrillas were forced to perpetrate atrocities against their next-of-kin in order to force them to cut family links and

[182] For more detailed information about the attacks on civilians in N1 see AHM, *TEMPO* 895 December 6, 1987, 4; AHM, *NOTICIAS* 775, August 18, 1985; AHM, *AIM* No. 137 December 1987, 11-12; AHM, *AIM*, 137, 1987.
[183] Roesch, "Renamo and Peasantry;" Hilary Anderson, *Mozambique: A War against the People* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).

remain fully attached to the guerrilla fighters. Shifting from these explanations, this section asks, how could a group without a political project survive sixteen years of struggle?

There are various explanations for the motivation and morale of RENAMO guerrillas. One former RENAMO guerrilla pointed out that, to secure the loyalty of its guerrillas, RENAMO used the tactic of 'carrot and stick.' On one hand, guerrillas were promised better life after the end of war. On the other, defectors were publically executed to discourage recruits from deserting. While some recruits were coerced, others embraced the guerrilla war heartily hoping to improve their living condition after the end of war. A former RENAMO guerrilla said that one of the favorite songs sung in the morning gatherings reminded the guerrillas that after the war comes bonanza.[184] It is also important to observe that despite the uncertainty of guerrilla life due to the unpredictability of attacks by government troops, people created families in the bases. When the war ended in 1992, many guerrillas returned home with spouses and children. For the fighters who had family in the war zone, the war was also about the protection of their families.

Another factor that led people to join RENAMO was easy access to looted goods such as bicycles, cattle, cloth, blankets, radios and sewing machines. Despite the abundance of cattle in the region of study, oral accounts say that it was not common for the herders to slaughter cows to eat. Meat is regarded a luxury food by rural society of southern Mozambique, yet RENAMO guerrillas transformed it into their regular diet. Taking advantage of peoples' lust for meat, RENAMO slaughtered cows and goats and distributed meat to civilians. According to a victim of RENAMO kidnapping, his friend refused to flee

[184] Interview with Albino Capitine Chaia, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

RENAMO's captivity with him because he could not leave before eating meat.[185] A woman interviewed near the former RENAMO base of Manzuile said that meat attracted many villagers to RENAMO.[186]

One of the striking realities about RENAMO during the civil war was the absence of coherent political mobilization. The majority of the eighty-seven interviewees for this dissertation did not know why RENAMO was fighting. Those who were kidnapped and taken to RENAMO bases were isolated from the guerrillas. Because of this isolation, they claim not to have received any explanation of the causes of war. The central message that they received consisted of threats of death to those attempting to escape.[187] Others say that they stayed with RENAMO because they were told that if they tried to escape to government areas they would be executed by government troops. Overall, oral testimonies show that fear was a key factor in keeping people under RENAMO's control. In fact, people feared execution by both FRELIMO and RENAMO. Thus, coercion was the dominant force behind peoples' loyalty to RENAMO.

The lack of essential goods was another factor that motivated RENAMO guerrillas. Lacking supplies during drought and famine, RENAMO guerrillas did not have a choice but to attack areas endowed with abundant resources, such as people, agricultural products and wildlife. In interviews with government war veterans it is common to hear that RENAMO guerrillas were more motivated than them.[188] Coming from people who were directly involved in combat, this information deserves attention. Unlike government troops

[185] Informal conversation with Goncalves Justino Malate, Matola City, 1990.
[186] Interview with Amélia Duzeta Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 23, 2013
[187] Interview with Artur Wetela Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.
[188] Interview with Casimiro Francisco Noa, Matola city, October 15, 2013.

who expected to be provided with salaries and food supplies, RENAMO guerrillas battled every day to satisfy their basic needs. Therefore, the lack of a unified message about the objectives of war was compensated by the driving force of necessity to survive.

What about the logistics and morale of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FAM)?[189] The war of aggression waged by the Rhodesian regime and the subsequent civil war found the new government of Mozambique unprepared. Emerging from ten years of guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese colonial regime as the civil war began, FRELIMO was still in the process of transforming its guerrilla forces into a regular national army. In fact, RENAMO consolidated its offensive while most of the liberation struggle war veterans were planning to pass into civilian life and enjoy the benefits of their struggle for independence. Faced with the challenge of a fast expanding RENAMO, the government had to request military assistance from Eastern European countries and Cuba. It was under these circumstances that Mozambique received hundreds of military experts from the Soviet Union and Cuba. It also became one of the regular customers of the Soviet military industry.[190]

As RENAMO actions extended to other regions of Mozambique, particularly the corridors of Beira and Nacala which connect countries of the hinterland to Mozambican ports in coast, FRELIMO requested military assistance from the direct beneficiaries of these corridors. Zimbabwean troops were requested to protect the Beira corridor which consists of a road, railway and oil pipeline. As a result, in 1985 there were around fifteen

[189] From 1975 to 1990, the Mozambican armed forces were known as Peoples Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique (FPLM in Portuguese acronym). After the constitution of 1990, they were branded Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM, in Portuguese acronym). With the General Peace Agreement of 1992, they were renamed Mozambique Armed Defense Forces (FADM, in Portuguese acronym)
[190] See Veloso, *Memórias*.

thousand Zimbabwean troops in Mozambique.[191] Further north, Tanzanian troops were deployed to protect the Nacala corridor which is very important for Zambian and Malawian exports and imports. In 1986, the government signed a joint security agreement with Malawi leading to the deployment of Malawian troops in northern Mozambique.[192]

The recourse to external military assistance together with the increase of recruits impacted the national budget. In order to create an organized and well-equipped army, the government allocated a disproportionate amount of money to the Ministry of Defense. As is demonstrated in the following chart, in 1986 the funds allocated to Defense reached a record of 42 per cent of the national budget.

[191] Hoile, ed., Mozambique, 6.
[192] Hoile, ed., *Mozambique*, 7.

Figure 4 Chart of National Defense Budget, 1978-1988



Source: Based on data from AIM No. 20 February 1978, 7-8; AIM No.54 December 1980, 4-7; Supplement to AIM No.142, 1988; AIM No.114, January 1986, 4; AIM No.108 July 1985, 10-11

In 1984, President Samara Machel appointed General Armando Panguene and Colonel Sérgio Vieira as deputy ministers of Defense.[193] With these nominations, the ministry was served by four ministers, all of them coming from high ranks of the liberation struggle forces. With this concentration of resources on Defense forces, the government expected to defeat RENAMO in a short time.

To the dismay of the ruling party, the abundance of means did not translate into success in the battlefield. As the Chief of Staff of the FPLM had admitted in 1982, the government was in a defensive position while RENAMO took the initiative by attacking government targets. Throughout the war, the Chief of Staff attributed this condition to disorganization of the armed forces. Although the government received military support

[193] AHM, *AIM* 91 January 1984, 6.

from the Soviet Union, on the battlefield it was proven that weapons alone do not fight a war. Warfare also demanded good planning and management.

During the war period, the Mozambican armed forces encountered serious problems of indiscipline, mismanagement and corruption. In fact, the mismanagement of funds and resources in the Ministry of Defense had long roots but it was not addressed openly. Under the regime of one party, people did not have space to denounce irregularities. Only a few people such as President Machel could have the courage to denounce irregularities committed in the management of the public treasury. Machel took his first major action in 1981, when he announced a cleanup operation in the Mozambican Armed forces, people's militias, police and security services. Machel condemned what he called infiltrated elements in the defense and security forces. He pointed out that "infiltrated elements violated the constitution, the principles of FRELIMO Party and the law of the land through arbitrary imprisonment, beatings, torture, and other forms of abuse of power."[194] In 1989 President Joaquim Chissano, the successor of the President Machel, who died in1986, admitted the existence of corruption in the party structures. Chissano gave examples of theft and indiscriminate killing of cattle involving high political officials.[195] The use by Machel and Chissano of expressions such as 'infiltration' and indiscriminate killings hints at the existence of high ranking military officers not fully committed to the army's objectives.

The introduction of a multi-party system under the constitution of 1990 opened space for denunciation of corruption and abuse of power within the armed forces.

[194] AHM, *AIM*, 65 November 1981, 1.
[195] AIM, *NOTICIAS*, April 19, 1989, 1.

Government officials at provincial and district levels together with junior military officers and ordinary servicemen used the media to denounce various infractions including the diversion of salaries and torture. In Niassa Province, the Governor condemned the commanders of the government troops who in 1981 were accused of rape, consuming alcohol while on duty, threatening local people with firearms and stealing large quantities of goods destined to supply civilians and military in Marrupa and Mecula districts. In Maputo, the Mozambican police aborted an attempt to steal military equipment from the country's Air Force to smuggle it to South Africa.

The most alarming cases of corruption in the armed forces came from Nampula Province. In 1992, the Provincial Governor pointed to failure to pay soldiers their wages as the major cause of the defeats suffered by the national army in that province. These problems, he said, allowed RENAMO to occupy several towns in the province in 1991-92.[196] Also in Nampula Province, a military prosecutor brought to light cases of corruption and abuse of power within the provincial military command. He accused the provincial commander of suspending him from the post in Nampula Province Military Tribunal because of his determination to fight corruption. The prosecutor also denounced military judges who accepted bribes. He accused the chief attorney of stealing money from military court, and of being constantly drunk. His accusations included the head of operations of the provincial military command who was allegedly involved in illicit exchange of combat rations for cigarettes and other goods for his own consumption.[197]

[196] AHM, *AIM* - June 1992, No.191, 20.
[197] AHM, *AIM* February 1992, No.187, 21.

While the high commanders were selling military rations for personal benefit, the soldiers on the battle front were starving. It became common to hear rumors of soldiers left to their own fate in remote areas without food supplies and salaries. According to the former commander-in-chief of government troops in Mabote-Inhambane, the army endured long periods without receiving food supplies. He described an episode in which government troops ate leaves of a wild tree. War veterans provide accounts of soldiers going into combat on the verge of starvation.[198] As a result, they extorted food from civilians.

It is important to observe that not all soldiers were involved in acts of extortion. Many soldiers were also victims of corruption in the high ranks of the armed forces. With the easing of restrictions on freedom of expression in 1990, lower ranking soldiers began to denounce irregularities in the armed forces. A war veteran complained about the irregularity and inconsistency of his salary. In an open letter, he complained that he had not received his salary for two years. He ended his letter saying that soldiers were abandoning their positions to look for food. He questioned whether it was the policy of the ministry of defense to train soldiers and then abandon them.[199]

Another war veteran said that after joining the army in 1982 he did not receive his salary for four years. He questioned "why do the salaries not reach the soldiers while the Ministry of Defense sends them to the Provincial Command? Why are the military commanders eager to send troops to combat missions but they do not pay them? Why does the Provincial Military Command not take action against the irregularities committed

[198] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013; Dinis Chibique, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.
[199] AHM, *TEMPO* 1123, 1992, 46.

against the soldiers? We were recruited before preparing our future. Initially we were told that there was money. They mobilized us politically but this does not pay the comrades that suffer day and night."[200] Another veteran expressed his frustration with the poor salaries paid in the armed forces. He emphasized that the situation prevented him from working with passion and dedication. He stated that when he joined the armed forces in 1985, he was already married and had two children. He asked how someone could survive with low salaries paid in the army especially with the rising of the cost of living in the country.[201] Oral accounts from war veterans and civilians confirm that some military units stationed in interior areas were used to going over six months without receiving supplies. One war veteran recalled that "lacking basic necessities supplies, we had to live off land but because of the drought it was difficult to find wild products and water sources."[202]

Under Mozambican law, citizens are liable to serve two years in the armed forces but during the civil war, many soldiers stayed in service longer. In an open letter in 1992 to the editor of TEMPO Magazine entitled "When will I get discharged," one government soldier revealed a reality that affected many soldiers. He said that he was enlisted in 1985 but his request to be discharged was ignored. He lamented that his mother was widowed and lived in an area under constant attacks by RENAMO guerrillas but he could not help her.[203]

While ordinary soldiers focused their denunciation on their superiors, civilians complained about abuse by soldiers stationed in their community to protect them. Like the

[200] AHM, *TEMPO* 1136, 1992, 45.
[201] *TEMPO* 1137, 2, 1992, 49.
[202] Interview with Dinis Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[203] AHM, *TEMPO*, 1126, 1992.

military, in the 1990s civilians used the media to express their dissatisfaction with the military and other state functionaries. In Inhambane Province, civilians wrote to the provincial government denouncing abuses committed by government troops. They accused government troops of acting as judges, extorting civilians' goods and flogging people without reason. The writers stressed that they were aware of the legal procedures in Mozambique and knew that soldiers were acting illegally.[204] In this case, the governor forwarded the letter to Provincial Military Command to verify the allegations and take appropriate measures.[205] The final answer to the letter came eight months later. It blamed the victims, accusing them of taking civil conflicts to the military. It recommended local authorities to instruct civilians to seek justice in local courts while addressing words of comfort to the victim of flogging.[206] This reaction from the provincial military command shows that government troops were loath to recognize their mistakes and overlooked excesses against civilians.

In another letter to the editor of TEMPO Magazine, a civilian told how he was forced to cancel his trip from Inhambane to Maputo after suffering extortion by government troops in Chongoene, Gaza. "I identified myself as war veteran," he wrote, "but despite having documents proving my discharge, they accused me of having bought them. I challenged the soldier who interrogated me to tell me where they sell military service discharge cards. My question infuriated the soldier and he ordered me to lie down to be

[204] Eusébio Maurício Bavane, *Requerimento ao Governador da Província de Inhambane:* AGPI 29 de Março de 1986.
[205] AGPI, Gabinete do Governador da Provincia de Inhambane. *Despacho.* Inhambane, 7 de Outubro de 1986.
[206] AGPI, Partido FRELIMO, Comité Provincial de Inhambane, Departamento de Defesa. *Informação Sobre o Trabalho Realizado no Distrito de Zavala.* Inhambane, 28 de Novembro de 1986.

flogged. To avoid flogging, I used the money saved for my return from Maputo to bribe the soldiers."[207]

Another civilian complained about theft and rape. He pointed out that civilians were facing two wars, one with government troops and the other with RENAMO guerrillas. He contended that it was not clear what distinguished RENAMO from FRELIMO. He went on to question "where the humble people will live if not in their land? How will the fish survive if not in the water? If the soldier does not respect the people whom are they going to respect? When they are questioned by some courageous people, they say that civilians have no right to speak to soldiers. It is not from people that the soldiers get fat?"[208] As many soldiers used to say, he observed, "Who does not get fat in this war will never get fat."[209] These letters to public media and government authorities show that the FAM was rife with disorganization and indiscipline.

Despite denunciation of irregularities the condition of the military in the frontline did not improve. Left without adequate supplies, they engaged in actions that put them in conflict with civilians. With the rumors in 1990 that the war was about to end, the military became more vociferous and engaged in protests against non-paid salaries and lack of food and military supplies. In 1992 government troops went on strike in several parts of the country. The mutineers demanded non-paid wages, and the updating of pensions for veterans and for the war-disabled. The first mutinies took place in late July among Special Forces known as *Comandos* and members of the Maputo City garrison. They spread to

[207] AHM, *TEMPO*, 1136, 1992, 44.
[208] AHM, *TEMPO* 1123, April 26, 1992. Getting fat is associated with 'good life' or wellbeing. During the time of socialist experience in Mozambique the bourgeois was caricatured having big belies to show their well-being at the expense of the proletariat and peasants.
[209] AHM, *TEMPO* 1123, April 26, 1992.

Manica province in August. Additional mutinies occurred in Montepuez, Cabo Delgado and Dondo, Sofala Province.[210]

As the denunciations by both civilians and the military show, the condition of the military was precarious. The disorganization and corruption dissuaded potential conscripts. Soldiers lacked morale and material support to wage war. This forced many soldiers to desert the army. It also made it difficult to convince the youth to join the army. Consequently the military services received many requests for the postponement of military enlistment.

A letter written by a civil servant shows some of the arguments used to avoid military service. He argued that he was the only one left to take care of his family because his brother was already in the army. He added that he was attending school and he would like to write exams before being enlisted.[211] Letters like this were often written by young men working in public administration. Similar letters were written by managers of state companies arguing that their employees should be exempted from military conscription. Such arguments benefited primarily the educated. As one citizen complained, the military service became the burden of those not attending school and the illiterate.[212]

While the literate used such tactics, ordinary people adopted various strategies including the mutilation of the trigger finger, nepotism, bribery and migration. Since military recruitment in rural areas was coordinated by local party structures, it was difficult for the youth to hide. For the ordinary men, the only option available was to flee the

[210] AHM, *AIM*, 195, 1992, 9; AHM, *AIM*, 1992, 16.
[211] AGPI, Lourenço Matsinhe, *Carta para o Presidente do Comité Provincial para o Recrutamento Militar*, Inhambane, 27 de Fevereiro de 1990.
[212] AHM NOTICIAS, 694, 1984, 30-31.

countryside to South Africa and Zimbabwe but this was risky because of the check points installed throughout the main roads. In addition, they needed passports which were not issued to people who had not served in the military.

Migrating illegally had many risks. Since RENAMO received logistical support from South Africa, it installed its military bases near the border. Many young men were captured and integrated into RENAMO guerrillas while attempting to flee government recruitment.[213] On the other hand, if caught by government troops near RENAMO camps men risked execution for being associated with RENAMO. In urban areas the youth avoided recruitment by attending school and purchasing forged medical certificates stating that they were suffering from diseases such as asthma, tuberculosis and epilepsy.

Thus, an overview of logistics and morale of both RENAMO guerrillas and government troops shows that contrary to government propaganda about the 'parasite' character of RENAMO, both belligerents lacked reliable military and food supplies. Despite benefiting from state resources, government troops were often left without ammunition and food, clothing and other indispensable goods. With the near collapse of government supply chains due to corruption, poor roads and RENAMO attacks on military convoys, it became the duty of civilians to assist government troops by providing food, water, and building barracks and digging trenches. Like RENAMO guerrillas, government troops relied on civilians and nature to survive. Like RENAMO guerrillas, their relationship with civilians combined voluntary and coercive mobilization. When prolonged

[213] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

drought exacerbated the effects of war by exhausting natural resources and agricultural production, the contenders engaged in systemic violence and extortion of civilians.

As the war became prolonged, government troops lost their morale to fight. By the late 1980s, government troops passed from an offensive to defensive posture. Information from civilians and war veterans reveals that on various occasions, government troops delayed chasing RENAMO guerrillas while they looted from villagers.[214] In fact, some government troops were more concerned in getting booty rather than protecting civilians. These actions had a devastating impact on civilians and on the rural economy. Villagers saw their cattle depleted by soldiers and certain people particularly, mineworkers, became soldiers' preferred targets.

Conclusion

This chapter took a social and environmental approach for the study of warfare in Mozambique. Its definition of environment included natural, political, social and technological environments. Taking this broad definition, it argued that the environmental conditions of the war zone played an important role in the conduct of war and on the way it was experienced by people. The chapter began with an analysis of the relationship between warfare and environment in global perspective followed by the analysis of the environment of the war zone. It also addressed natural adversity during war and the logistics and morale of the military forces.

[214] Interview with Valente Jossefa Massangaie, Zavala District, December 17, 2013; Interview with Casimiro Carlos Noa, Matola city, October 15, 2015.

The analysis of the relationship between warfare and environment in global perspective showed that scholars have emphasized macro-economics and geopolitics at the expenses of personal experiences. They have also tended to reduce the environmental dimension of warfare to the effects of war on strategic natural resources such as water, arable land, wildlife, minerals and oil. They have also tried to understand whether the abundance or scarcity of natural resources was a cause of war. In addition, scholars of global warfare paid more attention to the ecological effects of war than on the symbiotic relationship between environment and people during military conflict.

Keeping in mind that environmental conditions are key factors in the experience of warfare, this chapter shifted the study of warfare and environment from a global to a local approach. Focusing on the environment of the war zone, it argued that environmental conditions shaped the conduct of war in various ways. It observed that environmental conditions helped to determine the establishment of military camps, the timing of military offensives and the mobilization of resources for the conduct of war. The economic and social environment played an important role on the location of military bases and on the relationship between civilians and soldiers. The political environment determined who were the enemies and set conditions for the administration of violence. Moreover, the lack of technological infrastructural development conditioned military operations and put more burdens on civilians.

The chapter discussed also the relationship between natural adversity and the conduct of war. It stressed that the civil war in southern Mozambique coincided with long period of drought. It demonstrated that drought reduced the capacity of civilians to supply food staples to the military. This compelled the military to extort food supplies from

civilians, leading to widespread violence that dominated the academic debate of the Mozambican civil war.

Finally it analyzed the logistics and morale of the belligerents. It focused on showing that both government and guerrilla forces lacked reliable logistics to conduct the war. As the war became prolonged they lost morale to fight and focused on their own survival which depended on extracting subsistence from civilians. Thus environmental constraint explained the behavior of military forces. The next chapter attempts to give voice to villagers to tell their experience of dealing with starving soldiers in time of warfare and natural distress.

CHAPTER IV

WARFARE AND DROUGHT AS EXPERIENCED BY VILLAGERS IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

Introduction

This chapter looks at the intricate effects of warfare on the lives of southern Mozambique villagers and their environment. It argues that the overemphasis on national, regional and international factors in Mozambican civil war obscures the effects of war on villagers and their environment. Based on testimonies of people who were directly affected by war and drought, this chapter shows how people survived within the liminal zone that separated them from the military contenders. It analyses the relationship between warfare, drought and rural economy. It explores the effects of warfare and drought on rural people, on their economy and on their relationship with wildlife. It asks how access to resources, including crops, livestock, wild plant foods and wildlife, needed to survive famine and to prosper in the environment of southern Mozambique was threatened by war and military forces.

Civilians at War in Southern Mozambique

The Mozambican civil war was predominantly fought in rural areas. These areas were strategically important for the guerrillas. They were endowed with key resources for the conduct of guerrilla warfare. It was in rural areas where the belligerents struggled for the

control of conscripts, informants, collaborators, food supplies, bush meat, porters and human shields. As result, living in a conflict zone demanded everyday sacrifices. People had to renegotiate their identities and alliances with both RENAMO and government troops.

RENAMO guerrillas penetrated Southern Mozambique in the early 1980s. At the time, many civilians had no idea of the cause and purpose of war. They were unable to distinguish government troops from RENAMO guerrillas. Later they would vaguely describe RENAMO guerrillas as the men from the bush, the men from North and the men from West. These descriptions varied according to the direction from which RENAMO guerrillas entered a certain village. Alberto Nataniel Ngovene, from Mabote District, recalled the first days of RENAMO penetration in Mabote in 1981. He said that he had learned for the first time about RENAMO while on his way to Tanguane village when he met a woman selling chicken. He asked why she was selling the chicken and she replied: 'Ah, there are people coming from the other bank of the Save River. They are called *Chigaramugwasha,* 'those who live in the bush.'[215] It was the first time that Ngovene heard about *chigaramugwasha*. He continued his journey to Tanguane but before long he met a man selling goats. When asked why he was selling the goats the men responded that there were people coming from the other bank of the Save River who extorted peoples' goods. Therefore he was selling his goats before they took them from him. Ngovene continued his trip but he was suddenly stopped by two men without shirts. The men asked him to turn-off the car engine. He asked, what was happening. They said: ''we were invaded by

[215] This term is from Xi-Ndau language. Chigara stands for who lives in and mugwasha stands for bush. It refers to thieves, madman, killers and murderers.

Chigaramugwasha here in our settlement of Tanguane. They came with big guns. Don't try to go there, unless you want to see for yourself.'' Ngovene made a U-turn and returned to Mabote.

On his way back he alerted the communities of Metchisso, Maculuve, Pungune, Pissolo, Mussengue, Chitanga-Serração and Chitanga-Aldeia about an unknown situation. On the following day he sent a message to Inhambane Provincial government about the occurrence but no one believed him. In his capacity of FRELIMO cadre, he sent a group of unarmed militia to Tanguane to assess the situation. They came back with evidence that Tanguane was occupied by strongly armed men. Ngovene sent a second note to the provincial government but again was ignored. He travelled to Inhambane city to inform the provincial government about the situation but no one believed him. Finally they sent a FRELIMO Party official to assess the situation. When he arrived he shouted at him saying: ''you send messages bothering us saying 'enemy, enemy.' 'Enemy is in your head!' Yet when the government official worked with local militia to assess the situation he found that indeed there were armed men in Mabote."[216]

As this story shows, RENAMO expansion to Southern Mozambique surprised both civilians and government authorities. A few people had heard rumors of a military group operating in central Mozambique along the northern bank of the Save River, but they did not know much about it. Moreover, they underestimated the capacity of the movement to expand its operations nationwide.

[216] Interview with Alberto Natal Ngovene, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.

The surprising effect of the arrival of RENAMO in southern Mozambique is also expressed in the words of one resident of Funhalouro. "Initially we heard rumors that there were people called *chigarane* (from *chigaramugwasha*). It was said that they cut peoples' lips and limbs but we did not believe. When they arrived in this region in 1981 they targeted FRELIMO party members. They cut off people's limbs, breasts and lips and ordered them to go to inform President Samora Machel. This is how RENAMO established itself here."[217] One woman recalled that "RENAMO arrived in the village of Tome in 1981. Initially, they were not violent, they requested food from us. After some time they became violent. I don't know why they changed but they began to take our goods by force."[218]

This initial contact between RENAMO and the southern Mozambican population had two distinct moments. Initially, RENAMO tried to 'win the hearts and minds' of villagers but, later on, it resorted to coercive measures to control people and resources. One villager described what happened when RENAMO guerrillas arrived in his homestead. "In 1983 I was surprised by *Matsangas* in my house.[219] They asked me why I did not flee the region. I told them that I could not abandon my house and trees. They asked me a difficult question, and I realized that if I did not respond well they would kill me. They asked: 'Who do you choose between us and FRELIMO?' I said 'I choose you.' Then they asked: 'Are you happy that we burned the communal settlement?' I said 'Yes, I am happy.' They laughed. After that they draw a map on the sand and said: 'Look, we already liberated these areas. Now we are going there (eastwards). We want you to stay here.' After that they

[217] Interview with Alexandre Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.
[218] Interview with Carlota Faustino, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.
[219] RENAMO is also known as Matsanga, from the surname of its first commander Andre Matsangaisse. In southern Mozambique Matsanga carries the stigma of cruelty.

asked for food. I gave them one hen and they left."[220] In the words of one resident of Tome-Funhalouro, "RENAMO guerrillas were clever. Initially they did not seize villagers' goats, cows and other goods and they did not kidnap people from this area. They brought people from distant places to train them here in the Manzuile base. They used to tell us to stay calm and continue with our activities and they promised to punish whomever they would find fleeing the region."[221] However, this strategy of wining the hearts and minds of villagers did not last.

Some RENAMO guerrillas who had relatives in Funhalouro confided to them that the peaceful interaction would not last forever. As a relative of RENAMO guerrilla said, "My nephew told me that they recruited people of my age. He promised to inform me when the time for local recruitment would arrive. He told me, don't listen to this rubbish that we don't take peoples' belongings. When time arrives we will take all these cattle by force. He said, 'where we come from we took all cows. Better you sell yours to get some money to buy food.'"[222]

In fact, RENAMO soon began looting goods and conscripting civilians to serve as porters and guerrillas. In his description of his kidnapping by RENAMO guerrillas, Albino Capitine said, "When we arrived in the RENAMO camp, they separated us. The young men received military training and were transferred to another base. I was kept in jail for over a month and I was later released and assigned the job of cooking for wounded soldiers.

[220] Interview with Arnaldo Salomão Mazive, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[221] Interview with Alexandre Chichongue, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[222] Interview with Alexandre Chichongue, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.

Later on, I became responsible for the rationing of the food that they went to loot out there."[223]

The end of the attempt to win the hearts and minds of local people brought the burden of war to the villagers. Women and children were forced to carry heavy loads of stolen goods to RENAMO bases located in remote areas. One woman kidnapped by RENAMO guerrillas in Chigubo said: "they found us in the bush, they opened gunfire. As you can see me, I am disabled, they wounded me. They hit me badly and killed my baby and my husband. They forced me to carry heavy loads to the base. They put me in front to show them where we had hidden cows. After walking a long distance at night, I decided to run away. I said to myself, 'if they kill me there is no problem, I will follow my child and my husband.' When we approached one settlement I dropped the load and ran away. Unfortunately I never saw the graves of my child and my husband."[224] One resident of Tome recalls what happened when RENAMO guerrillas arrived in their village: "I was around seven years old but I remember being beaten because my mother did not have food to supply RENAMO guerrillas. I also remember my mother being taken to carry stolen goods to the base in Manzuile. Life was very difficult in those days."[225]

The testimonies above show how RENAMO interacted with civilians in the area of study. They show that RENAMO established itself in the region before the government deployed military forces there. In fact, in the early 1980s, RENAMO took the initiative to place its bases in areas endowed with human and environmental resources that allowed it to survive. One of the key resources was people. In the beginning, RENAMO understood

[223] Interview with Albino Capitine, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.
[224] Interview with Salmeta Wache Chitlango, Chigubo District, August 27, 2013.
[225] Interview with Violeta Manuel Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.

that the success of its military operation depended on the support of local people. It persuaded people to remain in areas under its control and punished those who were found fleeing the areas. It targeted FRELIMO party officials and everything that symbolized the formal government like economic and social infrastructure. As the secretary of the local branch of FRELIMO party in Chigubo explained: "my wife was killed because they knew she was the wife of secretary Manhiça in Chigubo. *Baba* (father), war is ugly.[226] Look at me; I was targeted just because I was elected secretary. What was the meaning of that? They hunted me just because I was secretary. What was wrong with that? I was just serving my people. You know that people are troublesome, they need leaders to regulate them but that was not well understood by RENAMO. If they realized that you were a leader, they cut your throat. But tell me what the meaning of that is? Is that good? No, it is not! You see, they killed my beautiful wife because I was secretary but she was not!"[227]

This selective violence took different form when Government troops launched military offensives to dislodge RENAMO guerrillas from their strongholds in the region. In response to government attacks, RENAMO extended its punitive measures to all civilians accused of collaborating with government troops, particularly those who relocated to government sponsored communal settlements. Many people were caught by RENAMO trying to harvest their crops.

In fact, the government strategy of isolating civilians from RENAMO guerrillas inaugurated a new cycle of violence against civilians. For RENAMO, everyone who had relocated to communal settlements became the enemy. It launched campaigns of destroying

[226] In xi-shangana language, Baba means father, is used to express respect but in this case it was used to emphasize the gravity of facts narrated.
[227] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.

communal settlements to keep people out of government control. As one resident of Funhalouro put it, "RENAMO did not want us to relocate to communal settlements. It attacked the settlement and torched houses. It was complicated for us because the government wanted us relocated to communal settlements and punished those who refused."[228] A woman who lived in Maculuve Communal Settlement recalled the attacks that occurred in her settlement: "I survived this war by God's grace. Many people were killed in this village. RENAMO attacked us several times. They burnt our houses, and sabotaged water sources, including the well that supplied water to people."[229] Another woman shed tears when she recalled the death of her mother. She said, "One night during the 1990s RENAMO guerrillas attacked this settlement of Maculuve. I saw houses in flames. I asked help to take my elderly and blind mother out of the house. People were not there to help. Everyone was running for his life. Since the house has started burning and there was shooting everywhere, I was unable to rescue my mother. I fled in tears and, when I came back after the shootings, I found my mother in ashes. I was horrified and left the settlement to find refuge at my son's house in Maputo city."[230]

The concentration of people in communal settlements deprived RENAMO of peoples' support. In addition, RENAMO was angered by the government mobilization of civilians for the war effort. Under government control, communal settlements became a source for the recruitment of conscripts and local militia. Moreover, given the lack of roads and the remoteness of RENAMO's bases, government troops depended on the assistance of civilians to wage war. As one government war veteran admitted, "civilians helped us to

[228] Interview with Felizarda Jossefa Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 23, 2013.
[229] Interview with Raina Julai Covane, Mabote District, August 7, 2013.
[230] Interview with Daina Mabote, Mabote District, August 7, 2013.

transport war material. They were with us in many battles. They accompanied us to the battlefield and we returned with them. We did not let them return before the attack."[231] One woman who worked as a porter in military missions described her experience: "I used to fetch water to supply government troops here in Chigubo. Soldiers escorted us to the river early in the morning to bring water for them. Only after that we could fetch water for ourselves"[232] Another woman from Maculuve recalls: "there was not enough water for us and for the soldiers. We had to begin fetching water for the soldiers. It was risky because the *Matsangas* were drinking from the same water source."[233] One civilian who walked over 50 km (31 miles) to bring food supplies to government troops said: "The road from Mabote-Sede to Metchisso had landmines. It was impossible to reach Mabote by car. The local authorities mobilized us to go to Mabote to bring food for the military. We walked all that distance in silence."[234]

It is important to underline that the participation of people to help government troops to transport war material or food supplies was not voluntary. It was coordinated by FRELIMO party structures. It was the responsibility of local authorities to guarantee the rotation of people. Local FRELIMO leaders also dictated what type of vegetables each community should take to the military barracks. Villagers were ordered to bring pounded peanuts or vegetables or leafy vegetables. In fact, one of the legacies of the civil war in southern Mozambique is the term *svi djumba* (loads). This expression reminds people of the hardship of participating in warfare effort.

[231] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[232] Interview with Laurina Mbenzane, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.
[233] Interview with Cristina Feijão, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.
[234] Interview with Finiasse Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.

The transportation of *svi djumba*, consisting of military supplies and weaponry, was generally a women's job. Men were recruited for military service and those who were older than 35 years were mobilized to join local militias. In some districts such as Mabote, young women were also trained as militia.[235] In reality, the government mobilized all resources at its disposal for a total war. In the process, it blurred the distinction between civilians and militaries. Initially, local militias were expected to defend their settlements, but they ended up involved in major military operations including the destruction of RENAMO bases. In the words of one militia man from Massangena, "I joined local militia and I became chief of staff. The army was demoralized but we were strong because we were fighting for our families and property. We ended up performing the same duties as the regular army but we did not receive salary and uniforms."[236] Samuel Mbatane Chaúque describes his condition as a militia member: "I was militia, in those days, even if you were old you had to have a gun. We did not have salary and we were not given food. We ate at home. Because of famine we used our guns to hunt wild animals."[237] Interviews confirm that all adult males who lived in areas under the control of government enlisted in local militias.

Those who refused to relocate to government communal settlements were seen as sympathetic to RENAMO. As one government war veteran put it, "in Mukodwene there were people sympathetic to RENAMO. They resisted resettling in communal settlements. They provided intelligence to RENAMO guerrillas. I remember that one time we liberated people from RENAMO bases. We did not kill them because there was a law of amnesty. But when we went to destroy the base of Mboningwe we found some of the people that we

[235] AHM, Tempo, 606, 1982.
[236] Interview with Robson Razão Chaúque, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.
[237] Interview with Samuel Mbatane Chaúque, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.

had liberated. There was no way to save those people, we had to annihilate them."[238] This veteran's statement raises the question of voluntary and involuntary alliances during the conflict. As the contenders struggled to control resources, people had to identify with one of the sides. Even those who did not take part in the fighting were seen as collaborators with the dominant force in their area of residence. As we have seen, RENAMO associated communal settlements with loyalty to government troops. On the other hand, government troops saw people who lived near RENAMO bases as collaborators with that guerrilla movement. This situation put civilians in a very dangerous and vulnerable position.

The accounts of Tome residents show how being associated with any of the war contenders became dangerous. When government troops took over the RENAMO provincial base in Tome, Funhalouro, they hunted down alleged RENAMO collaborators. Many people were executed after being accused of collaborating with RENAMO. As one informant recalled, "people who refused to join communal settlements for various reasons were labeled RENAMO's collaborators. When they were found by government troops in their houses they were brought to the settlement to be killed publically. I remember one resident of this settlement who was caught in the bush collecting cashew nuts. He was beaten unmercifully until he confessed to having participated in attacks on government troops. When I went to see the person, I realized that he was a local resident. I approached the commander and I told him that I knew the man, he was not *Matsanga.* After some cross-examination, the man was released but if he did not have someone to defend him, he could have died innocently."[239]

[238] Interview with Ramos Vicente Manhice, Mabote District, August 19, 2013.
[239] Interview with Bandane Mahungane Maunze, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.

One resident of Tome remembers how government troops slaughtered people associated to RENAMO:

> Here in Tome many people were killed because we did not shut our mouths. We denounced those who interacted with RENAMO. Many people were killed with machetes and axes. Here in Tome, hey, so many people were killed, *baba*! In one of those execution sessions, one soldier asked me: 'Don't you want to kill people?' I said no. I saw that with my own eyes, I was there in the barracks. I remember seeing three tractors full of people from Mangumo brought to be executed here in Tome. When I say war kills I mean it. I know that war kills. It kills innocent people. Here in Tome, 253 people were slaughtered in one day. This place smelled of putrefying bodies. There was not time to bury all the people that were killed daily. I saw it with my own eyes."[240]

One resident of Tanguane said:

> Eshy! [241] We lost many people in my family. During the war we did not trust each other. You needed a traveling document to visit distant places. Without documents you were in danger, especially if you spoke a different language. You were more likely to be suspected of espionage. Even locals were killed by government troops. Some people were reluctant to leave their homesteads to resettle in communal settlements. If RENAMO visited or passed by these villagers' houses to request food, those people were accused of supporting RENAMO. When government troops found out that you fed Matsanga they killed you. Even when you said, I did not give the food voluntarily, the soldiers would say: 'you gave them food so that they will gain strength to fights us. Many people were killed in that way. [242]

One old woman from Maculuve, Mabote shed tears when she remembered the death of her brother. "My brother was killed by FRELIMO's troops accused of collaborating with RENAMO. He was caught by RENAMO rebels. They forced him to drink homemade gin and to tell them local customs. When FRELIMO found out, it accused him of being

[240] Interview with Alexandre Hauze Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.
[241] *Eshy* expresses profound shock in local language.
[242] Interview with Damião Albino Nhachale, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

collaborator. He explained that he did not do it but it was not enough to save his life. They took him to a place not far away from this settlement. They ordered him to dig a hole; they put him in and soaked him with paraffin and then set him on fire."[243] This environment of terror in the countryside not only caused death, it disrupted economic and social activities. The next section shows how drought and warfare disrupted family economies in rural southern Mozambique.

Warfare, Natural Distress and Rural Economy

The war zone relied on rain-fed agriculture, hunting and collection of wild products, distillation of local liquors, migrant labor and small businesses. As we saw in Chapter Three, warfare coincided with long period of drought which harmed crops, wild plants foods and wild animals which for villagers represented their customary basket of resources. Because of warfare, people did not have time to practice agriculture. Moreover, warfare affected wildlife, a traditional resource in the mitigation of recurrent droughts in the region. Migration has been another key asset in the mitigation of droughts, but with war, it became difficult to migrate to urban centers and neighboring countries. Thus even in areas less affected by war, drought pushed people to starvation. This section describes stories told by residents of the interior of southern Mozambique about their daily struggles for survival in the face of warfare and drought.

[243] Interview with Raina Julai Covane, Mabote District, August 7, 2013.

One of the immediate impacts of warfare and drought was the acceleration of the policy of communal settlements. The government responded to drought by ordering villagers to relocate to communal settlements. With the escalation of warfare in the early 1980s, the government accelerated villagization to deprive RENAMO of villagers' support. Unlike resettlement necessitated by drought which was well coordinated by government officials, resettlement caused by warfare was rife of disorganization. In many cases, it was coordinated by military commanders without consulting provincial or national government officials. In some cases, resettlement was done without the consent of the concerned populations.

The account of two residents of Metchisso in Mabote district illustrates the coercive nature of resettlement during the war. In a group interview held in the village of Metchisso, they said, "in 1983, one military commander ordered us to evacuate to Maculuve communal settlement. We refused to move to Maculuve because it is far and it has poor soils compared to here. The commander threatened to kill us if we continued defying his orders. He detained us in the barracks but we succeeded in escaping and walked over 50 km (31 miles) to the district headquarters to file a complaint. The District command ruled that we should remain in our village and sent troops to protect us. The commander who had threatened to execute us was transferred to other region."[244] Elsewhere, people moved to communal settlements fearing reprisals from government troops.

People who moved to communal settlements tell what happened to those who refused to relocate: One of them said, "Those who delayed or refused to relocate to a

[244] Interview with Feniasse Lázaro Chitlango and Feniasse Mangumo Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.

communal settlement were compulsorily brought to the settlement and punished by the military."[245] In fact, in areas of conflict, communal settlements became open-air jails. The movements of residents were controlled by FRELIMO party authorities and by the military. Some people who had left their farms before harvesting their crops needed government travelling documents to go back to their original areas. Those who exceeded the period of absence stipulated in the travelling documents were accused of collaborating with the enemy.[246] One villager recalled, "Government troops used to flog people who abandoned the settlement for long period without convincing explanation. If you left the settlement to look for wild products in the forest and it happens that RENAMO guerrillas attacked on the same day, the military would accuse you of bringing RENAMO guerrillas. Even if you said: 'I did not see them,' they would say: 'You are lying. What would you say?' They would beat you until you confessed lies. I remember some people killed because of allegations of collaborating with RENAMO."[247]

While the few people who chose to remain in their regions of origin were deemed RENAMO collaborators, those who relocated to communal settlements faced new challenges. They had to adapt to a new way of life and look for farm land. Although the Mozambican land law stipulates that the land belongs to the state, ordinary people continue to have a say in land use.[248] They have local forms of land transfers which include the payment of compensation in kind. Consequently, people who relocated to communal settlements received land from local authorities in coordination with local residents. The

[245] Interview with Madalena Finisse Novela, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[246] Considering that the majority of people were illiterate, some people failed to return before the expiration date because they could not read their travelling documents.
[247] Interview with Sara Julai Mucongue, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.
[248] See Lei No.19/97, Article No.3, available at www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz

demand for productive land in areas that became densely populated due the influx of displaced people created opportunities for their exploitation. As one displaced person recalled, "When the war broke out we relocated to Maqueze. We had difficult times there. Villagers used to give us exhausted and unproductive lands keeping the fertile areas for themselves. Others would give you a dense forest to clear. Once they saw that you were having a good harvest they would demand their land back and allocate you another area of bush to clear."[249]

Arnaldo Salomão Mazive told his experience of land use after relocating to Massinga district: "I was renting land in Massinga. After the harvest I had to pay tribute to the landholder. Sometimes they would stop me from working in a particular plot. I was not allowed to plant some cash crops such as coconut and cashew trees. Even fruit plants such as orange and tangerine I was not allowed to plant."[250] One woman described how she was treated by the host community in the communal settlement: "They gave us small land plots to farm. They also allocated us dense forests to clear but once they saw that it was clear they removed us from the land. They let us plant coconut trees and later on they told us that we were not supposed to plant them."[251]

Another challenge faced by people relocated to new areas was the lack of knowledge about how to farm in new areas. As one woman explained, the knowledge about particular land is key factor for agricultural production. As she put it, "I fled to Funhalouro-Sede settlement. The local authorities provided me land for agriculture but it

[249] Interview with Celestina João Mapossa, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.
[250] Interview with Arnaldo Salomão Mazive, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[251] Interview with Aminosso Maela Matcheque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.

was small plot of poor soil. I did not have experience of working in that type of land. You know, it takes knowledge of the land to have good production."[252]

Farmers develop micro-geographical knowledge of the environment. But during the war, they were forced to leave familiar micro-geographical environments. In Mabote District, farmers were forced to leave areas endowed with palm tree which during drought are an important resource. During famine, people tap palm wine for sale and consumption. As one resident of Mabote district observed, "In times of drought, some people tapped palm wine and exchanged it for food. But when we were resettled, we could not have access to palm trees."[253] The importance of palm wine in local economies is also stressed by the former administrator of Mabote. He recalled that, "One day I went to visit the Banamana plains. I found many people extracting palm wine. I remember seeing them giving palm wine to children. This is something that I saw myself,"[254] he stressed.

Despite the critical importance of palm trees and other resources for the mitigation of drought, the government ordered the relocation of the residents to communal settlement considered safe from RENAMO attacks, even if they were located in areas that lacked those resources. Consequently, in communal settlements residents faced many limitations. As one resident of Massangena District observed, "In the communal settlement we did not have enough land to diversify crops. Unlike my home village which is located near a river, when we relocated to Funhalouro I could not make use of wetlands to plant drought resistant crops such as sweet potatoes and cassava."[255]

[252] Interview with Madalena Finiosse Novela, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[253] Interview with Tomas Chenzelane Sambo, Mabote District, August 6, 2013.
[254] Interview with Alberto Nataniel Ngovene, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[255] Interview with Felismina Johane Chirindza, Chigubo District, August 28, 2013.

In addition to its impact on land tenure and on access to vital resources traditionally used to survive drought, instability caused by warfare devastated the economic activities of villagers. Even people who relocated to communal settlements did not have the resources they needed to farm and did not have freedom to engage in productive activities beyond the borders of the communal settlement. Villagers described the disruption of agricultural activities in these desperate communities: "We lived in communal settlement under the protection of government troops but it was dangerous to go outside to farm because of RENAMO incursions. We ended up hungry."[256] A woman from Massangena said: "We did not farm during the war. There was not time for agriculture. We ate wild foods. Some were bitter but we did not have an alternative. We used to be escorted by government forces to the forest to look for wild foods."[257] Another woman who witnessed the hardship of war remembers: "before moving to the communal settlement we hid in the forest. When we moved to the communal settlement there was terrible drought and the war was intense. We did not have time to farm, we relied on humanitarian aid."[258]

In addition to preventing people from agricultural activities, war brought anarchy to communities that were attacked frequently by RENAMO. Both government and RENAMO guerrillas invaded civilian farms. On many occasions the military harvested unripe crops. According to Maria Nguiliche Zucule, RENAMO guerrillas invaded her farm to harvest unripe maize. In her words, "we faced difficult times here. We farmed but those

[256] Interview with Johane Tavane Moiane, Massangena District, August 15, 2013.
[257] Interview with Melissina Jorge Mondlane, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.
[258] Auneta Wache Mamuque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.

men (RENAMO) came to loot our crops."[259] Moreover, the frequent use of violence against civilians forced them to hide in forests.

Oral accounts associate warfare with changes in the agricultural calendar. In the words of two peasants from Tanguane: "There is difference between life before and after 1981. Before 1981 we used to put seeds of millet in September. By October the plants were quite big; by November they were fine. In December we were eating *xima* (hard millet or corn meal porridge also known as *papa* and *ugali*). Now if you want to plant millet put the seed on November 15. If you put your seed in September you won't get anything (My research assistant agreed saying: 'Can you do that? No, you can't do that'). Look this year, it was supposed to rain in August. In September we would see cashew nuts and it would rain again to water cashew nuts. Since the war no one is succeeding in getting extra harvest of millet here. Even if you open big farm you won't get it."[260]

As this conversation illustrates, warfare is deemed responsible for the lack of rainfall and changes in agricultural seasons because agriculture became dependent not only on rainfall but on military stability. Warfare led to the abandonment of traditional areas of residence and relocation to new areas without adequate natural endowment needed to support a larger number of residents. This put pressure on natural resources, particularly land in the new settlements. It also isolated people from resources that they had formerly relied on to cope with recurring droughts.

Apart from the disruption of agricultural production, warfare severely affected the reproduction of livestock. With the exception of the limited areas near Zinave and Banhine

[259] Maria Nguiliche Zucula, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.
[260] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango and Carlos Arone Nhachale, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

National Park, the area of study is favorable for keeping of livestock.[261] In fact, the abundance of cattle appears to be one of the key factors that attracted RENAMO guerrillas to establish their strongholds in the interior of southern Mozambique. Oral accounts and government records claim that warfare depleted the livestock in the region. However, there are no reliable censuses of cattle in southern Mozambique before the war.

We only have some estimates of livestock population during the war. According to the Mozambique Economic Yearbook of 1989, Gaza Province with 218,917 had the largest number of livestock in the country. Inhambane Province had approximately 47,100 cattle.[262] Data gathered at Inhambane government by AIM reported that 60 per cent of livestock was depleted by war. It estimated that in 1983 there were almost 102, 000 head of cattle but by 1989, this number was reduced to only 40,515. AIM argues that in addition to war, the mid-1980s drought also contributed to the high mortality of cattle. The report notes also that there was a decline of 45 per cent in the number of pigs, which dropped from 21,000 in 1983 to just over 11,000 in 1989. As for goats, their number fell by 69 per cent from 41,000 in 1983 to only 12,000 in 1989.[263]

These data must be taken with a grain of salt. In 1989, many of the areas where cattle abounded were inaccessible due to war. It is not clear how the government succeeded in collecting data in such areas. Yet, despite these shortcomings in assessing the extent of the impact of war on cattle, evidence from my fieldwork suggests that cattle herders were hard hit by warfare. Both government officials and villagers agree that the number of

[261] It appears that in the early 1980s, some areas of Mabote district had no cattle due to tsetse-flies. Due to the drastic reduction of wild animals in wartime, currently all the four districts have cattle.
[262] AHM, *Anuário Económico de Moçambique, 1990/1991*. Maputo, 1991, p.102
[263] AHM, AIM 156, 1989, p.21.

livestock was drastically reduced by war. Over 95 per cent of people interviewed for this study claim that they had their cattle stolen by RENAMO. Making an inference from the number of cattle which people claim to have had before the war as well as the number of cattle which they had in the time of interviews, twenty one years after the end of war, it is fair to assume that people lost thousands of cattle during the war.

The impact of warfare on cattle was described by one man from Chigubo. "When I was young I tended my parents' cattle. We had many cows here. I think my father had nearly 500 head. Cows were very cheap in those years. They cost around 100 to 300 Escudos. I remember that my parents used to exchange cows for maize. One sack of maize could be exchanged for one cow. One needed 18 cows to pay bride price (*lobola*) but now, you can get married with only one cow."[264] Moiane contrasts this abundance with the loss brought about by war. In his words: "*Baba*, war is ugly, look now, we are poor. They took 500 cows from us and we could not complain."[265]

One resident of Chigubo described what happened to his cattle during the war: "Before the war I had over 40 cows. I left them behind and RENAMO ate all of them. Now that the war ended I restarted raising cattle. I invested the money that I received in South African mines to buy a couple of cows and now I have thirty."[266] This man's account shows that, despite the damage inflicted by war in Chigubo District it was possible to rebuild herds in a short time.

[264] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013
[265] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.
[266] Interview with Simione Chivambo, Chigubo District, August 30, 2013.

Testimonies of people who lived near RENAMO guerrillas confirm that warfare depleted cattle. A resident of Funhalouro District said "RENAMO guerrillas used to gather people to distribute meat. They used to allocate one cow to each community."[267] As was shown in Chapter Three, meat was the main food in RENAMO bases. One former RENAMO commander illustrates the importance of cattle in their diet: "When I arrived in Chigubo, they served me *xikutso.*[268] I tasted it and I realized that it was sour. I said 'this is shit!' I guided my men towards the southeastern region in search of food. I looked for places where cattle abounded. You know, I ate meat!"[269]

RENAMO was not solely responsible for the plunder of civilians' cattle. Government troops also stole cattle. As one militia man recalls, "when we destroyed RENAMO base at Kanyissane, Migige in 1991 we recovered many cattle. Some we ate and the rest were taken by the government."[270] One war veteran justified these actions by saying, "you know, in wartime it is difficult. Even our soldiers stole cattle but they did not take many like RENAMO. They would steal one and bring it to their military positions to eat. They used to dig holes to hide stolen beef. They did so because of hunger."[271] One civilian who saw his cattle confiscated by government troop recalled: "in many cases, government troops did not return our cattle that they recovered from RENAMO guerrillas."[272]

[267] Interview with Alexandre Hauze Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.
[268] Xikutso is a wild tree consumed in time of famine. People dig the roots, pound them and boil. They drink the water like tea.
[269] Interview with Armando Francisco Sumbane, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.
[270] Interview with Ernesto Budula, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.
[271] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[272] Interview with Auneta Wache Mamuque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.

Targeting cattle in time of drought and food scarcity disrupted traditional forms of coping with natural distress. Historically, cattle had been a key asset for the alleviation of drought effects. People sold cattle to buy food, and relied on draft cattle not only for plowing but also for transportation of purchased food supplies. The depletion of this strategic economic asset increased the vulnerability of local people to the combined effects of warfare and drought. This might be one of the explanations of the cases of famine-related deaths in the war zone during the 1980s and 1990s.

Wildlife was another customary resource which helped villagers survives droughts. Published studies on the civil war make vague statements about the impact of warfare on wildlife, but we have no wildlife censuses before and after the conflict. Moreover, the published literature has considered only megafauna that have commercial value, particularly elephants and rhinoceros.[273] But if we shift away from this narrow approach, and instead define wildlife as "all non-domesticated species of plants, animals or microbes,"[274] we find that the combination of warfare and drought devastated a very wide variety of undomesticated fauna and flora.

The Zinave and Banhine National Parks were located in the warzone without physical delimitation between humans and fauna. Humans and wildlife are interconnected in symbiotic relationships which include episodes of cooperation and conflict. Elephants, hippos, monkeys, bush pigs, and birds have invaded farms in search of food. In their turn, humans relied on wild animals and plants to improve their diet and to mitigate the impact

[273] See Hatton, Couto and Oglethorpe, *Biodiversity and War;* Thor Ranson, "War and Biodiversity"; Jessica Schafer, *Soldiers at Peace*.
[274] See Michael B. Usher, *Wildlife Conservation Evaluation: Attributes, Criteria and Values* (London, New York: Chapman and Hall, 1986), 4.

of drought and disease. These symbiotic relationships were heavily disturbed by warfare and drought.

One woman, who had lived in the interior of southern Mozambique before the establishment of national parks in 1972, spoke about the region's wildlife. She said, "We are originally from Zinave, we relocated to Maculuve because there were many wild animals which used to destroy our crops. It was difficult for children to protect the crops from big animals like elephants and hippopotamus. Here in Maculuve there were many wild animals as well but the big ones were not as many as in Zinave."[275] A resident of Tanguane, Mabote described the region's fauna this way: "During my childhood we practiced agriculture. This region was dense forest where animals abounded. There were many wild products which we ate in times of drought. When we were young, we hunted and trapped animals in the forest. We used to kill giraffe and distribute the meat to people in the community for free. We competed for water with hippos. I am telling you, people and wild animals disputed water in Tchovane region. Our mothers spent hours walking many kilometers to fetch water. We used to protect farms from wild animals, particularly monkeys. We also helped our parents in the farms. In those days there were no cattle here because of tsetse fly."[276] One native of Mabote District contrasted the present and past of Zinave National Park. With nostalgia he recalled: "I knew Zinave Park when I was young. It was very beautiful and replete with wild animals such as impala, buffalo, elephants and many more. But now there are few left. I think that they migrated to areas where they could find a peaceful environment."[277] Another villager who saw the wildlife of the region before

[275] Interview with Cristina Feijão Matavele, Mabote District, August 7, 2013.
[276] Interview with Albino Capitine Chaia, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.
[277] Interview with Ramos Vicente Manhice, Mabote District, August 19, 2013.

the establishment of the park described it this way: "the area of the current park was very beautiful. If you arrive at this time of day [Around 12:00 pm] you would see variety of animals which went to drink water in Zinave lagoon."[278] One man remembered that in those days the area was rich with wild animals. Hunters would gather around water pools near their homestead to trap animals, he said. In those days, he recalled, it was not forbidden to hunt for food.[279]

Such descriptions were provided by almost all of my interviewees. In the reminiscences of villagers, the area was endowed with abundant wildlife which became vital resources in times of distress. The comments of some informants revealed the existence of traditional forms of sustainable use of these resources. According to one resident of Mabote District, long before the establishment of National Park, traditional leaders regulated hunting for food. As one resident said, "in the past hunting was regulated. It was necessary to ask permission from traditional authorities to open the hunting season. It was not allowed to sell bush meat like people do today."[280] Villagers remember the abundant wildlife of the past with nostalgia. They look at the past as a period of abundance and order. They think that droughts were not harmful because they had access to abundant wild resources.

Villagers think that the civil war and long periods of drought in the post-colonial period were responsible for the depletion of wildlife. Because RENAMO guerrillas established their military camps in areas rich with wildlife, villagers were prevented from accessing key resources such as rivers and other water streams, wild animals and wild

[278] Interview with Alberto Nataniel Ngovene, Mabote District, August 19, 2013.
[279] Interview with Feniasse Mangumo Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.
[280] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

plants. People remember being forced to relocate to communal settlements leaving areas rich with wildlife under the control of the military. Villagers accuse the belligerents of using automatic guns to decimate local wildlife.

One man who witnessed the extension of guerrilla activities said: "RENAMO penetrated Mabote District through Tanguane, an area with abundant wildlife. They established their camps inside the park area. Later on, the government army established its camps there as well. As it was a time of drought and hunger, the military killed wild animals for food. Thousands of wild animals were killed indiscriminately. Sometimes soldiers shot animals for pleasure. By the end of war the park was unpopulated and the government had to repopulate it."[281] A former government militia man from Chigubo District said, "The war decimated wild animals. We used guns to hunt because there was no food. Even the commanders allowed hunting. The military used to escort hunters to bring meat to distribute to civilians in the communal settlement."[282] Another former government militia member in Mabote District argued that "the proliferation of arms during the war contributed to the devastation of wildlife."[283] He recalled that during the 1983 drought and famine both military and civilians in the communal settlements depended on mass hunting for food. He also remembered that the government military employed porters to transport meat from the bush to the communal settlement.

The reminiscences of villagers, former government officials and war veterans agree that warfare brought changes in the way people dealt with wildlife. It changed the way people hunted by introducing modern weapons. It destroyed legal and traditional

[281] Interview with Alberto Nataniel Ngovene, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[282] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.
[283] Interview with David Moiseis Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.

mechanisms of sustainable use of natural wildlife. As civilians congregated in communal settlements, the wild environment was subject to unprecedented plundering by the military. Under these circumstances, what is often referred to as civil war involving humans became also a war against wildlife. Like humans, wild animals were confronted with AK 47 and landmines. They had to run for their lives or face extinction.

Villagers' perceptions about the contribution of the civil war to the depletion of wildlife corroborate government reports about the status of wildlife in post-war Mozambique. Nevertheless in some situations wildlife seem to have benefited from the conflict. The relocation of people to communal settlements had double impact on forests. In abandoned areas, forests thrived. Indeed, the preservation of forests was strategically important for civilians as well as guerrillas, for villagers hid in the forests. Elina Julius Muchanga described the importance of preserving forests during the war: "we escaped the war by hiding in the forest. We only came home during day light."[284] One woman from Mabote district said, "Forests were the safest places; we did not clear all forests around because they provided us space to hide. We used to spend more time in the forest than in our houses. In those days it was not important to have a good house because we slept in the forest."[285]

The experiences described above coincide with my own. As resident of southern Mozambique I remember that from 1985 we started sleeping in the forest. Because RENAMO used to 'comb' forests in search of people, we adopted the strategy of splitting family members in different forests. This meant that villagers needed very large areas of

[284] Interview with Elina Julius Muchanga, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.
[285] Interview with Sara Julai Mucongue, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.

forests in which to hide. In peacetime, family members lived in the same household and shared one room. In war time, a family of six required at least three hiding places in widely scattered locations. This encouraged the preservation of large forests which in peacetime might have been cleared for agriculture and construction. Therefore while it is fair to argue that warfare depleted wildlife, particularly large mammals, we do not know to what extent. Moreover, the overemphasis on the depletion narrative prevents us from seeing that warfare contributed to the recovery of forests and wildlife populations.

In addition to harming wildlife, agriculture, and livestock keeping, warfare affected small businesses. It became difficult to transport supplies to local shops without military escort. As one war veteran recalled, "local businessman could not drive without military escort. I remember one time that we were ambushed eight times from Maxixe to Vilanculo, a distance of approximately 300 Km (186 miles). We lost comrades, civilians and cars. These attacks forced the government to stop using the road. We resorted to maritime routes to bring food from Maputo to Vilanculo. Even so, we continued suffering ambushes from Mapinhane to Mabote, a distance of 120 Km (74 miles) westwards."[286]

One trader from Metchisso in Mabote district tells how his business was ruined by war: "My shop was looted and torched by RENAMO guerrillas. Since then I have never succeeded to reopen it."[287] Warfare disrupted many small transactions which connected people in strategic social networks to mitigate the impact of cyclical droughts in the region, particularly because it became dangerous to travel from one region to another. Even where communities had good harvests, the insecurity brought by war prevented people from

[286] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[287] Interview with David Luis Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.

circulating freely. Activities such as cutting poles for construction, preparing grass to thatch houses, fishing and hunting were affected by war.

One of the ways used to minimize the impact of recurring droughts in southern Mozambique has been migration to major urban centers and to neighboring South Africa and Zimbabwe. During the civil war, migration became difficult. Those who succeeded leaving the region found it difficult to send remittances back home due to lack of transport and frequent movement of people in search of refuge. Many migrants became refugees and did little to help their relatives back in Mozambique. As one retired mineworker observed, "The combination of drought and war provoked hunger which killed many people. Even people working in the South African gold mines could not help. There was no way to send goods home because the roads were insecure. To make things worse, RENAMO targeted mineworkers. For people like me who crossed the border illegally, it was very difficult to reach South Africa. If you were intercepted by either RENAMO or FRELIMO you were accused of belonging to the other side and killed."[288] Another migrant worker said "I could not send goods to help my starving family in Mozambique because of frequent attacks on cars along the road. I only managed to bring some clothes but it was also dangerous because one could be targeted because of the way he dressed. Even government troops assaulted migrant workers."[289]

The consciousness of being in danger drove Albertina Daniel Chirindza out of Chigubo. In her words, "we fled this area earlier because my husband was a mineworker. We knew that we were at high risk. We stayed out of this district until the end of war in

[288] Interview with Tomas Lázaro Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.
[289] Interview with Damião Albino Nhachale, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.

1992."[290] The testimony of one war veteran about the way government troops treated migrant workers shows how warfare victimized them: "My father was working in South Africa. It was very difficult for him to return home. He had to inform me in advance that he was coming back. After telling me, I would tell my commanders here in Tanguane. I had to bribe all of them. They wanted cigarettes, music tapes and toothpaste to let him pass freely. Those who risked returning without the protection of soldiers would arrive home without trousers. Their bags would be opened and searched several times. To avoid extortions you had to place cigarettes in your bag. Cigarettes were a luxury in those days. You know, soldiers wanted to eat. It was not about war, it was about eating."[291]

Thus when we shift from the traditional focus on macro-economic impacts of war to the personal experiences of people who were directly affected by warfare and drought we see that villagers tell stories of daily struggles against coercive demands by military contenders. They describe periods of hardship and uncertainty. They express the anguish of seeing their possessions taken unmercifully. Their stories demonstrate that warfare and natural distress contributed for the depletion of wildlife, depriving villagers of key resources for the mitigation of recurrent droughts.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the effects of warfare on rural people and their environment. It has demonstrated that the burden of civil war and drought fell upon villagers and their

[290] Interview with Albertina Daniel Chirindza, Chigubo District, August 28, 2013.
[291] Interview with Daniel Nassone Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

environment. Despite their role as suppliers of food to the belligerents, civilians were the major victims of violence and extortion. Civilians who lived in a contested war environment were forced to share their scarce resources with both government and RENAMO guerrillas. The effects of civil war were extended to wildlife and other natural resources. Contrary to widespread arguments that war depleted natural resources, a close analysis of data showed a more complicated scenario characterized by both depletion and preservation of wildlife. The chapter has analyzed also the relationship between warfare, drought and the rural economy. It observed that in people's memory, warfare is intimately connected to long periods of drought and famine. In fact, war disrupted economic activities, particularly agriculture. War prevented people from farming and hampered traditional mechanisms of dealing with drought effects. It also affected local trade and migration by limiting the free movement of people and goods.

CHAPTER V

COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF WARFARE AND DROUGHT: VILLAGERS' RESILIENCE

Introduction

This chapter argues that the civil war and drought in Mozambique must be understood beyond Cold War ideologies, military confrontation and quantification of victims. It analyses the experiences of villagers who survived the combined impact of warfare and drought. It pays attention to the collateral effects of warfare by investigating the experience of villagers in dealing with violence, trauma, hunger, diseases and death. It also looks at villagers' strategies of coping with warfare and drought and their collateral effects. It examines what people did to provide or receive support during the time of warfare and drought. It presents the population of the war zone not merely as victims but as innovators. In this way, it humanizes the war experience in Mozambique. The chapter is organized in three sections: section one analyzes the relationship between warfare, drought, famine and disease. Section two looks at wartime as a period of innovation as villagers exploited opportunities brought about by war. The last section looks at the role of social institutions in helping villagers to cope with the effects of warfare and drought.

Warfare, Drought, Famine and Diseases

As was emphasized in the previous chapters, the residents of rural southern Mozambique rely on rain-fed agriculture but the region has suffered from recurrent droughts. The civil war reached the region of study in the early 1980s, when local people were struggling against severe droughts that have affected the area since the late 1970s. In fact, many civilians associate the arrival of RENAMO in the region with the beginning of cyclical droughts and famine. As one resident of Funhalouro pointed out, "I remember that war reached this village in 1981 and it was a year of drought and famine. It was very bad! From the time that war entered in this village it stopped raining. By 1983, we were suffering acute hunger. I think that the famine of 1983 was the worst because of war. We spent so much time hiding; we did not have time to farm."[292] Melissina Jorge Mondlane, a woman from Massangena district, was convinced that war brought droughts. As she put it, "War brought droughts here. I say this because some of the strong rainmakers were killed during the war. The bloodshed blocked rainfall."[293] Like many African societies, the region has a long tradition of rainmaking ceremonies. These ceremonies are administered by people who have spiritual power and legitimacy inherited from their ancestors. Therefore, the death of a rainmaker represented a collective social disaster for villagers.

For other villagers, warfare was responsible for droughts because it violated the mores of the land. Marta Nguiliche Zucula, an elder from Massangena District said: "Once you shed blood it stops raining. Those men recruited and armed children who ended up killing their parents and elders. Because of this, I think that RENAMO was responsible for

[292] Interview with Alfiado Mutuque, Funhalouro, Inhambane, September 1, 2013.
[293] Interview with Melissa Jorge Mondlane, Massangena, August 16, 2013.

the drought that affected us here."[294] Another woman from Funhalouro blamed the transgression of moral norms for the recurrent droughts in the region. In her words: "When war entered this district the girls were forced to have sex out of marriage.[295] This is against the mores of the land and I think it angered the ancestors and they stopped the rain."[296]Others believe that the smoke of guns has the capacity to stop the rain. In the words of one resident of Funhalouro District: "The gun has terrible power. You could see a heavily clouded sky and think that it will rain but once you hear *thothothooo*[297] in the sky all clouds will disappear."[298]

Villagers' saw warfare not only as the cause of drought. They also saw it as responsible for hunger. Since war disrupted all economic activities, villagers became vulnerable to famine, disease and shortage of resources. The deterioration of living conditions in the countryside supports villagers' assumptions that warfare was responsible for drought and hunger but these ideas were not new, they were part of a long history of responses to war and hunger recorded in the region since the late nineteenth century. Throughout time, villagers have developed a deep history of thought about the causes of frequent natural distress. The frequent reference to the transgression of social norms shows that in their understanding of the causes of catastrophic events, villagers bring together the world of the living and the dead.

War provoked hunger because it injured, murdered and intimidated food producers. It destroyed roads and bridges making the transport of food and agricultural equipment

[294] Interview with Marta Filipe Zucula, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.
[295] Taken in its context, sex out of marriage refers also to cases of rape that occurred during the war.
[296] Interview with Felizarda Jossefa Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 23, 2013.
[297] Sound of gun fire.
[298] Interview with Alfredo Famanda Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.

expensive, and it diverted farmer laborers from food production to military service and reduced investment in agriculture. Villagers associate war with death of friends and relatives because of starvation and thirst. The former administrator of Mabote district provided a broad picture of the effects of warfare and hunger saying:

> Here in Mabote the war erupted in time of drought. I did not know how to manage war and famine victims at the same time. We did not have food to give to people. Between 1982 and 1983, around 1500 people died because of famine including my friends and relatives. I had to mobilize people to come to the district headquarters. I requested assistance from Provincial government. They sent some food but it was not enough to feed all the people concentrated in the town. I had to organize food banks to assist people in critical condition. People who looked strong received food to cook at home. There were also orphans of war to take care of. I asked people to donate whatever they had. Some donated blankets and plates. I mobilized volunteers to take care of children. I have seen people dying in the queue waiting for a plate of *papinha.*[299] In one of my visits to the hospital, I heard a woman crying: 'I haven't eaten anything.' The woman died shortly before receiving the porridge which was being distributed. Another woman poured porridge on the mouth of her husband so that I would think that she was feeding him while she was keeping the food for herself. When I approached her I realized that the man was dead. This is something that I saw, it is true. I ordered people to take the corpse to the mortuary. What kind of mortuary house? They were barracks built in our own way. It was a shocking moment of my life to see people dying because of hunger. There were constant deaths. We had to open mass graves to bury the victims of famine. We had three to four deaths a day. We did not even have time to identify the dead, we just buried them. That is what happened to me.[300]

Aminosso Maela Matcheque, a traditional healer from Funhalouro District who lost his sister in 1990 famine told his story:

> From 1982, when RENAMO entered here, there was hunger. We did not have food. We ate wild plants. People who did not receive assistance were dying. I lived in a communal settlement and I saw people dying of hunger and disease. People ate plants that ended up killing them. I remember that we used to

[299] Maize meal porridge
[300] Interview with Alberto Nataniel Ngovene, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.

> bury two to three people per day. My sister died that time. Children were dying of hunger. [301]

Matcheque believed that hunger and diseases were intimately connected to warfare. In similar terms, Tomás Chitlango told how hunger threatened his life:

> In 1983 I almost died of hunger when I lost strength on my way to Mabote villa to board a car to Maputo city. I was very hungry and weak and I stopped under a big tree to rest. I looked around and I saw one woman trembling, she was dying of hunger. I dragged myself to Mabote but I was very frightened because there were many corpses along the road. Even today I still remember that day because I almost died.[302]

A resident of Massangena district said: "In the 1980s we did not have food. We ate wild fruits like *tinulo, and makwakwa.*[303] Even RENAMO guerrillas were starving, but since they controlled the bush, at least they had access to wild animals. Many old people died because they did not have strength to look for water and wild foods."[304] One war veteran who travelled in the interior of Inhambane and Gaza provinces on military operations described the devastating impact of drought and famine: "During our military missions it was common to see corpses of people who died in the roads on their way to

[301] Interview with Aminosso Maela Matcheque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[302] Interview with Tomás Lázaro Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.
[303] Tinulo are fruits of Nulu tree, green thorn, Y-thorned (Balanites maugami Sprague), Tinulo, the fruits of nulo tree are small and yellow. In times of hunger villagers cook tinulo for food. See Ribeiro et al., "Ethnobotanical Survey in Canhane village, district of Massingir, Mozambique: medical plants and traditional knowledge," *Journal of Ethnobiology and Ethnomedicine* 6, 1 (2010), p.5. *Makwakwa* or Myrianthus is a wild tree belonging to the mulberry family. It is also known as monkey orange. It is round, about a size of an orange, with a hard outer shell. When broken it contains stony seeds wrapped in a delicate, strongly scented pulp. See Henri Alexandre Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe*, 23 and Hugh Stannus, "The Wayao of Nyasaland," *Harvard African Studies* 3, (1922), 347.
[304] Interview with Johane Tavane Moiane, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.

search for food. I don't know how many people died of hunger because many died in the forests and areas isolated from the major roads."[305]

These personal stories show that government estimates of the victims of famine and war need to be complemented by qualitative evidence. More than two thirds of the eighty-seven interviewees for this dissertation claimed to know a relative or neighbor who died of hunger. These claims reinforce the idea that studying the civil war from national, regional and global ideological perspectives does not capture the real experience in the countryside. The war disrupted traditional mechanisms of coping with natural calamities. RENAMO guerrillas attacked camps for displaced people, frequently preventing villagers from farming in the scarce and often poor lands provided by the hosting villagers. As the war and drought intensified, the communal settlements were filled with hungry, debilitated people who became vulnerable to disease.

Lacking adequate housing, sanitation and food supplies, residents of communal settlements were vulnerable to diseases principally diarrhea, anemia and measles. In addition, people were attacked by bedbugs, fleas, lice and other parasites. In many cases, the diseases that attacked people were consequences of malnutrition. Malnourished individuals are vulnerable to infection, mortality and morbidity. In fact, there is a cyclical relationship between poor nutrition and susceptibility to infectious diseases. [306] The lack of food compelled villagers to try new types of foods including some that turned out to be

[305] Interview with Ramos Vicente Manhice, Mabote District, August 19, 2013.
[306] See Gareth Morgan, "What, if any, is the effect of malnutrition on immunological competence?" *Lancet* 349, 9066 (1997), 1693; Gerald T. Keusch, "The History of Nutrition: Malnutrition, Infection and Immunity," *Journal of Nutrition* 133, 1 (2003): 336-340, p.336.

poisonous or caused kwashiorkor[307] and diarrhea. Hungry people went to the extent of pounding cashew nuts tree leaves for cooking.[308] Some villagers cooked unripe wild fruits such as *makwakwa*, and *masala.*[309] Villagers pointed out that during drought and famine, they consumed *Xikutso*, a wild plant associated with cases of diarrhea and vomiting. The preparation of *Xikutso* requires a lot of water because it takes time to cook. Water was scarce because of drought and people were not able to prepare *xikutso* properly. Many interviewees emphasized the dangers of improperly prepared *xikutso*. Sara Julai Mucongue said: "*Xikutso* is sour and if not well prepared it provokes diarrhea and death."[310] Another villager commented, "that thing smells bad, many people died because of that root, they suffered unstoppable diarrhea."[311]

In addition to diarrhea, kwashiorkor and measles were the most frequent illnesses during war and drought time. The impact of these diseases was exacerbated by the concentration of people in communal settlements. In the case of diarrhea epidemic, the lack of clean water in the communal settlements played an important role on the spread of the disease. Measles is contagious when someone comes in direct contact with infected droplets or when someone with measles sneezes or coughs and spreads virus droplets through the air.[312] The crowded conditions in the communal settlements were favorable to

[307] Kwashiorkor is a type of malnutrition. It is most common in areas of drought and famine. Kwashiorkor is due to inadequate protein in the diet despite an adequate caloric intake. Symptoms may include irritability and fatigue followed by slowed growth, weight loss, and muscle wasting, generalized swelling, skin changes, enlargement of the liver and abdomen, and weakening of the immune system, leading to frequent infections. Once kwashiorkor develops, some of the effects, such as short stature and intellectual disability, cannot be corrected. See http://www.healthgrades.com/conditions/kwashiorkor, (Accessed on November 17, 2014).
[308] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.
[309] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013. Like makwakwa, massala or Strychnos spinosa is also known as spiny-monkey orange, green-monkey orange. It has a format of orange; it has juicy, sweet-sour and contains numerous hard brown seeds.
[310] Interview with Sara Julai Mucongue, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.
[311] Interview with Celeste Sabão Chaúque, Massangena District, August 29, 2013.
[312] www.kidshealth.org/parent/infectious/lung/measles.html, (Accessed June 6, 2014).

the spread of measles and hampered traditional strategies of fighting the disease. As it was observed in Chapter Four, formerly people suffering from measles had been isolated from the rest of the community but in the crowded environment of the communal settlement it was difficult to isolate the sick because villagers were uprooted from their social and cultural institutions.

Traditionally, villagers put the sick in confinement to avoid contact with 'hot' or polluted people. Villagers spoke of 'hot' people who slowed down the recovery of people from illness. Similar theories of disease are found over a large region. For example, Isaac Schapera wrote that people living in the territory of modern-day Botswana believed that,

> At certain times a person's blood becomes 'hot' and until he has 'cooled down' he is in a condition harmful to others with whom he comes into close contact. Both men and women still capable of bearing a child are 'hot' immediately after intercourse… widows and widowers are also 'hot' for about a year after their bereavement. A woman is 'hot' during her menstrual periods, during pregnancy, and immediately after childbirth. People are said to be 'hot' when they have just returned from a long journey, from a funeral, or from visiting a newly-confined mother….In the first place, men and women with 'hot blood' should not visit sick people or women confined after childbirth. It is believed that breach of this injunction will cause them to 'trample' upon the patient or mother, and greatly retard recovery[313]

Writing on the Thonga people in 1926, Henri Alexandre Junod stated that "during the period of confinement the father of the child and all those who have regular sexual intercourse were excluded from seeing the baby because, it was believed that the baby

[313] Isaac Schapera, *Married life in an African Tribe* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), pp.194-5, 202.

would die."[314] I, too, was told that people suffering of measles and other diseases were confined to avoid contact with 'hot' people who could worsen their condition.

Albino Capitine Chaia, a resident of Mabote district who witnessed the deadly impact of measles at a RENAMO camp, explained how the disruption of traditional strategies contributed to the spread of measles: "Around 1982 we suffered a measles epidemic. The cemetery was full in a short time. We tried to isolate the sick from 'hot' people but some people violated the confinement because they wanted to assist their ailing family members. In those days we often heard mothers crying after losing their children."[315] Samuel Mabunda from Chigubo district whose three children were killed by measles told his story: "in 1983 many people died of measles and hunger. There was no food and people were dying here. Personally I lost three children and I was devastated by losing three children in one year."[316] One woman from Mabote recalls another epidemic of measles in the 1990s. In her words: "The year 1990 was very difficult for us. In addition to war we suffered an epidemic of measles. It spread rapidly throughout the communal settlement. People were concentrated in a small place and some transgressed the rules of confinement and entered in contact with sick people while they were 'hot.' This slowed down the recovery of the sick and some ended up dying. "[317]

Bedbugs, fleas, lice and other parasites were among the causes of diseases that affected villagers in wartime. Prolonged drought, lack of water for basic hygiene and the concentration of people in limited space created favorable conditions for the proliferation

[314] Henri Alexandre Junod, *The life of a South African Tribe*, vol. I, *Social Life* (London: MacMillan, 1927), 42-43.
[315] Interview with Albino Capitine Chaia, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.
[316] Interview with Samuel Mabunda, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.
[317] Interview with Saurina Jorge Chitlango, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.

of insects and parasites. One man who lived in a RENAMO camp says that some people were killed by fleas. In his words: "in 1982, our camp was severely attacked by fleas. We confined the victims in a house. One day the person who went to give them food found them dead."[318]

Thus one of the consequences of drought and warfare was the deterioration of the health of villagers. Because war destroyed hospitals, people were denied access to medical treatment. In addition, starvation weakened villagers' immunological system making them vulnerable to diseases. People were found dead in forests, along the roads, and in the communal settlements.

Capitalizing on Drought and War

Warfare brought suffering to Mozambicans but also created opportunities. While the majority of Mozambicans were engaged in daily struggles for survival, others took advantage of the war to prosper. They embezzled humanitarian aid, spread rumors about imminent RENAMO attack and formed gangs of robbers that pretended to be RENAMO guerrillas. They appropriated and sold war booty and traded with distant regions despite the risk of traveling during the war time. Facing famine, government requested humanitarian aid from national and international communities. Unfortunately, corruption, theft and nepotism prevented people from receiving donations. Government officials at all levels of civil administration were involved in these schemes. Leaders knew of these

[318] Interview with Albino Capitine Chaia, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.

activities. President Chissano said in 1989 that people enriched themselves thanks to war. He appealed to the population to denounce those involved in the theft of humanitarian aid. Moreover, he announced that the Council of Ministers had formed a Commission to deal with theft of humanitarian aid.[319] In May 20, 1989 the Minister of Cooperation Mr. Jacinto Veloso, who was responsible for the coordination of humanitarian program, expressed his preoccupation about the theft of humanitarian aid. He admitted that there was mismanagement of humanitarian aid and he promised to reverse the situation.[320] The government strategy to minimize the misappropriation of humanitarian aid was to forbid distribution of goods to individuals. It stated that only people living in the camps for displaced people were entitled to aid. In this way the government hoped to stop the interference of government officials in aid distribution.[321]

Following the restoration of the freedom of press by the constitution of 1990, civilians became more vocal in denouncing acts of embezzlement of humanitarian aid. The frequent diversion of aid to the black market led civilians to write letters of denunciation to government officials. In Inhambane Province two civilians wrote a letter to the provincial governor stating that:

> We, Arthur Saizane and Patrício Lucas, residents in this province of Inhambane, would like to inform His Excellency that the warehouse of humanitarian aid for the victims of natural disasters located in Massinga town was transformed into a private warehouse that supplies some local shops. Looking at the critical condition of the population in Chicomo, Malamba, Nhaloi and other regions of this district, we are deeply disappointed with the diversion of products for private use in the eyes of everyone. We cite some examples: 'On August 10, 1992 a woman known as the wife of Captain Maqueia diverted 2.5 tons of maize to the shop of Mr. Francisco. One week later, the same woman diverted more 2 tons of maize to Mr. Majongue,

[319] AHM, NOTICIAS, April 20, 1989, p.1.
[320] AHM, NOTICIAS, May 30, 1989, p.1.
[321] AHM, NOTICIAS, May 31, 1989, p.1.

> a native of Funhalouro.' The so-called DPCCN delegate gives orders and leaves to cover up the situation. Our initial idea was to talk to the Administrator but we analyzed the situation and concluded that he condones these practices. The so-called delegate, defended himself in the name of the administrator. He said that he only obeyed orders from the administrator. Massinga is a district with few cars but he obtained one illegally. He also has one small kiosk and tailor shop both obtained dubiously. In reality, if one day God comes to earth to punish thieves perhaps these would be the first. Thus we demand His Excellency to investigate this case. Please contact Mr. Saizane, I drive a Yamaha 100 motorcycle and I work at central market where I own a tailor shop.[322]

This letter shows that the embezzlement of humanitarian aid was conducted with consent of administrative and military officials with the result that goods destined for free distribution ended up in the black market. It also suggests rivalries between local elites over access of humanitarian aid. The fact that the authors of this letter were businessmen suggests rivalries among local businessmen. Indeed this denunciation of embezzlement may have been inspired by jealousy. Many letters published in the widely-circulated *TEMPO* Magazine show how these practices were widespread.

One citizen, outraged by misappropriation of humanitarian aid, wrote: "I observed that products that were supposed to be distributed for free are now sold to the residents without any explanation. Now I ask: 'Are these products for sale? Local officials do not see this?' Some people go as far as to brag, saying 'humanitarian aid is good business therefore no one will move us away from the district.'"[323] Another indignant citizen wrote: "I observed many problems in the distribution of aid. Many people entitled themselves as militia members to receive maize. A militia commander took 29 sacks of maize and seven

[322] AGPI, *Exmo Senhor Governador da Provincia de Inhambane: Carta de Denuncia Escrita por Artur Saizane e Patricio Lucas*. Massinga, September 10, 1992.
[323] AHM, TEMPO 1126, 1992, 47.

sacks of beans. Now I ask, does it happen in all provinces of Mozambique that the militia commanders, *chefes de localidade* and FRELIMO Party secretaries have the right to receive larger quantities than others? [324] The worst thing is that the commander sells the products to local residents. I would like to see the authorities acting on this matter."[325] One employee of the DPCCN deplored the actions of his director and the district administrator. He said:

> I work as part-time longshoreman at DPCCN, I know that we received various articles for distribution to the victims of calamities. But instead, I have seen tractors and cars transporting goods to the residence of the Administrator. The victims of natural calamities are forced to work at the farms of the Administrator or to pound the maize of DPCCN delegate to receive emergency aid. The products stolen are sold at the local market. The businessman responsible for the sale of humanitarian aid receives one quarter of the sales and the rest goes to the administrator of district and DPCCN delegate. The residence of the administrator was transformed into a warehouse. Many products vanish from the warehouse but they do not reach the people in need. But the reports sent to higher authorities say that people are receiving aid. Why is it said that DPCCN is a humanitarian agency while in fact it is commercial enterprise?[326]

A man from Inhambane province questioned the mission of DPCCN saying: "It should not be called DPCCN because this is a deceit. In fact, it has become a commercial enterprise. When aid arrives in Vilanculo, people think that they are saved from starvation but later on, they see the goods transported to big cities for sale."[327] One soldier expressed

[324] *Chefe de localidade* is the lowest rank of public administration in Mozambique which includes, national government, provincial government, district government and administrative post also known as locality. The literal translation of *chefe de localidade* is locality chief which is different from local chief who is normally appointed or elected by residents or inherit the position from his relatives.
[325] AHM, TEMPO 1137, 1992, 49.
[326] AHM, TEMPO, 1121, 1992, 47
[327] AHM, TEMPO, 1087, 1991.

his indignation about the sale of humanitarian aid: "I met the Delegate of Red Cross selling humanitarian aid to displaced people. I asked local people whether that was frequent and they told me that that it was a common practice."[328]

The representatives of DPCCN at district level wrote reports complaining that the lack of trucks and fuel constrained the delivery of aid to the victims of famine. In many cases fuel was diverted for private use. The Chief of Transportation at Inhambane DPCCN himself stole two hundred liters of diesel.[329] Ironically, this employee was the one who gave me access to DPCCN archives where I found the document implicating him.

These examples show the level of disorganization and impunity that plagued public institutions during the war. Of course, some of reports may have been false. Since the government operated in a war environment and there were no culture of accountability, people speculated about what they saw. Hungry villagers assumed that all food offloaded in their camp was destined to them. They may have ignored the fact that the food was intended for other areas. This issue aside, there is enough evidence to argue that food aid distribution was rife with disorganization, corruption and nepotism.

The misappropriation of humanitarian aid was also common in the communal settlements and camps for internally displaced people. Military commanders and local authorities kept much of this aid for themselves and their relatives. As one militia man said: "I received more food and cloths because I was militia member. Many people got rich thanks to humanitarian aid. Our leaders bought cows, goats and other goods using

[328] AIM, TEMPO 1112, 1992, 44.
[329] IPGA, DPCCN: Comunicação Interna No. 6/DPCCNI/90

humanitarian aid. By the end of war, they were rich. I know military commanders who bought cattle using the food destined to assist the victims of famine."[330]

As was emphasized in Chapter Three, in Mozambique there is a tradition of taking booty and spoils of war. This tradition continued during the civil war as some commanders from both government and RENAMO guerrillas took war spoils for personal gain. Cattle were the major trophies of war. Government troops recovered thousands of cows from RENAMO but failed to return them to their owners. As a man from Funhalouro District observed, "on many occasions, government troops did not return the cows they recovered from RENAMO guerrillas."[331] One war veteran pointed out that "there were some commanders who benefited from war. They used to take the cattle recovered from RENAMO to their kraals. Up to now those people are big cattle owners. For example, one commander from Chidhoko accumulated many cows. Whenever he recovered cattle from RENAMO he took them to his kraal."[332]

Like the military, some civilians used war for personal gain. As a resident of Inhambane Province during the conflict I remember that sometimes we had to evacuate our homes urgently because of rumors about an imminent RENAMO raid. We did not have enough time to hide our possessions such as clothing, dishes, sewing machine and food. After spending some time hiding in the forest without hearing signals of gunfire we would return home and find out that some of our food and domestic utensils were missing.

[330] Interview with Alexandre Hauze Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.
[331] Interview with Aminosso Maela Matcheque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[332] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.

Like my family, many people experienced these false alarms. As one native of Mabote stated, "There were many false guerrillas including people who knew who was better off in the community. These people spread lies to force people to run away so that they could steal. I think that people did this because of the hunger that affected us in war time."[333] As was observed in Chapter One, mineworkers are economic elite in the countryside. Because of their status, they were victims of attacks by both military and fellow-civilians. Some people collaborated with RENAMO guerrillas, telling them about villagers particularly mineworkers who were better off than most people. These collaborators received protection from RENAMO and some of the goods stolen from fellow-villagers.

Some civilians took advantage of warfare and drought to accumulate wealth by exploiting rare but risky business opportunities, such as trade of basic products such as salt, sugar and soap. Traders travelled between distant villages to sell their goods and in the process exchanged information about the whereabouts of people scattered by war. Jossefa Lucas Muchuane, a resident of Massangena district who traded in war time, said: "During the war I was among the few people who supplied the communal settlement with products such as sugar and rice. I used to smuggle goods from Zimbabwe to our border in Mavue. From there I used my bicycle to bring the merchandise to Mbokota settlement. I accumulated so much money that after the end of war I did not feel it necessary to return to my civil service job."[334] Muchuane is one among many traders who conducted business

[333] Interview with David Moiséis Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.
[334] Interview with Jossefa Lucas Muchuane, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.

and accumulated wealth in wartime. In Mabote district, I interviewed two businessmen who accumulated their capital in war time.

Another business which flourished in war time was helping people to cross borders illegally to Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland. As one man who paid for these services recalled, "When the war intensified I crossed the border to Zimbabwe where I found a job. I decided to come here to take my family with me and I was helped by intermediaries who knew the best ways to cross the border and paid some money for their services."[335] Traders moved between RENAMO camps and government controlled areas without fear. Considering that RENAMO had camps along the border with Zimbabwe, South Africa and Swaziland, it seems that the smugglers of people enjoyed the protection of both government and RENAMO guerrillas.

Coping with the Effects of Warfare and Drought

This section focuses on the social institutions on which people relied to cope with the combined impact of warfare and drought. It argues that more than governmental and international humanitarian aid, family, spirit mediums, churches and other social organizations were the key institutions that helped people to cope with the effects of warfare and drought because the state was incapable of assisting all victims. The section begins with the analysis of the contribution of family and relatives in helping villagers to

[335] Interview with Vasco Julai Mbonzo, Massangena District, August 15, 2013.

cope with the effects of war and drought. It then describes the role of the local branches of the Mozambican Women Organization, the spirit mediums and churches.

In the districts of Chigubo, Funhalouro, Mabote and Massangena there are seven major clans: Mbenzane, Chitlango, Chichongue, Chirindza, Mazive, Chaúque and Sumbane. [336] Many of these people do not know each other but they agree that they have common ancestor. This creates a sense of common identity connecting people dispersed throughout the region. In time of war, this common identity helped villagers to cope with the impact of war. Villagers who ran away from war were received as family members elsewhere. In addition to genealogical connections, intermarriage helped villagers because a person's in-laws include all members of one's spouse or spouses' extended family. As Henri Alexandre Junod explained in his ethnographic study of the Thonga people, marriage "is not an individual affair as it has become with us. It is an affair of the community. It is a kind of contract between two groups, the husband's family and the wife's family."[337] Writing on bride wealth, Junod considered it as a compensation given by one group, in order to restore the equilibrium[338] between the various collective units composing the clan."[339] Junod's detailed explanation of the social and economic role of marriage among the people of southern Mozambique is a key element for understanding the importance of family ties in times of distress. The Portuguese ethnographer Augusto Cabral emphasized that the people of the region of study usually married in distant regions but he did not

[336] Literally translated from Xitswa, Xi-bongo which means surname or clans' name.
[337] Henri Alexandre Junod, *The life of a South African Tribe*, 121.
[338] Junod uses the word equilibrium as equivalent of compensation. Because marriage implied losing a family member to another clan, he thought, the bridewealth served as a kind of compensation because the brother of the bride used his sister's bridewealth to marry his wife. If paid in cows, the use of these animals to farm was a kind of compensation as well.
[339] Henri Alexandre Junod, *The life of a South African Tribe*, 278.

explain why.[340] Considering that Cabral also characterized the region as vulnerable to drought, it is likely that marrying partners from distant villages was one of the strategies used to mitigate the danger of hunger by forming family ties with people from different micro-climates.

During the civil war, villagers who fled from their residences needed housing, clothing and food. They relied on family networks to restart life. The role of families is well expressed by one villager who said, "There are only two surnames (clans) in this settlement: Chitlango and Chirindza. It is not good not to take action if you hear someone saying: 'my son slept without eating.' If you have something you must give him. Before the war we were dispersed and it was quite difficult to know who had or did not have food. In the communal settlement you had to share what little you had and this put you in a vulnerable condition because your reserves did not last long."[341] This statement shows that villagers felt moral obligation to assist relatives. In fact, I remember seeing people waking up early in the morning and go to better-off neighbors where they entertained themselves with conversation until meals were served.

Family ties helped to determine where displaced people went. Rosalina Razão Sitóe from Massangena District described how her relatives helped her to settle in Mucambene camp for displaced people: "Our relative received us; he introduced us to local authorities and provided food and land to build a house and farm. You know, we *ma-shangana* people help one another. Even in times of hunger we share food with neighbors."[342] When this woman says "we *'ma-Shangana,*' she refers to an extended network of the Shangani ethnic

[340] Augusto Cabral, *Raças, Usos e Costumes dos Indígenas,* 83.
[341] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.
[342] Interview with Rosalina Razão Sitóe, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.

group scattered throughout southern Mozambique, southeastern Zimbabwe and northeastern South Africa. This shows how the networks of solidarity were large. A man who got refuge in Chóckwè District remembers how friends and relatives supported him and his family: "when we arrived in Chihaquelane we were received very well. They gave us a big plot to farm."[343]

Family ties helped people to integrate themselves into new regions. Refugees relied on relatives to introduce them to local authorities. Those who did not have someone to testify for them were often at risk of being accused of spying for the enemy and executed. For example, in the District of Funhalouro, which harbored a RENAMO provincial base in Inhambane, when government troops engaged in hunting villagers suspected of collaborating with RENAMO, many of them were saved by their relatives. Many people were saved by a Frelimo secretary who had strong family ties to the villagers. As one woman explained, "we were saved by Mr. Chichongue who said: 'You all were under RENAMO influence. It is foolishness to accuse others. Better you forget the past.' Before that (long pause) *Oh, Oh, Oh!* Many people were killed in that *Nwambo* tree over there. People were lined up and asked whether they ate with Matsanga and all those who said no, were killed."[344]

Villagers believe that Mr. Chichongue acted this way because of his family ties with residents. This story was told by various interviewees with variations in the name of the family member who saved people from FRELIMO reprisals. One man from Tome put it this way: "the person who did the intelligence service in Manzuile was our relative. After

[343] Interview with Simione Chivambo, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.
[344] Interview with Felizarda Josefa Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 23, 2014.

the destruction of RENAMO base, he said: 'You people of Tome shut your mouths.' He said that in the presence of FRELIMO troops. The people of Manzuile understood that he was warning people against denouncing those who collaborated with RENAMO and they shut their mouths. But here in Tome we did not shut our mouths. We started denouncing those who collaborated with RENAMO and many people were killed."[345]

These accounts confirm the importance of family networks in the time of conflict. They are in line with Jan Shetler's observation of the Western Serengeti farmers who coped with the problems of drought, soil infertility, disease, and pests by establishing obligations with a variety of people.[346] They show that even among the government armed forces and RENAMO guerrillas, there were those who strove to protect their friends and relatives. They also show that not all soldiers condoned acts of violence against civilians. Lacking power to contest orders from their superiors, they acted secretly to save their friends and relatives.

Other institutions that played an important role in supporting the victims of warfare and drought were the social branches of FRELIMO party, namely the women's organization (OMM) and the secretariat. Since the war occurred during one-party rule, it was difficult to distinguish the role of the government from the role of the party because when the war reached southern Mozambique FRELIMO had already established its political structures in the countryside. These organizations, particularly the Women's Organization and the Secretaries of Communities, mobilized people to relocate to

[345] Interview with Alexandre Hauze Chichongue and Alfredo Famanda Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.
[346] Jan Bender Shetler, *Imagining Serengeti: A History of Landscape Memory in Tanzania from Earliest Times to the Present* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007), 67

communal settlements. It was the duty of these unpaid and mostly illiterate party personnel to assist the victims of warfare and drought. They helped people to obtain land for agriculture and participated in the distribution of humanitarian aid. In addition, they had access to confidential information about the conduct of warfare. One woman who despite being illiterate ascended to the position of *chefe de localidade* told her story of participation in the meetings with the military to discuss a plan of civilians' evacuation in case of RENAMO attack:

> When I was secretary of Women's Organization I attended military meetings. In one of those meetings, our Major summoned local leaders to alert us about an imminent RENAMO attack. He asked us to warn people about it. We assembled people in the evening and informed them that they should remain in a state of maximum alert because we were about to suffer an attack. Because this communal settlement was surrounded by a fence and landmines, we opened pathways to evacuate people in case of attack. We decided to move before the attack and by sunset the settlement was attacked. Our troops were defeated but we saved many civilians lives.[347]

The OMM was also responsible for maintaining social order in the communal settlements. Its members dealt with cases of adultery and domestic violence. Women and men depended upon the services of the OMM to report soldiers' abuses against their spouses and property. As one member of OMM put it, "I was responsible for the recruitment of people to transport bush meat to feed civilians and soldiers in the settlement. I also participated in the resolution of various conflicts involving soldiers and civilians. Since many of the complaints were related to adultery, I educated women to respect their

[347] Interview with Celestina João Mapossa, Chigubo, August 29, 2013.

marriages by avoiding having affairs with soldiers."[348] Another member of the OMM in Massangena District stated, "I mediated many conflicts, particularly those concerning theft and adultery. The concentration of people in one place in time of famine pushed people to steal and to exchange sexual favors for some food or clothing. As a leader, I had to counsel people to deal with these problems"[349]

The establishment of FRELIMO party social organizations brought political and administrative power to the hands of villagers. This proved very important in creating networks of solidarity to cope with the impact of warfare and drought. In the eyes of the villagers, a secretary of a women's organization or of a communal settlement was not a bureaucrat imposed from above. She was someone like them; she also faced the same problems brought about by warfare and drought. When warfare brought soldiers from distant regions including central and northern Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, party structures like the OMM at village level did everything in their capacity to protect fellow-villagers from outsiders.

Unlike central and northern Mozambique, where RENAMO administrated territories for long periods during the war, in southern Mozambique RENAMO did not control territory for long time.[350] Major RENAMO military bases in Tome-Funhalouro, in Inhambane Province, Saúte and Nhanala in Gaza Province lasted approximately two to three years. Unlike the government that ordered villagers to resettle near military camps, RENAMO favored dispersed settlements. Villagers do not recall the existence of civil

[348] Interview with Agineta Sumbane, Mabote District, August 7, 2013.
[349] Interview with Melissina Jorge Mondlane, Massangena District, August 15, 2013.
[350] For more on RENAMO territorial administration see Sibyl Cline, *Renamo: Em Defesa da Democracia em Moçambique* (Washington DC, 1989).

administration during RENAMO occupation. However, during the initial phase of occupation, RENAMO invested in winning the 'hearts and minds' of the villagers by redistributing war spoils. RENAMO guerrillas distributed beef and other products extracted from other villagers. One village woman who benefited from RENAMO assistance said: "RENAMO guerrillas confiscated villagers' cattle but when they slaughtered them they offered the meat to the owner and other villagers.[351] RENAMO was also responsible for providing food to the kidnapped people who lived near their military bases as helpers and sexual partners. As one villager kidnapped by RENAMO explained, "the bases were organized like 'normal' houses, we had churches and traditional healers who took care of the sick. We ate wild foods and what the guerrillas brought from their military operations."[352] Artur Wetela Mazive, a former RENAMO guerrilla who lived in many bases from 1981 to 1992 said: "the conditions in one base were bad because of drought and hunger. We used to eat bush meat and the food that we brought from outside for those who remained in the base."[353] Aside from these references of RENAMO guerrillas' assistance to people who they controlled, I did not encounter evidence of RENAMO assistance to villagers suffering of hunger. This is not surprising taking into account the roving nature of guerrilla and the lack of access to the humanitarian sources available for the government.

Having analyzed the role of the organization of Mozambican Women and RENAMO guerrillas in helping people to cope with war and hunger, I now focus on religious institutions. As in other conflicts in the world, religious beliefs played an

[351] Interview with Amélia Duzeta Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 23, 2013.
[352] Interview with Albino Capitine Chaia, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.
[353] Interview with Artur Wetela Mazive, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.

important role in fighting and experiencing the war.[354] Traditional healers, diviners, pastors and prophets helped villagers to cope with war and drought. Villagers believed that many acts of bravery in the battlefield were due to magic powers. This thought is part of a tradition of the use of war-medicine in the region. In his description of the preparation of African warriors for the battle of Marracuene against the Portuguese on January 7, 1895, Henri Junod observed that a warrior took a medicine which "persuaded him that he was invulnerable, that the bullets would be deflected on either side of him, or either should they hit him, they would be flatted against his body and fall harmless to the ground."[355]

Oral accounts mention widespread use of spirits and magic by both government and RENAMO military. These accounts are similar to those collected by K.W. Wilson about the use of magic in the central province of Zambézia. Based on oral accounts from former RENAMO guerrillas, government troops and militias, Wilson provided detailed stories of warriors who transformed themselves into anthills and tall grass. Others turned into bees able to sting the RENAMO soldiers who had become snakes. He concluded that the civil war in Mozambique was "a war of the spirits whereby RENAMO sought to secure authority (and a little legitimacy) through elaborating a spiritually-empowered cult of military capacity. The spirits have not been discarded by FRELIMO nor have they

[354] See Stephen Ellis, *The Mask of Anarchy: the Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of the African Civil War* (New York: New York University Press 1999); Heike Behrend, *Alice Lakwena & the holy spirits: war in Northern Uganda, 1985-97,* translated by Mitch Cohen (Oxford: J. Currey; Kampala : Fountain Publishers,1999); Giblin and Monson, (eds.), *Maji;* David Lan, *Guns & Rain : Guerrillas & Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe* (London : J. Currey, 1985).

[355] Henri Alexandre Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe,* p.465. For similar beliefs see Gilbert Clement Kamana Gwassa, *The Outbreak and Development of the Maji, 1905-1907* (Koln: Rudiger Koppe, 2005); Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, "Kony's Message: A New Koine? The Lord's Resistance Army in Northern Uganda," *African Affairs* 80, 390 (1999): 5-36, p.18.

abandoned the Mozambican people. Both local chiefs and the FRELIMO military have competed for this same authority and been able to deploy it to good effect."[356]

My interviewees talked about the use of magic and war medicine as well. For example, three war veterans who participated in the battle of Manzuile-Tome in Funhalouro District, which was regarded as RENAMO's strategic stronghold in Inhambane Province, believed that the government troop's chief spy had magical powers. The following episode involved his use of magic powers in warfare:

> Our intelligence man had supernatural powers. He did extraordinary espionage. He went to gather intelligence at RENAMO base in Kwalakwadha. He came back dressed in a RENAMO uniform. He showed us the best way to beat the enemy and we won the battle easily. It was the same guy who did intelligence service at RENAMO provincial base in Manzuile. When he arrived there he introduced himself as RENAMO's artillery commander. He told them that FRELIMO was preparing to attack the base soon. He said he had been sent to lubricate heavy weapons and redirect guns to Massinga District (East) because FRELIMO would attack from that direction. They allowed him to do the job but instead of cleaning, he removed the firing pins on the mortars. He returned after five days and told us to prepare the assault right away. We went there and took over the base. I believe that the man had supernatural powers.[357]

Soldiers needed the services of the spirit mediums even after being discharged from the military service because they believed that someone who killed people or who was exposed to killing must be cleansed before returning to civilian life. This is an old practice in African warfare. In his description of the treatment of the warriors in late-nineteenth-century, Henri Alexandre Junod observed that those who killed in war "are exposed to the mysterious and deadly influence of the *naru* and must consequently undergo a medical

[356] K.B. Wilson, "Violence and Counter Violence in Mozambique," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol 18, No. 3, 1992, p.581.
[357] Interview with Dinis Simione Chibique, Mabote District, August 20, 2013.

treatment."[358] Junod went on to explain that "*naru is* spirit of the slain which tries to take its revenge on the slayer. It haunts him and may drive him into insanity."[359] The spirits of the slain are also known as *minpfukwa* and are feared for their capacity to harm the slayer. In southern Mozambique, the *Ndau* ethnic group is feared as *minpfukwa*. Incidentally, RENAMO's top commanders, including André Matsangaisse, the first president, and his successor, Afonso Dhlakama are *Ndaus.*[360] Recent studies show that villagers dealt with *minpfukwa* through war. In his discussion of the cleansing rituals performed by healers on war veterans of the Mozambican civil war, Paulo Granjo observed that the danger of war is placed in the same category as other dangerous situations such as travel, childbirth and adultery. Granjo noted that cleansing rituals facilitated the reintegration of individual veterans and contributed to the acceptance of the former enemies into society. The rituals were also a way of ensuring that the veteran did not relapse into violence.[361] Cleansing rituals were performed for both civilians and soldiers. People who returned from RENAMO captivity were also subjected to these rituals administrated by traditional healers and spirit mediums.[362] Villagers in the war zone believed that some traditional healers and

[358] Henri Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe,* p.478.
[359] Henri Junod, *The Life of a South African Tribe,* p.478;
[360]André Matsangaísse was killed in combat in 1979. For more details on *minpfukwa see* Henri Philipe Junod, *Os indígenas de Moçambique no Século XVI e Começo do Século XVII Segundo os Antigos Documentos Portugueses da Época dos Descobrimentos* (Lourenço Marques: Imprensa Nacional, 1939), 28.
[361] Paulo Granjo, "Trauma e Limpeza Ritual de Veteranos em Moçambique," *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos* 21 (2011):34-69, p.44-45. This article provides the description of the rituals by the spirit medium that performed them and veterans. For more details on the procedures and relevance of rural social institutions see the work of the Mozambican anthropologist Alcinda Honwana, "Healing for Peace: Traditional Healers and Post-War Reconstruction in Southern Mozambique," *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology,* 3, 3 (1997): 293-305.
[362] For more details on the history of cleansing rituals in southern Mozambique, the ethnographic study of Henri Junod published in 1912 continue to be an indispensable source. For more updated discussion, see Alcinda Manuel. Honwana, *Espíritos vivos, tradições modernas: possessão de espíritos e reintegração social pós-guerra no sul de Moçambique* (Maputo: Promédia 2002).

spirit mediums had spiritual powers to influence RENAMO guerrillas to release people from captivity. According to one man from Mabote:

> Spirit mediums made a lot of money during the war. I don't know how they did it but they helped to bring back many kidnapped people. Many of the good spirit mediums who used to do this job were in Mambone District. I know many people who went there to get help. In 1989, one family from this village requested the services of one spirit medium to bring back three family members kidnapped by RENAMO. The spirit medium asked for one goat to make sacrifice and an amount of 500.00 Meticais in cash for each person. After one month the three people received death threats in a RENAMO camp. They ran away and spent four days and four nights to reach the Save River where they met government troops who brought them to the village.[363]

Asking a spirit medium service to protect people from war and to rescue kidnapped individuals was a common practice. In fact, some spirit mediums like the Spirit of Mungói in Manjacaze District of Gaza Province established a neutral war zone which some scholars labelled an 'oasis of peace in a sea of war.'[364] Neither RENAMO nor FRELIMO dared attack Mungói's people. People from different villages went to Mungói hoping to bring back their kidnapped relatives. A study published in 2013 showed that the Mungói family used the power of spirits to negotiate peace and to rescue kidnaped villagers.[365]

K.W. Wilson described similar cases in Derre area of Morrumbala district in Zambézia Province where chief Capiteni, who had reputation for magical power, succeeded in keeping RENAMO away from his territory. According to Wilson, between 1982 and 1984 approximately one thousand displaced people moved to Chief Capiteni's

[363] Interview with Jossefa Simione Chitlango, Mabote District, August 6, 2013.
[364] Carolyn Nordstrom, *A different Kind of War Story* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 148.
[365] See Mary B. Anderson and Marshal Wallace, *Opting out of War: Strategies to Prevent Violent Conflict* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), 143-156

territory. Wilson refers also to medium Samantaje who in 1987 established a peace zone in Gorongosa in the central Province of Sofala. He explains that in Samantaje's peace zone, any bearer of a weapon would be bitten by a snake or killed by a lion.[366] A common feature of these oases of peace, including the zone of spirit Mungói, was the taxation of outsiders who sought refuge.

In addition to the spirit mediums, villagers relied on the services of churches to cope with war and hunger. [367] As a Methodist pastor, Arnaldo Salomão Mazive observed, "during the war people attended Church in large numbers. When I moved to the camp of displaced people in Massinga district I received many followers. Many displaced people were seeking comfort from God. We used to pray for those who had their family kidnapped or killed by war and we also prayed for peace in the country."[368] Mazive's experience shows that villagers were eagerly looking for someone who could comfort them and churches were among the social institutions that villagers relied on to cope with war and drought.

As Alfredo Melisse Mutuque, a Methodist Superintendent recalled, "people prayed a lot during the war. We preached the gospel for the displaced people and prayed for peace. We used biblical passages to explain the war to people and we advised them to be patient because wars had happened in human history. We told them that God said that there will be a time when a father and a son will fight."[369] Mutuque's statement is based on the book of Ecclesiastic 3:8 (NIV) which states that there is "A time of love, and time of hate; a time

[366] K.B. Wilson, "Violence and Counter Violence in Mozambique," 554-557.
[367] My home village did not have many established churches up to 1983 but by 1992 there were dozens of congregations claiming curative and prophetic powers.
[368] Interview with Arnaldo Salomão Mazive, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[369] Interview with Alfiado Milisse Mutuque, Funhalouro District, September 1, 2013.

of war, and a time of peace."[370] This quote shows the contribution of Christian churches in the mitigation of the effects of war on villagers.

In some cases, churches provided material support to people in need. Two women who received help from church in this period told their story: "We adhered to the Old Apostolic Church in our refugee camp in Maqueze. We received a lot of support from the Church. When we were sick, they prayed for us. On our arrival to the camp, the church helped us to build houses. Later on, we also helped the newcomers to settle down. The church was very supportive indeed."[371] Another woman who ran to Maputo because of war recalled the importance of Church: "In Maputo I attended Old Apostolic Church. When I was sick they visited me in hospital. When the war ended, I told them that I was returning home and they bought me goods so that I could restart my life here at home."[372]

Conclusion

Warfare displaced villagers from lands about which they had micro-geographical knowledge and forced them into crowded settlements with poor sanitation. The concentration of villagers in communal settlements exposed them to diseases, particularly diarrhea, malaria and measles, which killed many of them. As villagers struggled for survival and state social services collapsed, the countryside experienced various social problems. Some people saw in these crisis opportunities to explore new activities to prosper. They engaged in various profitable activities including the smuggling of

[370] Holy Bible, New International Version (NIV), *Ecclesiastic* 3:8 (USA: Biblica, 2011.
[371] Interview with Celeste Sabão Chaúque and Raulina Razão Mabote, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.
[372] Interview with Lúcia Sabão Sumbane, Chigubo District, August 30, 2013.

humanitarian aid, forming gangs of robbers that pretended to be RENAMO guerrillas, appropriating of war booty, and conducting trade of scarce goods between enemy lines.

Family, local branches of the Organization of Mozambican Women, spirit mediums and churches were key institutions in helping people to cope with the combined impact of warfare and drought. From the late 1980s, many people looked at these social institutions for emotional, spiritual and material support. They wanted support from people who could help them to understand the barbarity of war, and from those who could help them to ask God to bring back rain and peace. Other villagers went to church to receive donations such as food and clothing. In their turn, church leaders persuaded adherents to support people who lost everything due to war. Villagers helped one another in various ways including helping them build houses and also by providing them with land for agriculture. Thus the analysis of the civil war in Mozambique from the perspective of the villagers expanded our understanding of the effects of war on Mozambican society. Learning from villagers' experiences, the chapter showed that the villagers affected by war were far from being passive victims. In fact, they actively shaped the way the conflict was conducted.

CHAPTER VI

FORMATTED REMEMBRANCE: REVIVING THE MEMORY OF THE CIVIL WAR IN SOUTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

Introduction

The general peace agreement of 1992 that put an end to sixteen years of civil war in Mozambique encouraged Mozambicans to forgive and forget all war atrocities. However, villagers wondered how they could reconcile with people who killed their relatives. They also wondered how to explain their traumatic experience to younger generations. This chapter argues that the general peace agreement between the government of Mozambique and RENAMO has effectively censored an important chapter of Mozambican history, thereby constraining the way war survivors have dealt with their turbulent past. It also argues that the transformation of the former belligerents into political opponents in the new democratic dispensation established by the general peace agreement was the chief factor in shaping the memory of war in Mozambique. Bearing this argument in mind and the experience of being one of the survivors of this conflict, I engage villagers who suffered the brutality of war in the reconstruction of their memories. In this way, the narrative I am presenting is based upon my own experience and the stories which I collected about this traumatic experience.

Warfare and Memory in Rural Southern Mozambique

On October 4, 1992 the FRELIMO government and RENAMO signed a General Peace Agreement. This agreement set the stage for the first democratic elections which took place in November 1994.[373] Although Mozambicans celebrated the end of war, the terms of agreement brought many challenges. Many questions emerged: How would they heal the wounds of war? How would they react to the appeal for votes by former belligerents considering the atrocities committed against civilians during the war? The peace agreement responded to these concerns by decreeing a national amnesty.[374] In a way similar to what scholars called 'selective national amnesia,'[375] and 'organized forgetting,'[376] FRELIMO and RENAMO in collaboration with the international community encouraged people to forgive and forget. Nevertheless, unlike in the neighboring South Africa where the post-Apartheid government created a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation to deal with violence committed during the Apartheid regime, in Mozambique such a move was ruled out. In fact, before the end of war in 1992, the government of Mozambique offered amnesty to RENAMO guerrillas.[377] Yet, in that period, the government was reluctant to allow the

[373] See Chissano, Joaquim, "Healing the Wounds of Past Conflicts, Mozambique Opts for a Culture of Peace," *UN Chronicle*, 35, 4, 2 (1988).
[374] Boletim da República, Lei 15/92. Maputo, 14 de Outubro de 1992.
[375] Shahid Amin, *Event, Metaphor, Memory: Chauri Chaura, 1922-1992* (New Dehli, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[376] Shari J. Cohen, *Politics without a Past: The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalist* (London: Duke University Press, 1999).
[377] Hoile, *Mozambique*, 106. On the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa see Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, "Remorse, Forgiveness and Rehumanization: Stories from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission," in *Historical Memory in Africa: Dealing with the Past, Reaching for the Future in an Intercultural Context*, edited by Mamadou Diawara, Bernard Lategan, and Jörn Rüsen (New York: Berghahn Books 2010); George Bizos, *No one to blame? : In pursuit of Justice in South Africa* (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers; Bellville, Mayibuye Books 1998).

international human rights organizations to investigate massacres allegedly committed by RENAMO.[378]

Keeping in mind these politics of peace building in Mozambique, I engage villagers in the remembrance of war experience. But I am aware that studying memory is complex and problematic because "memory is conceived in terms of multiple, diverse, mutable, and competing accounts of past events; it is conceived as fluid and dynamic."[379] Joan Tumblety captures the fluidity of memory stating that:

> We stretch memory across cognitive and neural processes of remembering located in the human brain and the narrative expression of autobiographical memories; it serves for public acts of commemoration that mark significant events in the past, and for public apologies for past atrocities made by state authorities. We know it as public history, museum practice and 'heritage'; we spawn from it notions of social memory, collective memory and historical memory. It extends far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of history, to encompass not only other humanities and social sciences disciplines such as music and sociology, but cognitive psychology and neuroscience as well.[380]

Bearing in mind that memory is complex and fluid, this chapter approaches memory as a subject for historical inquiry and not merely as a source of information about the past or about the civil war in Mozambique. This chapter is concerned not on the experience of the civil war but with the war experience as it is remembered by villagers. It takes memory "not as straightforwardly a transparent window onto an individual's lived experience but as narrative product that speaks not only to complex questions of selfhood but to the

[378] Hoile, *Mozambique*, 105
[379] Kendall R. Phillips, ed., *Framing Public Memory* (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2004), 2.
[380] Joan Tumblety, ed. *Routlege Guides to Using Historical Sources: Memory and History: Understanding Memory as Source and Subject* (Florence, KY, USA: Routledge, 2013), 1.

interplay between past experiences and present recollections."[381] It builds upon previous studies of memory including the sociologist Maurice Halbwachs' work on "collective memory" which paved the way to the current understanding of past as social construction shaped by the concerns of present.[382] It also builds on the work of Terence Ranger and Eric Hobsbawm on "invented traditions" which also emphasizes social invention of shared memory of the past to explain new situations without long historical background.[383] In addition to acknowledging memory as a social product, it agrees that memory shapes personal identities but, is also shaped by political and social contexts.[384] The scholarship addressing memory shows that it must be approached as an attempt to reconstruct what happened or was experienced in a particular social context. It also shows that memory is influenced by individual tellers, audiences and the relations between them.[385]

This chapter shows how villagers call up images, stories, experiences, and emotions from their turbulent past of living in a region torn by war and natural calamity. These memories are ordered and placed within narratives shaped by their social environmental, cultural and political context.[386] Moreover, the memories by villagers are not isolated from external influences, they are contingent and express both past and present.[387] In fact, what may appear as personal memory is a socially constructed, complex and fluid experience. It has many layers including family, community and public representations. As it will be

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[381] Joan Tumblety, ed. *Routledge Guides to Using Historical Sources,* 4.
[382] Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory* edited, translated, and with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser. Selections (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 25.
[383] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 1-12.
[384] For more on the politics of war memories see T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, *The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration* (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), 6-16.
[385] For more on the complex nature of memory see Tonkin, *Narrating our Past*, pp.*97-98;* Abrams, *Oral History Theory*, p.78.
[386] Lynn Abrams, *Oral History Theory*, 78-79.
[387] Lynn Abrams, *Oral History Theory*, 79.

demonstrated later in this chapter, villagers' remembering of war time is influenced by the official discourse of national reconciliation as well as by the new political identities which emerged with multi-party democracy. In this new political dispensation, the ruling party contradicts itself by imposing organized forgetting while at the same time encourages selective remembrance for political purposes.

Indeed, organized forgetting affects the way villagers construct their memories of war but it fails to erase the memories of war on villagers because silence is also a form of communication. As Jay Winter observed, "silence is a socially constructed space in which and about which subjects and words normally used in everyday life are not spoken."[388] Winter goes on to observe that silence can take what he calls 'liturgical,' political and strategic forms. 'Liturgical' silence is concerned with the framing of public understanding of war and violence and addresses loss, mourning and sacrifice. Political or strategic silences are used to avoid discussions of war issues that may lead to a new conflict. They are used in the hope that the passage of time will lower the temperature of disputes about traumatic experience or even heal the wounds caused by war.[389] As Jay Winter says "silence is the insurance policy people take to protect the given order, even at the cost of the truth."[390]

Memories are also formed through amnesia and silence. They are "constructed and reconstructed by the dialectics of remembering and forgetting, shaped by semantic and

[388] Jay Winter, "Thinking about Silence," in *Shadows of War: A Social History of Silence in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Efrat Ven-Ze'ev, Ruth Ginio and Jay Winter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 4.
[389] Jay Winter, "Thinking about Silence"
[390] Jay Winter, "Thinking about Silence," 29

interpretive frames, and subject to panoply of distortions."[391] Memories "are not a matter of simply recalling past experiences; rather they are complex and continuing process of selection, negotiation, and struggle over what will be remembered and what forgotten. The process involves remembering and forgetting, changing and restructuring one's perception of the past so that it both supports the needs of the present and projects a logical future."[392]

The silencing of memories is very frequent in societies recovering from periods of civil war, state terrorism, or ethnic conflict. There are many examples of silenced memories amnesia such August Pinochet's Chile where it was believed that "atrocities were committed by both sides. Because of this, it was agreed that the best thing to do was to forget about what may have happened in the past and move on.[393] In the 1950s and 1960s West Germany, the West emphasized a sense of suffering that excluded the acknowledgement of Germany guilt and complicity. Laurel Cohen-Pfister and Dagmar Wienroerder-Skinner, argue that in East Germany, the government omitted the expulsions and the rapes committed by the communists.[394] Sometimes, the making of national identity requires collective amnesia because some violent actions perpetrated in the process of nation building end up being beneficial for the state.[395] In cases like this, reviving the memories of the atrocities can jeopardize the existence of a state.[396] In Mozambique, state-imposed amnesia went beyond forgiving the atrocities of the wartime to include

[391] Jacob J. Climo and Maria G. Cattell, eds., *Memory and History* (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2002), 1.
[392] Cheryl Natzmer, "Remembering and Forgetting," in *Memory and History*, ed. Jacob J. Climo and Maria G. Cattell (Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2002), 164.
[393] Natzmer, "Remembering and Forgetting, 162.
[394] Laurel Cohen-Pfister and Dagmar Wienroerder-Skinner, eds., *Victims and Perpetrators: 1933-1945: (Re) Presenting the Past in Post-Unification Culture* (Berlin; New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 6-7.
[395] Hector Lindo-Fuentes, Eric Ching and Rafael A. Lara-Martinez, *Remembering a Massacre*, p.252.
[396] Here I am thinking about the bombing of civilian targets during the WWII and the atrocities committed by liberation struggles guerrillas.

suppression of the memories of the socialist experience. As Anne Pitcher observed, government officials and business elites have engaged in organized forgetting to navigate the transition from socialism to neo-liberalism. Pitcher explains that since the establishment of liberal market economy in the 1990s, Mozambican elites abandoned their socialist discourse altogether and started to speak as established capitalists.[397]

Neglecting some aspects of memory is not exclusive to governments. It happens at personal level as people select what to remember and what to leave out. People may choose to leave out some experiences of their lives "whether as result of the kind of trauma that makes it harder to men and women to reconcile their past experience with continuous sense of self, or because what is remembered is framed – perhaps in unconscious ways – by social and political needs in the present."[398] Thus, silence may be an assertion of dignity by those who, like rape victims, suffered indignity.[399] This is very common among women who were raped during the civil war in Mozambique.[400]

The following paragraphs look at villagers' memories of wartime taking into consideration that "what is remembered is shaped fundamentally both by the meaning of the initial experience to the individual in question and by the psychological-and-inextricably social circumstances of recall."[401] Villagers use various genres to narrate their experiences. Some use songs; others prefer to tell their stories in the third person, while others communicate through silence and some are excited to tell what they experienced.

[397] Marie Anne Pitcher, "Forgetting from above and the memory from bellow" Strategies of legitimation and struggle in post socialist Mozambique," *Africa* 76, 1 (2006): 88-112.
[398] Joan Tumblety, ed. *Routledge Guides to Using Historical Sources*, 4.
[399] Jay Winter, "Thinking about Silence," p.4.
[400] My research assistant in Chigubo district told me that among my interviewees there were rape victims but they did not tell me.
[401] See Joan Tumblety, ed. *Routledge Guides to Using Historical Sources*, 7.

Like the testimonies of the Second World War victims interviewed by Joanna Burke, Mozambican men and women reconstruct their war time experiences, "some through an apathetic silence, others through a barrage of hostility and denial."[402]

Despite the diversity of approach there is one common denominator in the way villagers talk about RENAMO. Overall they avoid making explicit reference to the former rebel movement. Many interviewees used code words such as va *yisa lavayani* (those guys), *ma djaha ya mpela djambo* (the men from the west), *va Kokwani lavayani* (those grandpas), *ma djaha lawayani* (those men) and *chigaramugwasha* (the men from the bush). Making explicit reference to RENAMO has become out of bounds in the region and even after twenty one years of peace villagers do not want to be associated with RENAMO as a political party. In fact, RENAMO have never elected an MP in Gaza Province. In Inhambane Province, RENAMO never won more than four seats as they did in 1999.

This hostility to RENAMO is in part the result of the government efforts to publicize RENAMO brutality against civilians. The war created a divide between 'them' (RENAMO) and 'us' (FRELIMO government).' As explained in Chapter Two, the government portrayed RENAMO as armed bandits without a political agenda and attributed to it full responsibility for atrocities against civilians. This propaganda was popular in southern Mozambique, where RENAMO guerrillas were seen as bloodthirsty outsiders who looted and killed civilians. In fact, oral accounts often claim that RENAMO was responsible for the great part of lootings and killing of civilians in the region. Nevertheless, listening to personal accounts provides a nuanced understanding of the ways

[402] Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing*, 9.

people chose to recall their calamitous past. For example, songs provide a broad picture of how war divided Mozambican society. Here are some songs that were popular during the time of distress:

> *Wa nuha matswangaisse.* [Matsanga stinks]
>
> *Wa nuhooo* [Stinks]
>
> *Hambi loko va mu nika sipo wa nuha matsanga* [Even if you give him soap, he stinks]
>
> *Wa nuhooo* [Stinks][403]

This song is still very popular in Massangena district. People sing it in public gatherings. Its content is in line with the idea that RENAMO guerrillas were from the bush. The fact that they continued stinking after taking baths with soap shows their inability to 'civilize' or assimilate to a new way of life under government control. It also means that any effort to bring them to 'normality' was fruitless. During the war, the government propaganda machine collected some popular songs and broadcast them on radio. One of the songs which I heard frequently during my fieldwork was very popular when I was a teenager. As school boys in war time, we were instructed to sing:

> *A Nhloko ya Matsanga ya matequenya* [Matsanga's head has lice]
>
> *A Nhloko ya Matsanga ya matequenya* [Matsanga's head has lice]2x
>
> *Loko u tsama na yenaaa* [If you live with him]
>
> *Loko u tsama na yenaaa* [If you live with him] 2x
>
> *Yena, ata ku tluletaaa!*[404] [He will infect you!]

[403] Interview with Ernesto Budula, Rosalina Razão Sitóe and Manguiza Ofice Chauque, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.
[404] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.

This song denigrates RENAMO guerrillas and incites people to keep distance from RENAMO influence. As it states, if you associate with RENAMO they will infect you with lice. Lice appear to be a metaphor for RENAMO ideology that was intended to discourage people from joining the guerrillas. Twenty-one years after the end of war, people were still singing this song. By tolerating these divisive songs, the government contradicts its appeal to forget the past and reconcile with former enemies. This cements divisions among villagers which surface in electoral seasons. For example, after two decades of multi-party democracy rural southern Mozambique, particularly Gaza Province remains a no-go zone for RENAMO and other opposition parties. In the 2014 general election, people chanted anti-RENAMO songs and blocked roads to prevent RENAMO members from campaigning in Gaza Province. This provoked tumult which killed one FRELIMO militant. In Mabote District, Inhambane Province, the Minister of Transportation and Communications took a photograph near a burial ground of people killed during the war and posted it in his Facebook account with anti-RENAMO statements. This raised an intense debate on Facebook and television about the politicization of war memory with many participants condemning the attitude of the minister. During my field work I came across a case of hostility to a former RENAMO guerrilla man who was forced to abandon his village in Chigubo District in 2013 due to his loyalty to RENAMO in an area regarded as FRELIMO stronghold.[405]

Other songs portray the consequences of war on peoples' lives. One woman from Mabote District provided this short song: "*A yimpi na ndambi swi heti maxaca* [War and

[405] Interview with Celestina João Mapossa and Samuel Mabunda, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.

floods destroyed family]/*Yooo mamani whê/*[Yoooo mom whê].[406] The woman said that the song has other stanzas that she forgot. Since there is reference to a great flood in the region during the war, her reference to floods appears to be an adaptation of the song to remember a more recent calamity, the great floods of 2000. In fact, villagers mix past and current events in their song. For example, in the following songs, villagers connect the atrocities of war to post-war politics:

Ti homo ta hina tinga takiwa hi Matsanga [Our cows were stolen by Matsanga]
Se Ukohlwile kê? [Did you forget?]
Ha kumbula [We still remember]
Ti mova ta hina tinga hisiwa hi Matsanga [Our cars were torched by Matsanga]
Se Ukohlwile kê? [Did you forget?]
Ha kumbula [We still remember]

This song enumerates the damages allegedly committed by RENAMO guerrillas and asks people whether they have forgotten. As the lead singer lists the damages, the choir replies that they still remember. According to Francisco Johane Manhiça this song is a reminder of RENAMO's war atrocities to people who may be attracted to join RENAMO party during the democratic elections held regularly in Mozambique.[407]

The song shows the level of post-war political intolerance. By incorporating wartime songs into democratic politics, people make a selective reconstitution of wartime experience in order to respond to the needs of present. They use their memory of war to

[406] Interview with Sara Julai Mucongue, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.
[407] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.

intimidate their political opponents and suppress dissent. This reconstitution of war time memories shows that "memory can strengthen individual and collective identity by emphasizing links with past."[408] In this case, "memory is used to justify entrenched positions, reinforce existing stereotypes and to resist change."[409] The following song is more explicit in this regard:

> *Matswanga lwiyaneeee* [That is Matsanga/RENAMO]
> *Kasi uta hlawuliwa hi mani?* [Who will vote for Him?]
> *Ti mova u hisileee* [He burnt our cars]
> *Kasi uta hlawuliwa hi mani?* [But who will vote for Him?]
> *Avanu u dlayileeee,* [He killed people]
> *Kasi uta hlawuliwa hi mani?*[410] [Who will vote for Him?]

In the first verse the lead singer alerts people that the RENAMO party stands for Matsanga, a name associated with brutality. In the third and fifth verses the song enumerates the atrocities allegedly committed by RENAMO. The fourth and sixth verses ask who will vote for RENAMO. The song does not answer these questions but it is implicit that its purpose is to persuade voters to abstain from voting RENAMO by invoking a grotesque past. Again, we have a case of selective memory used for political purpose.

As we have seen, the war coincided with long periods of drought and famine. This connection dominated villagers' memory of the war. Ernesto Budula, a resident of Massangena whom I met in the Mavue Administrative Post Headquarters near the Save River on August 14, 2013 used a song to express the importance of drought and famine in

[408] Bernard Lategan, "Remembering with the Future in Mind."
[409] See Bernard Lategan, "Remembering with the Future in Mind."
[410] Zaida Júlio Mbenzane, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.

the wartime experience. Gifted with very good voice, Budula invited me to sing the following song:

Ahi ndla leyi [What a famine]
Ahi ndla leyi [What a hunger]
Kawulisa ndlaloooo, [We learnt from hunger]
Ndlala yita dlaya mani, ndlala? [Hunger, who will you kill?]

I ndlaloooo [This is hunger]
Nita ku hluala ndlala! [I will defeat you hunger]

Ndla yita dlaya mani ndlala? [Hunger, who will you kill?]
Ahi ndlaloooo [What a hunger]
Nita ku hlula ndlala![411] [I will defeat you hunger]

Budula explained that villagers sang this song during the severe droughts that affected the region in the 1980s and 1990s. He explained that the song describes the severity of famine and encourages people to persevere. He went on to explain that many people were dying of hunger but they had to sing to help people to cope. He also said that currently they sing these songs to remember the difficulties that they went through during the war. [412]

Villagers remember war and drought by singing. In time of distress, people resorted to song and dance to lament and mourn their condition. These songs remain engraved in the memory of people who experienced the catastrophic 1980s and 1990s and represent a

[411] Interview with Ernesto Budula, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.
[412] Interview with Ernesto Budula, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.

common heritage of the war time. With the end of war in 1992, people adjusted the war time songs to respond to new challenges. Songs which described RENAMO massacres during the conflict are now reworked to marginalize political opponents in the new era of democratic politics. In this case, the memory of warfare and famine is politicized to prevent people from adhering to RENAMO as a political party. This manipulation of wartime songs demonstrates that the call for national reconciliation in the general peace agreement is far from being achieved.

Some villagers try to forget everything associated with their bad experience during the war. For example, one interviewee whom I met in her house in the former communal settlement of Funhalouro-Sede asked: "Why are you bringing up this conversation? It is scaring me to talk about those guys. *Ummm!? Um!? Um!?* Is frightening! It is frightening! I did not see them but there were many people in my family who died. My hair stands on end when I try to remember them."[413] Similarly, a woman whom I interviewed in her home village in Chigubo district asked: "Why are you asking these questions? Even when I speak I feel a bad sensation in my hair. If the war should restart I do know what to do, perhaps I will hang myself."[414] These statements show that villagers did not heal from the traumas of the civil war. They live in constant struggle to suppress its memory. The fact that my interviews coincided with rumors about the return to war may have affected the way people expressed their memories. While I was conducting interviews the government of Mozambique and RENAMO were fighting over the revision of the electoral law with RENAMO demanding proportional representation in the electoral commission. This led to

[413] Interview with Rute Luís Chimusse, Finhalouro District, September 1, 2013.
[414] Interview with Rabeca Nguiliche Mbenzane, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.

the return of military confrontation in the neighboring provinces of Sofala and Manica as well as in Tete and Nampula Provinces. Later on the confrontations extended to Funhalouro and Mabote districts. This crisis ended with the signing of a peace deal in September 5, 2014 which created conditions for the realization of the fifth democratic elections on October 15, 2015.

Given the post-war political environment, villagers censor their own memories. The questions put forward to me by one old woman who lost her brother during the war show how people censor their memories. After explaining the purpose of my study and receiving her permission to conduct the interview, Rute Luis Chimusse engaged me in the following discussion:

> Our children who did not see the war think that war is a joke. My brother was killed in this war.' - Who killed him? I asked. 'I won't tell you' (long pause). Like now that you are here, if something happens, people may say is that guy with a car. 'I understand,' I said. 'Do you have any question about this conversation?' I asked. - "Yes, I do! Tell me, all this that you asked me will be published in a book?' 'Yes, if you allow me,' I explained. 'That's all I wanted to know.'[415]

It is apparent that her brother was killed by government troops but she has no courage to talk about it. It is also evident that the woman fears possible reprisals for speaking out. This conversation is an example of how people choose to express their memories through silence. Nevertheless, those who remained silent were also expressing their experience because silence is a form of expression which villagers use to differentiate between the sayable and unsayable.

[415] Interview with Rute Luís Chimusse, Funhalouro District, September 1, 2013.

When confronted with the need to tell their story so that younger generation may learn from it to avoid relapsing into war, villagers chose to highlight the brutal nature of war. One woman who experienced the cruelty of warfare said: "*Heyi*! I saw the malice of war. I always tell people to not think about going back to war. Many people were killed during the war including my brother. I also lost my grandfather, the father of my mother. They [RENAMO] beat him and slashed his head with a machete making a cross mark. He died with that cross in his head. My aunt, my fathers' sister, was pregnant when they abducted her and opened her womb with bayonets to remove twin babies [pause and tears]. I don't want to go back to war [weeping]."[416] One woman kidnapped by RENAMO guerrillas recalled her experience: "My young children do not know war. I use to tell them that war is bad. We slept in the forest; we lost our houses, we lived under gun fire and we often ran away leaving our food behind. I also tell them the strategies that we used to escape war. I had two children during the war and the day they kidnapped me, they kicked my daughter with boots. She fell down there and perhaps she fainted. They ordered me to lie down on my belly and flogged me. After that they gave me heavy load to carry."[417] This woman's recollection describes displacement, daily struggle for survival, and the inhumane nature of warfare illustrated by the violence against children and women. She told me that she wants her children to know how bad war is.

Another personal experience of war comes from one woman from Mabote District: "War is bad, I do not want our children to experience what we lived. My sister and her two sons were killed and cut into pieces by RENAMO guerrillas. They raped my sister and

[416] Interview with Zaida Júlio Mbezane, Chigubo District, August 27, 2013.
[417] Interview with Rabeca Nguiliche Mbenzane, Chigubo District, August 28, 2013.

forced her to carry heavy loads to their military base. My nephew was also killed and cut into pieces and thrown inside the well there in Chikayane (silence and tears). I am living with anguish because of these killings. Look at me, I am left alone, I have no family."[418] Another woman recalled: "Matsanga came from north. They said they were *chigaramugwasha*. They killed people, stole cattle and they used bayonets to remove children from their mothers' wombs. We were lucky to survive. *Hey?* I lost many people in my family. Some were shot and other stepped on landmines and died."[419] One traditional healer remembers that war destabilized her family. In her words, "I lost my brother, my sister and my grandfather. My sister was killed together with her baby. My brother was killed with other three family members. We were devastated by this war and it will be difficult to recover."[420] For others, war time was a period of indiscriminate killing and lack of respect for the dead. Their stories reflect actions such as those of General Gomes, RENAMO's southern region commander, who allegedly instructed his forces to kill whomever did not collaborate with RENAMO.[421] It also supports Robert Gersony's classification of southern Mozambique as RENAMO's zone of destruction.[422] Indeed, I witnessed the killings of many friends and relatives by alleged RENAMO guerrillas. As one man from Massangana explains, "many people were killed. Perhaps we are sitting on graves here because the dead were buried where they fell. It was very bad to see corpses abandoned without proper burial according to our culture."[423]

[418] Interview with Cristina Feijão Matavele, Mabote District, August 7, 2013.
[419] Interview with Milissina Jorge Mandlate, Massangena District, August 16, 2013
[420] Interview with Malachane Mboene, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.
[421] Massaeite, *Chicualacuala: A Guerra na Fronteira*, 59.
[422] Robert Gersony, "Summary of Mozambican", 28.
[423] Interview with Jossefa Lucas Muchuane, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.

Alexandre Hauze Chichongue, a resident of Funhalouro District, remembers warfare as period of betrayal, false accusations and distrust among villagers. According to Chichongue, "many innocent people were killed because of false accusations. I remember the case of a woman called Joaquina who had an affair with a Matsanga man. She hired two young men named Laitane and Tendelane to accompany her man to guerrilla raids in other village so that they could carry looted goods for her. When government troops took over this villager from RENAMO, Joaquina told them that the boys collaborated with Matsanga. Those boys were the first people to be killed by government troops here in Tome and many were killed thereafter. Because of war, there was no time to bury the corpses and it smelled so bad here, especially along the road to Mabote."[424] Isaura Eugénio Mbalane was another woman who lost relatives accused of collaborating with RENAMO. Here is her memory of war in her village:

> This settlement of Nhanala was vulnerable to RENAMO attacks. I lost many family members during the time of disturbance. There was a problem that…you see [long pause] as you visited me tonight. If you were Matsanga, you would say 'hi', and ask for water. I would give you water. If you entered my neighbors' house and took his goods he would tell FRELIMO that I am the one who directed them. In that case FRELIMO soldiers would kill me. If Matsanga knew that you told FRELIMO that they visited you, they would kill you as they killed my uncles. Someone informed the soldiers that they saw Mbalane's children with Matsanga. The government troops went to take them and killed them over here and we could not say a word. After killing them, they did not give us their bodies to bury them properly and we had no courage to approach the troops. We suffered a lot in this land.[425]

[424] Interview with Alexandre Hauze Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 22, 2013.
[425] Interview with Isaura Eugénio Mbalane, Chigubo District, August 29, 2013.

This woman expresses deep sorrow for the loss of her relatives accused of collaborating with RENAMO. She also shows that the prevalence of false accusations and indiscriminate killings weakened trust among villagers. Mbalane's inability to save the lives of her uncles and to recover their bodies to provide a decent burial is an example of how war disrupted local cultural practices, including funeral ceremonies.

Villagers remember wartime as a period of distrust and fear. As one woman indicated, during the war it was dangerous to make comments about someone's possessions. She said, "Look, in wartime it was dangerous to say that someone has many cows because if they were stolen you could be held responsible for that. In those days it was frequent to see people accusing others of collaborating with those guys [RENAMO]."[426]

The wartime is also remembered as a period of transgression of local mores. As one interviewee observed, "Those men killed people and threw the corpses into wells. Do you think that is right? They threw corpses in water that they could drink when they pass by. You see, those guys were bad."[427] Villagers use war time memory to warn post-war generations about the danger of returning to war. Salfina Maulane Ndove from Chigubo District has regular conversation with her children about her experience of war. In telling her stories, she emphasized the cruelty of war and survival strategies. In her words, "I always tell my children about the bad side of war. I tell them that judging from what we saw in this area, I did not think that I could return here. I remind them that I used to stuff their mouths with cloth to keep them quiet in the forest."[428] One man who lived during the

[426] Interview with Madalena Finiosse Novela, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[427] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhice, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.
[428] Interview with Salfina Maulane Ndove, Chigubo District, August 30, 2013.

war and witnessed atrocities against civilians doesn't want to hear the young generation talking about the war. As he puts it, "I use to tell our children all the bad things that we went through. I ask them: where is your brother? Where is your father? They were killed in time of war therefore don't talk about war, it is bad thing."[429]

This statement reflects the ambiguity about memories of war. On the one hand, villagers want their children to know that their families were killed by war. On the other, they do not want them to speak about war. Here, the villagers' attitude is in accord with government appeals to forget the past and look forward. Yet it prevents the younger generations from learning from the mistakes committed in the past. In these recollections of warfare, people describe murder and mutilation of corpses and spoiling of wells. Considering that water is precious resource, stories of contaminating the wells with corpses show that war led to grave transgression of local mores.

Others remember the civil war as a period of great societal disturbance. They emphasize that warfare made children think and act as adults. They present children who lived in war time as clever and those born in post war period as irresponsible. When asked whether he had time to share his memory of warfare with children, one man from Mabote District replied: "I am trying but today's children are no longer listening to the elders. I use to tell them how we escaped the war and which wild plants are edible in times of famine. When I wake them up to go to farm they are so slow. I tell them that if it was the time of war they could be left behind. This shows the difference between the war time and post-war children. During the war children were respectful and quick to react. Once you said,

[429] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhice, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.

'wake up'! The child would stand and prepare to flee. That doesn't happen anymore, if war breaks out again, these children will have troubles surviving."[430] The idea of 'today's' children being different compared to the older generation is present in many societies but here it is connected to war time experience to draw the contrast between war time and post-war generations.

The experience of Rosalina Razão Sitóe, who lived in Massangena district during the entire war, reinforces villagers' perceptions of the impact of war on children's' attitudes. As she told me in a conversation held in her homestead, "I always tell my children that if they had lived during the war they would be in danger because they sleep too much. During the war we slept dressed and some of my children were born and raised in the bush. It was difficult for mothers to escape the war with children. Sometimes we ran in different directions and we met later after the skirmishes. I always tell my children that war is bad. They must avoid sleeping deeply. One must be aware of danger even when is asleep."[431]

The preoccupation with sharing wartime experience with children is always contrasted with the apparent idleness of post-war children. As one woman from Funhalouro District who raised children in wartime said, "During the war my children used to whisper to ask permission to cough. Children were conscious of war. They knew the sound of gunfire, they knew what war was. The children raised in war time are different from the ones born today. These younger ones I have to tell them that we used to sleep dressed. I also tell them that one day I slept on the ground in the rainfall and I could feel water running underneath me. I stress that those were difficult times and family members had to split and

[430] Interview with Feniasse Mangumo Chitlango, Mabote District, August 8, 2013.
[431] Interview with Rosalina Razão Sitóe, Massangena District, August 14, 2013.

hide in different places. This was our strategy to avoid having the whole family captured at the same time."[432] These recollections of wartime show that the memory of war period remains unsettled, ambiguous and uncertain. As time passes, it may become possible to reassess this topic in a new political and social context.

While some say that war shaped youth in a positive way, others say that it brought negative effects on youth. Elders say that the military recruitment of children by both RENAMO and government disturbed power relations between elders and youth. As one elderly woman interviewed in Mbokoda Massangena District headquarters complained, the war gave guns to children, allowing them to disrespect the elders. In her own words: "those guys who killed people during the war were mainly children. They were taught to kill old people. This affected the relationship between the youth and elders. Many of the problems that we face today are consequence of the transgression of local customs in war time."[433] The association of war time with the breakdown of social order was also described by Celeste Jossai Mbenzane. She said, "The war did not give us time to educate our children because everyone was busy trying to save his life. This created many problems such as lack of respect for elders and early pregnancies."[434]

Those who were affected by warfare during their school years remember the war as a period of educational opportunity denied. Carlos Arone Nhachale dropped out of school in second grade when RENAMO reached his village in 1980. Nhachale blames war for his illiteracy saying "when those guys arrived here in Tanguane I was attending second grade. My teachers fled the village and the school was closed. I can tell you that all my

[432] Interview with Janet Feijão Matcheque, Funhalouro District, September 3, 2013.
[433] Interview with Marta Nguiliche Zucula, Massangena District, August 16, 2013.
[434] Interview with Celeste Jossai Mbenzane, Massangena District, August 15, 2013.

generation did not study because of war."[435] Sara Julai Mucongue from Mabote District is a mother of four who saw her children denied access to education due to war. She said: "Our children did not attend school because the teachers abandoned the area due to war. Because of that it is very difficult to find literate people in this settlement."[436] Ramos Vicente Manhiça was forced to leave school to join the army. He described his experience in an interview held in his tuck shop in Mabote-Sede. Before the interview he took his time to dress up and arrange the quietest place to talk without interference. He used these words to describe the impact of war in his education: "I started attending school in 1978. In 1981 I was attending grade three but our school was burned down and I stopped going to school. I relocated to Mabote-Sede with my parents where I resumed my studies in 1985. I only stayed at school three years before being enlisted to the military service in 1988. I was discharged on August 7, 1994 but it was too late to return to school."[437]

The life stories presented above are just a sample of villagers' remembrance of war. As a school boy, I also saw my school set on fire in November 1986. We were just few weeks from writing grade four final exams. After losing our classrooms and desks, we were forced to walk 20 kilometers (12.4 miles) to write the finals at another school. After this incident, life was never the same for us. Many of my brightest schoolmates were forced to drop out. I was fortunate to relocate to Matola in Maputo Province where RENAMO attacks occurred only sporadically and only in the evening. This allowed me to continue with my studies during the day but in the evening I had to go to what was known as *placa*. Placa refers to the act of lying down on your belly during exchange of gunfire. During the

[435] Interview with Carlos Arone Nhachale, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.
[436] Interview with Sara Julai Mucongue, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.
[437] Interview with Ramos Vicente Manhice, Mabote District, August 19, 2013.

wartime the term referred to any safe place where people could spend the night and return to their homes during the day. It could be near military facilities, major towns or dense forests. This was a common practice in areas where RENAMO incursions occurred in the evening. Listening to men and women of my generation made me aware of the complex consequences of conflict in peoples' lives. As villagers recalled their experiences, I identified myself with them. Their experiences were similar to my own, but I realized that there were people who suffered more than I had ever imagined.

Villagers' stories show that they believe that warfare continues to affect their communities. This conforms to Diawara's observation that memory expresses both past and present.[438] Villagers feel unprepared to live in a world which requires the formal education which war denied them. Indeed, villagers often complained that they could not recall their date of birth because they had not gone to school. Others lamented that they can't get good jobs for lack of education.

Others remember wartime with mixed feelings. While some regret the killings that characterized the war, those who listened to them during my interviews laughed at descriptions of combats and killings. A good example of these mixed reactions about the memory of war took place in Mabote District, during an interview around a bonfire in the cool evening of August 16, 2013. In the presence of a mixed audience of war generation and younger people who did not experience war, a war veteran spoke amusedly about the brutality that he suffered as well as that which he inflicted on others. To my surprise, his stories of violence were received with loud laughter by the people who listened. The

[438] Mamadou Diawara, Bernard Lategan and Jorn Rusen (eds), *Historical Memory in Africa,* 6.

following passage shows that villagers have mixed feelings about their experience in war time. Some laugh when remembering what they went through, others weep and others prefer to remain silente. Here is one excerpt of a war episode that fascinated the people who participated in the interview:

> I took my bazooka and left the medical kit with another soldier. I told him: If you lose this kit I will kill you [listeners' laughs]. Those days I did not play, I killed [listerns' laughs]. We left and on our way we sighted the marks of where they [RENAMO] had passed. We realized that they were many. I said, "*ahhh* men, we won't make it, better we go back" [listeners' laughs]. I saw marks of where they had urinated, it was still wet. I stopped, I took my bazooka and I ordered my soldiers to check the surroundings. We were surprised by gunfire *tatatatatat* [listeners' laughs]. My men wanted to run and I told them, 'hey, if you run I will finish you all' [listeners' laughs]. I had three rockets. I shot one: *tsikitsiki….boom*, I said that's it [listeners' laughs]! I fired on the other direction. *Goboom*! There was total silence [listeners' laughs]. They started swearing and I said lets chase them. *Humm*, if we had ran away… [listeners' laughs] it would have been better. *Baba*, those who came from behind! [listeners' silence]. My colleagues said they were our comrades. I said no, that uniform is not ours. I shot my last rocket. I remembered that in military training they told us that if you lose a bazooka without suffering injury you have five years in jail. I said, better I die with my bazooka [listeners' laughs]. God does exist, I was surrounded by two, and they said bring the bazooka. I ran in direction to one and I pushed him, he opened the way [listeners' cheers], and I ran away with my bazooka. They said 'catch him, catch him!' When they stopped chasing me I realized that I was bleeding [listeners'' silence] and I was unable to run. I checked myself I realized that I was not shot [laughs]. I continued moving ahead. I found people who had been kidnapped in the previous day. *Heshy*, you know what, we suffered a lot in this country. I found children hiding inside a hole covered with grass. You could step on them without realizing that there were people inside (silence). When they saw me they said 'we escaped in Pungane and I asked, so where are you going? They said we want to go to Mabote.[439]

Flogging was widespread method of punishment used by government troops but, strangely throughout the area of study, villagers recall flogging with laughter. In fact, villagers use flogging to date important events in the community. One resident of Chigubo

[439] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 17, 2013.

associated the RENAMO takeover of Saúte with one commander who was renowned for his brutal floggings. He recalled: "We were dispersed three times in this village. We ran away during the time of *Nyongwa and Chamboca*. Nyongwa literally means gall. In southern Mozambique gall is used to refer to impudent behavior and audacity. *Chamboca* is corrupted form of *chamboco* which literally means musket. These were nicknames of FRELIMO commanders. *Nyongwa* was firing while standing, it was like he had immunity to bullets [laughs]. *Chamboca* was renowned for his floggings [laughs]. He was bad guy, he wanted people to denounce RENAMO guerrilla [laughs][440]. So those grandpas [RENAMO] took over Saúte in the time of Chamboca, now I remember, it was 1990."[441] Here it is evident that flogging was frequent in such a way that civilians nicknamed FRELIMO commander *Chamboca*. When people look back twenty one years after the end of war, they shamefully laugh at their terrible experience. Perhaps villagers use laughter to expresses disbelief about the deterioration of social mores during the war but we are not sure. In Mabote district, people giggled when they remembered the story of Bush, a FRELIMO commander renowned for his brutal floggings. According to one villager who suffered flogging, "Bush floggings started from fifteen to thirty. Other commanders used to give three to five lashes but Bush started from fifteen [cheers]. That man was very bad, he could order you flogged for minor infractions like returning to the camp fifteen minutes late [laughs].[442]

[440] It is not clear why people laugh when they remember or listen to stories about violence but it is not a unique case of Mozambique. Joan Burke describes similar situation about the Second World War veterans. See Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing.*
[441] Interview with Francisco Johane Manhiça, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.
[442] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

While my interviewees were describing their sad experience, people found it funny and laughed. Other men and women have been heard laughing remorsefully as they described committing or suffering acts of violence during the war. One man from Funhalouro, was not constrained when he told his story of continuing to enjoy the food for a man whom he knew was dead. He said: "They took him secretly to the bush where they killed him and I discovered his body on my way to deliver a letter at Ndziveni. I saw a body hanged and when I approached I realized that it was that man. I looked at him very well. I went to deliver the letter and returned to the military camp. When his wife brought food for his then-slayed husband she asked me if I had seen him. I said *haaa*, I did not see him because I used a different road. I ordered her to drop the food and come back the next day to pick up the dishes. My commanders, said, 'Man, eat the food, the man is dead' [laughs]. After hearing this I ate the food and I continued eating everything she brought."[443]

It is important to observe that this happened in a time of hunger. Evidently hunger drove him to keep eating the food brought by a woman whose husband was killed by government troops. Two decades later, he does not show regret for what he did. In fact, he finds it hilarious. This is one of the paradoxes of memory of war in southern Mozambique. People describe cruel acts and persons in quite comical ways. They talk often about bad commanders, particularly those who killed many people[444] but say little about those who engaged in acts of benevolence.

In addition to personal drama, storytellers also describe perceptions of their environments during and after war. Many people interviewed think that warfare disturbed

[443] Interview with Alexandre Hauze Chichongue, Funhalouro District, August 21, 2013.
[444] In the most feared military commanders included Tanguane and Nwachichocane (Funhalouro District), Bush and Sansão (Mabote District), General Gomes and Chamboco (Chigubo District).

local environments contributing to the depletion of natural resources, particularly wildlife. As was described in Chapter Four, the war is often associated to the severe droughts that affected the region in the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, villagers base their chronology of warfare on drought cycles. For some, the war came to them during the time of drought.[445] For others, the last rainfall and good harvest coincided with the beginning of war.[446] Villagers believe that from the time that war intruded the rain stopped. Guns and bloodshed are intimately connected to the wounding of land opening space for drought and famine. Many may find it difficult to explain the connection between warfare, drought and famine but they are convinced that warfare prevented rainfall throughout the region.

Conclusion

Villagers' memories of war shows that a peace settlement recommending forgetfulness and forgiveness fails to create an environment for an enduring peace and reconciliation because the government manipulates the memories of war for electoral gains. Villagers are hesitant to talk about their experiences. Those who talk are selective and strive to be politically correct to conform to the official discourse of national reconciliation. Because Southern Mozambique is regarded as a FRELIMO stronghold, villagers strive to show their loyalty to FRELIMO government by centering their remembrance on RENAMO brutality. Listening to popular songs about the war shows that the government has done little to

[445] Interview with Elina Julius Muchanga, Massangena District, August 16, 2013; Johane Tavane Moiane, Massangena District, August 15, 2013;
[446] Interview with Daniel Nasson Chitlango, Mabote District, August 16, 2013.

reconcile the people of southern Mozambique. In political rallies, people rework songs that dehumanized RENAMO in wartime to remind people that this party was responsible for the violence committed against civilians during the war. By encouraging people to sing these divisive songs, the government encourages a selective and discriminatory reminiscence of warfare experience in Mozambique. This leads to stigmatization of people sympathetic to RENAMO and prevents villagers from sharing their memories and experience of life with RENAMO guerrillas. It does not, however, prevent people from remembering and transmitting their memories to younger generations.

Despite government effort to control the memories of war experience, villagers find ways to tell stories that conflict with the official narrative. Many speak through silence by avoiding making reference to their personal sufferings during the war. Instead, they talk about what happened to others in their family or community. Only in exceptional circumstances, when there is a high level of trust between the interviewee, the interviewer and his local research assistants do people open their 'hearts' to reconstruct the memory of their difficult experience during the war. Others choose to tell only one part of the story and let the researcher draw his own conclusions. Villagers use war memories to date major events in familial and social history, including the birth of children, death, displacement, droughts, famines, and natural resources depletion. In villagers' imaginations, the war has become a point of reference between a past of stability, abundance, and respect of social mores and a present of scarcity and disrespect for social norms and environmental preservation.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation expanded the analysis of the civil war in Mozambique from national, regional and global politics to rural society and its surrounding environments. Warfare in Mozambique provoked profound changes in rural livelihoods and affected the access, use and management of land and other natural resources. The villagers of southern Mozambique shaped the conduct of war. They served as food suppliers, porters, conscripts, informants or collaborators. For these villagers, the war was a daily struggle as friends, relatives and neighbors were dispersed and later reunited after the end of conflict in 1992.

The civil war coincided with prolonged drought. Together they disrupted ecologies and environmental relationships making villagers vulnerable to drought, hunger and diseases in a way they had not been before. War disrupted agricultural production which was and continues to be the villagers' main economic activity. It also disrupted the transportation system, commercial activities, education, health services and other political, economic and social activities. It displaced villagers from lands about which they had micro-geographical knowledge preventing them from using the skills they developed over time to deal with their fragile ecosystems. War induced displacement kept villagers away from the natural resources such as wildlife and water streams which traditionally they had relied on to cope with recurrent droughts.

Villagers developed strategies to cope with the impacts of war and drought. They have relied on the rich wildlife of the region to supplement farming and have also invested in cattle grazing and migrant labor. The outbreak of war hampered these coping activities. The war cut the communication network including roads making it difficult to migrate to

South Africa, Zimbabwe and to major urbans centers. It forced villagers to flee areas with wildlife and decimated their cattle, making them vulnerable to hunger and diseases. Indeed parallel to the war among humans, southern Mozambique experienced a war against wildlife which contributed for the depletion of fauna and disturbance of conservation programs established by both colonial and post-colonial governments. Indeed, the study of warfare must take into consideration the environments in which it takes place because, like humans, natural resources suffer the consequences of war.

The hardship inflicted on Mozambican villagers and their environments by the armies raises doubts about the view that the "the guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea."[447] In the case of Mozambique, the belligerents engaged in practices that dried the sea in which the guerrillas were supposed to swim. Villagers were exposed to brutality, just as they had been throughout the history of warfare in southern Africa.

Despite this adversity, the people of southern Mozambique were resilient. They relied on traditional social institutions such as family, friends, spirit mediums, traditional healers, religious organizations and other social organizations to cope with war in the region. Others, however, took advantage of war to settle old quarrels, creating multiple layers of conflicts.

The civil war ended in October 4, 1992 when the government of Mozambique led by FRELIMO and RENAMO led by Afonso Dhlakama signed a general peace agreement in Rome, Italy. As one of the people who lived in the conflict zone and lost family members

[447] Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1978), 83.

and friends I did not believe that the belligerents would respect the terms of the agreement. Fortunately for the Mozambican people, the country witnessed twenty years of effective peace and economic recovery. It also witnessed five general elections and four municipal elections. Mozambique was internationally recognized as an example of conflict resolution, post-war reconciliation and reconstruction. This success was due to the policy of imposed collective amnesia about the war atrocities. Mozambicans were instructed to forgive and forget, and they were forced to live with those who killed their relatives without creating an opportunity for apology. After nearly two decades of war dominated by the use of derogatory propaganda against RENAMO, villagers had to accept them as a political party with a national agenda of democracy, social justice and development.

The idea that people would simply erase the memories of their traumatic experience produced unintended consequences. People did not seek revenge against those who brutalized them during the war but they did not forget. Moreover, the surprising success of RENAMO in post-war general elections forced the FRELIMO government to engage in a campaign of shaping the memories of war around political priorities. Senior FRELIMO party members reminded people that RENAMO were Matsanga men, a name associated with violence and murder during the war. This tactic re-opened the wounds of war and created an environment of political intolerance against RENAMO and other opposition parties. Southern Mozambique, particularly Gaza Province became a no-go zone for opposition parties while the ruling party scored hundred per cent of votes in the province. This environment of political intolerance together with the lack of transparency in the electoral processes put an end to twenty one years of peace and stability in Mozambique.

When I was conducting research for this dissertation from August to December of 2013, the country had relapsed into a low intensity civil war with epicenter in central Mozambique, the very same region that witnessed the outbreak of war in 1976. By spring of 2014, there were reports of military attacks in Mabote and Funhalouro districts in southern Mozambique. This confirmed my argument that the environment of the interior of southern Mozambique was conducive to guerrilla warfare. Sitting in Iowa City writing my dissertation, I saw TV reports of RENAMO attacks in areas where a few months before I had collected accounts of the civil war that ended in 1992. Fortunately, on September 5, 2014 the FRELIMO government and RENAMO signed an agreement for the cessation of military hostilities paving the way for the fifth democratic elections in October 15, 2014. These developments confirmed my argument that a peace deal based on organized or regimented forgetting and on the transformation of the former belligerents into political opponents without commitment to reconciliation fails to heal the wounds of war.

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Jerónimo Mubai, Zavala District, December 2013.

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Laurina Mbenzane, Chigubo District, August 26, 2013.

Lúcia Sabão Sumbane, Chigubo District, August 30, 2013.

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